FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1945

Last Time . . . . . *Hamilton Fish Armstrong* 349
Science and Foreign Policy . . . . . *George Fielding Eliot* 378
America at War: The Winter Months . . . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 388
The Chicago Air Conference . . . . . *Edward Warner* 406
Reconciliation in India . . . . . *Chakravarti Rajagopalacharia* 422
Sweden: A Case Study in Neutrality . . . . . *Bruce Hopper* 435
The Inter-American System and the United Nations *Walter R. Sharp* 450
China's Need for Transport . . . . . *Chang Kia-ngau* 465
Men and Circumstance . . . . . *Harold Nicolson* 476
Surplus Government Property and Foreign Policy *Arthur Robert Burns* 485
The Campaign in Burma . . . . . *Horace S. Sewell* 496
The Future of the Italian Press . . . . . *Luigi Einaudi* 505
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Robert Gale Woolbert* 510
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 522

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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LAST TIME

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

"Our enemies did not use their victory of 1918."—Dr. Robert Ley, Leader of the Nazi Labor Front, November 27, 1940.

AT LAST it was over over there. After four years of nearly mortal expenditures of blood and substance the Allies had put down their foes. Germany's military calculations had been frustrated by only a hair's breadth, but seemingly decisively. The ring of her subject and satellite nations had disintegrated, the Imperial Navy had mutinied, the Imperial Army had capitulated, the Kaiser had fled. Victory was complete. There remained to solve the problems which the war had created or brought to a head. Nobody could — at any rate nobody did — guess their number and complexity; they ranged over the whole face of the globe and intruded into every human activity and interest. Apart from these specific problems, there also remained to be solved the master problem of how to diminish the human appetites which had aroused the will to war and how to remedy the human weaknesses which had permitted it to find savage gratification. The only adequate answer to this question, obviously, would be the development of a new theory of the relationship of peoples and a new order in the relationship of states, built on the ruins of what had been worst in the old order and using the remnants of what had been best.

In this creative task the American people intended to share. Their ordeal had been short in comparison to that of their allies, but the same prayer was in their hearts: "Never again!" Never again the stupidity of war, never again its agony and waste, never again the separations, the waiting, never again the long rolls of wounded and dead! Joyfully making ready to welcome their boys home, the American people did not lose sight of this purpose; but they were far from clear in their minds as to what was practicable and necessary to give it effect.

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Some began with the premise that the world was one whole. They felt that the United States must join in a systematic attempt to organize and maintain peace throughout the world as the only feasible way of ensuring its own peace. Others, who saw the world as a series of compartments, had a simpler answer. Since the United States seemed situated in a comparatively ample and self-contained compartment they felt that if the Government were wise enough — as it certainly should be after what had just happened — it could avoid being ever again sucked into other people's troubles. The idea that a common interest overrode the interests of single compartments and of individual nations in them, or that the surest way of satisfying a particular interest might be to fulfill the general one, did not occur to them; or, if it occurred, was too startling to be considered seriously.

Presented with these completely antithetic conceptions of national strength and interest and duty, the average American found himself in a quandary. Both the signposts being erected at the national crossroads said "To Peace," but they pointed down opposite roads. Most people naturally inclined to follow the one which promised to call for the least effort; but they did not exclude the possibility that the uphill path might be surest and might therefore have to be taken. The risk obviously was that by simply drifting they might allow their course to be fixed for them without ever having reached any deliberate decision.

As yet, few Americans comprehended the significance of April 6, 1917, the day they had accepted Germany's challenge on the high seas and decided to send an army to fight her on her own ground rather than to wait passively for her to conquer Europe and then turn her complete power to the fulfillment of her transatlantic ambitions. In making that decision the United States had become a World Power in the full sense of the term. The change did not affect just its own future position and behavior. Henceforward, all nations had to reckon with a new situation, not merely in dealing with the United States but in calculating the possibilities and limitations of action among themselves. No longer would it be safe for them to regard the United States as an emigrant uncle who had made a fortune in distant parts and who, like all rich persons, required polite treatment, but who never expected to return to the old country, never needed to be consulted in family councils and never would take part in family feuds. Henceforth the uncle's opinion would have to be solicited in every crisis; and even if he withheld it, that simple fact would,

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in a way, be as influential on their actions as any expression of his direct interest could possibly be. For who now could fight without his help? Even more important, who could hope to resist a powerful antagonist for long without it? This situation would continue, moreover, whether Americans themselves liked and accepted it or feared and resisted it. From now on, whether they recognized it or not, their power of choice was limited to deciding whether to play their rôle in the world well or badly.

In December 1918 President Wilson left for Paris to make a peace which, he hoped, would enable and require the United States to play its rôle as a World Power decisively and well. Already the great debate as to whether or not to accept the rôle as he planned it had begun among the American people and in the American press. No purpose will be served today by exaggerating the importance of what was at stake in this debate. All it consisted of, according to any fair estimate, was a *chance*. There was a chance that the millions who had just died would not become a vain oblation, but that on the contrary the hopes which had carried them to their sacrifice would be fulfilled and perpetuated. There was a chance that the sacrifice of millions of lives more in a second holocaust might be avoided. This was the stake which lay on the table as Wilson settled down at number 22 rue de Monceau to perfect the plan for a League of Nations and the people at home began discussing in earnest the merits and drawbacks of what he intended to accomplish. Only a chance. Can anything more precious be imagined?

Nobody knew as yet whether mankind could mobilize enough intelligence to adopt a plan for peace and enough will power to make it work. The United States would decide. Because it was the strongest, the richest, the least damaged and apparently the most safely situated of the winners, because it was not tainted with any share of responsibility for having created the war, and because it did not seek any material profit from the victory, it enjoyed incomparable power and prestige and seemed to possess unique freedom of choice. Its vote would be decisive for all the anxious peoples of the world.

The plan eventually drawn up at Paris invited nations which said they wanted peace to club together to maintain it. Nobody could guarantee that the proposed association would work or prove that it would not. The only way to find out was for all who did not want it to be a failure to help in the effort to make it a success. The first step was to organize the club and adopt rules

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for the behavior of members. If the rules needed changing in the light of experience, as seemed sure to be the case, they could be changed. But at the start the emphasis would not be on change but on stability and security. The aim was to deter aggression by making the threat of it a matter of common concern and the prevention of it a joint responsibility. The hope was that while the danger of aggression was being held at arm's length the particular dispute from which it had arisen might be solved by negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. In case these procedures should fail, there was an undertaking to discourage aggression by applying economic sanctions and, in a last resort, a provision for defeating an actual aggressor by the joint use of force. Some felt that the procedure was dangerously weak, since the final decision to take action against an aggressor could be reached only by unanimous vote. On the other hand, this appealed to persons who were sticklers for national sovereignty and to liberals who were more concerned that a member should never find itself in a minority and obliged to defend a cause which it might consider unjust than that causes considered just by the majority should be defended.

Would the American people give the scheme a try? Would they gamble on the unknown risks of peace or stick to the familiar risks of war?

It is hard now to recapture the feelings of that distant time when the choice was made. Few of those who in 1919 and 1920 urged that the United States accept its full responsibilities would say today with any assurance that if only they had had their way the final result would necessarily have been different. The ensuing 20 years might have culminated in disaster just the same. But if hopes might have been dupes, fears certainly did not turn out to be liars. Passing again through the valley of death, we look back enviously to the time when once before we had won through the shadows and stood on the heights, bloody but victorious, free to take the road of our choice into the future. These pages recall what happened during the pause at the crossroads. There would be no justification in telling the story again, even briefly, merely for the pleasure of criticizing the individuals whose errors of judgment helped lose us the way. But simple justice to the soldiers of this war, to say nothing of those of the last one, requires that history never fail to record how it was that those errors reduced the victory to an armistice and condemned to futility the hope and plan for escaping a renewal of the conflict.

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Without American help, the nations which wanted peace found it impossible to organize an effective front against those which might sometime again want war. The sense of common destiny formed in the comradeship of a common struggle frittered away. "Friendship," President Wilson warned in December 1918, "must have a machinery." It was not provided. Forces which could easily have been preponderant in the world if they had been correlated remained separate and ineffectual. Potential aggressors were left free to prepare, at first subterraneously and tentatively, then boldly and boastfully, for a renewal of the dreadful test of arms which had come so near settlement, with American help and under the impact of the American President's moral authority, on the railroad siding in the Forest of Compiègne and in the great Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

II

In November 1918 all this lay in the undisclosed future. Very quickly, however, there began to appear symptoms of the changed American mood which was eventually to lead the country around full-circle to the edge of the same awful pit where it had stood in April 1917. The tension of war relaxed, and bit by bit a sense of letdown and even futility replaced the elation of victory. The inclination to let well enough alone became a conviction that well enough ought to be let alone. Apprehension about little things mingled with over-confidence about big ones. Satisfaction with what had been done was allowed to obscure the importance of what was still to do.

The American people did not consciously repudiate the idealism that had sustained their wartime efforts and made their wartime sacrifices seem worth while. If the Gallup Poll had been in existence, it probably would have revealed their continuing faith in the ultimate objectives established by President Wilson at the very start and eloquently restated by him at intervals throughout the conflict. "What we seek," he said compactly in July 1918, "is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." The exhortation to help make the world safe for democracy had become hackneyed. Nevertheless, because the requirement which caused Wilson to formulate it and repeat it time and again was clearly and abidingly true, it still had the capacity to stir people's hearts. Their immediate attention, however, was turning to the specific decisions which had to be made in the home and the office,

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in the shop and on the farm. The President was still looking forward and upward, but the eyes of the crowd were on the difficulties clustering close around their feet.

The country's inclination to lower its sights was natural enough. The danger which had galvanized everyone into united action had, with the coming of victory, changed its face. Instead of being incarnated in a hateful and easily recognized enemy, the Boche, the menace had reverted to that old pulpit abstraction, War. Hearts agreed enthusiastically that War should be wiped out; minds might be brought to agree that certain actions should be taken toward that end; but there was an overwhelming desire to rest a while first. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that for the first time in nearly two years people had leisure for criticizing the past and worrying about the future, and that by a natural enough process of rationalization they found in those criticisms and worries, no matter how relatively minor they really might be, an excuse for not proceeding with enterprises requiring new outlays of imagination and energy.

Everyone was pleased that the United States had been able to make such a decisive contribution to the Allied victory; and almost everyone was grumbling a little about the taxes needed to pay for it. Businessmen recognized that the Government had conducted the greatest financial operations in history honestly and had handled enormous war contracts impartially; but they feared that state intervention in business, accepted as necessary to achieve production goals and prevent profiteering, might be carried over by bureaucratic busybodies into everyday practice. There was widespread relief that democratic principles had survived the emergency; but a considerable lack of confidence in the democratic procedure was revealed in "red scares" and in the impatience of the public when "wobblies" or "parlor pinks" invoked their constitutional rights of speech and assembly. There was thankfulness that the pitfalls of coalition warfare had been avoided. Most Americans, when they realized with what difficulty Allied unity of command had been achieved and what chances for mutual recrimination had lurked in the differences in size, nature and timing of the various national contributions, were willing to grant that President Wilson had handled his military problems pretty well. They also credited him with picking able men to run the military machine, giving Pershing freedom of decision in the field and supporting him in his effort to make American power effective without sacrificing the separate identity

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of American troops. But they did not allow recognition of the President's merits as Commander-in-Chief to interfere with the pleasure of ridiculing him for having once dared use the phrase "too proud to fight;" and the successful organization and operation of the American Army and Navy did not put an end to cheap jokes about Secretary of War Baker's former pacifism and Secretary of the Navy Daniels' teetotalism.

Opinions were divided as to how quickly the American Expeditionary Force could and should be withdrawn from Europe. Families wanted their boys home instantly; and certainly the boys longed for home. The expression of this natural wish and the political emphasis placed on the need for its prompt fulfillment were early revelations that Americans generally considered the American job finished with the silencing of the last German gun in the Argonne. Allied military leaders were apprehensive that until Germany had actually signed a peace treaty she might balk and that further force might have to be employed. Regardless of this, they considered that American troops must stay at key strategic points until she had been thoroughly disarmed. Sporadic fighting still continued, moreover, in widely separated parts of the Continent. Former underdogs were settling scores with former masters and rival successors were taking pot shots at each other. Plebiscites were in view in certain areas, and order had to be maintained there meanwhile. In many cities starvation was causing discontent with whatever local authority happened to be in charge, regardless of its responsibility for the situation or its ability to remedy it. Bolshevik agents were shuttling from and to Russia, encouraging revolution. In the swamps and woodlands of Eastern Europe rival bands of freebooters were harassing each other in the name of national honor or racial integrity, living meantime off the stunned and miserable population.

Europe did not lack indigenous forces of regeneration and order, and the provisional governments which had installed themselves or were being installed under the aegis of the great Allies were gradually making their authority felt. But the process was evidently not going to be completed at once. American officers, diplomats, high commissioners, personal agents of the President and officials of the Relief Administration were all over the place, trying to help quell disorders, reconcile contrary claims and alleviate suffering. Sometimes they worked in harmony with the representatives of the other Allied Powers, sometimes at cross-purposes. But however much our Allies disagreed with our point

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of view on this problem or that, they begged us not to withdraw our political commissions or our relief agencies and not to remove all our troops. In accordance with overwhelming popular demand the bulk of the American Expeditionary Force was nevertheless brought back to the United States as rapidly as available transport would permit.

The war's legacy of rivalry and strife sprang to the eye and was of course described in the American press in all its deplorable detail. The evidences that mankind has unfailing and almost automatic abilities to renew its forces from the most unpromising soil were more obscure; but most of the American newspapermen who were assigned to cover the Peace Conference or sent poking about in the corners of the war-torn continent were able to detect the hopeful symptoms as well as those which seemed to foretell permanent chaos.[1] Some, of course, sent home biassed dispatches — often with the excuse that particular circumstances hampered accurate reporting, as, for example, when a censorship was placed on day-by-day developments at the Peace Conference; or sometimes out of spite or to suit the views of an ignorant newspaper proprietor. But the average correspondent showed sufficient tolerance toward European mistakes and an unexpected understanding of national cross-purposes. Certainly the American public needed every bit of guidance possible. The difficulty of correctly interpreting even scrupulously accurate news from abroad had much increased since the time when every act of everybody everywhere could be judged by the simple standard of whether or not it would help win the war. And plenty of the things which Allied politicians said and did with an eye on their electorates were bound to appear selfish and ungrateful on this side of the Atlantic and were sure to be criticized by American politicians with an eye on *their* electorates.

Many of the American reactions in this first period after the Armistice would have been natural in any people just released from unaccustomed strain. Others were special, due either to some particular American way of seeing and doing things or to the particular conditions in which the American people had entered, fought and won the war. Americans had watched with something like incredulity as Germany relentlessly, step by step,

[1] In the course of ten or fifteen years American foreign correspondents were to become, by and large, the best body of trained observers in the world, superior as a group to those of any other country (not, of course, in individual instances; no American would be rated as superior in courage to an Ebbutt or in perspicacity to a "Pertinax") and usually a jump ahead of the average diplomat in appraising the trend of international events.

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rendered it impossible that they should remain aloof from the struggle in Europe. Once they were in, however, they had taken in their stride all the difficulties and hazards incident to making power effective so far from home. They had transformed their peacetime machinery of production to the tasks of war almost overnight and (with a few notable exceptions) with phenomenal success. They had surprised their allies, their enemies and even themselves by the speed with which they had raised a great army and transported it across the submarine-infested Atlantic. The idea of a draft might have been thought too thoroughly antipathetic to the national spirit to be tolerated; on the contrary, it had been welcomed on grounds of democratic justice as well as military necessity. When the Armistice came, about two million men were overseas, another two million were in training, many other men and women were engaged in various kinds of war service and uncounted millions more were occupied with war work. This had been accomplished in one year and seven months. The achievement on the moral side had been as praiseworthy. The vast dislocation of normal life had been accepted as a matter of course; the deep anxieties felt by everyone with husbands and sons in the service had been concealed; and when the casualty lists began to appear they had been read with fortitude and pride.

With all this the American people had a right to feel satisfied. The fact remains that their ordeal had been merciful measured against the agony of their European allies. The differences in experience left them with strikingly different recollections and judgments.

Destruction had not descended on American roofs and death had not struck into American back yards. The enemy had not landed at Montauk and along the Jersey beaches, had not pounded Washington with Big Berthas, had not seized and shot American hostages and carted off American property. Civilian America had not been forced to discover the aggravations of finding billets for even the troops of an ally and of filling requisitions for corn and potatoes. There had been no blockade to jeopardize the American food supply. Americans had endured war at a distance for one year and seven months; Europeans had known the terror of war in their streets and felt the agony of it in their flesh during four years and three months. In the American Army and Navy, the toll was 126,000 dead and something over 200,000 wounded; more than a million Frenchmen had been

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killed by Germans and another four million wounded, while the British Empire counted close to a million dead and two million more wounded. When the fighting was over, the victorious American troops did not return home to find their industrial towns piles of rubble, their national shrines gutted, and charred rafters and gaunt chimney-stacks reflected in the waters of the Delaware, the Connecticut and the Wabash.

Even the pangs of acute military uncertainty had been brief. In the spring and early summer of 1918 the American people had shared the whole Allied world's anxiety while the outcome of the great new Ludendorff offensives hung in the balance. But it had not been the desperate concern of every individual citizen for his or her own roof and his or her own skin. It had been fully poignant, probably, only to those whose loved ones were about to go into action or might have to be thrown in hurriedly, before they were really ready, in case the battle-worn French and British could not check the German assault. The moment Foch's masterly counterstroke swallowed up the German attack of July 15, American apprehensions had dispersed as suddenly as they had come. Tough fighting remained. But this had been interesting to most Americans mainly because it revealed the mettle of the untried American Army. They never had been in any real doubt about the outcome.

Sensible Americans never adopted the gratifying theory that the A.E.F. "won the war." Ludendorff wrote later on of his astonishment at the speedy arrival of American troops in Europe, and certainly the knowledge that other millions were piling up at their backs was a principal factor in deciding the German High Command to capitulate. But no one phase of the struggle could be viewed apart from every other phase, and the contribution of no one nation could be considered decisive. The brilliant improvisations of the French command at the Marne and the heroic stamina of the *poilu* at Verdun; everything that the words Ypres and Vimy meant in English ears; the Serbian Army's repulse of two Austro-Hungarian invasions and the undismayed retreat of its survivors before a third; the fatalistic bravery of the Russian soldier in the blood, ice and mud of a thousand confused battles from the Baltic to the Carpathians; the Belgian monarch's refusal to capitulate; the operations on the so-called "secondary" fronts from the Dardanelles to Siberia, from the Arctic to the Cameroons, each of them really a war in itself — all the Allied losses in the field, all the sufferings at home, would have gone for

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nothing if the Americans had not come pouring overseas in the nick of time, brimming with confidence and with the resources of a new continent behind them. But the American advance guard would never have had a chance to reach Château-Thierry and the Argonne if day by day, after more than four solid years, the French and British had not been able to stand and willing to die. Every act of every minute of the long agony interlocked. The glory of each was the glory of all.

In the first flush of victory, however, it was not in human nature to review the whole story coolly, and this was true whether the humans happened to be American or European. Each nation had its own historical perspective. The French, British and others were bound to think back with some bitterness over the long months and years when the United States was clinging to its neutrality and German gunfire was bringing daily tragedy to European homes. For Americans, on the other hand, the final chapter alone was really vivid. That an expedition overseas had been necessary, that the utmost effort had been required to raise, arm, transport and supply the forces which made it successful, and that while this stupendous undertaking was going forward the country's fate had depended on the stamina of others — this ought to have been a chastening experience. As things turned out it was not. The expedition had been hardly more than a sortie. The moment the American troops appeared at the front the tide of battle had turned. If a few green divisions could work such a miracle against the veteran German Army three thousand miles from home, of what prodigies were the American people not capable? A wave of exhilaration and self-congratulation swept the country, erasing memories of the short period of apprehension when the Allied lines were bulging under Hindenburg's desperate blows and American hopes were pinned on the interdependence of the Allies and close and continuing team-play among them.

In a word, the precedents set by our action in Europe proved to be very misleading. As a yardstick for measuring the military strength of the United States alongside the normal military strength of other nations the experience of the A.E.F. was not reliable, for it did not reveal that the difference between potential force and force in being is ordinarily that between defeat and victory. More important than any such error in military calculations was the fact that the American people's emotional experience had been too incomplete to affect their character deeply and that their experience with coalition warfare had been too brief to

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fix in their minds the usefulness of having friends and the desirability of adopting a national policy directed toward that end. Instead, they were confirmed in their liking to "go it alone" and convinced of their capacity to do so when they chose if they chose.

III

A sign that the country intended to resume life entirely as usual was the instant revival of the traditional American prerogative of asking questions. Who had really started the war? Had America been inveigled into pulling British and French chestnuts out of the fire? Was Germany as black as she had been painted? Had Wilson been gypped at Paris? Self-appointed mentors were ready with confident answers, varying according to their prejudices, politics and sources of information. Attitudes on the receiving end were various also. Some would not hear any ill of their recent allies, some would not believe any good of them. Familiar American characters — the city slicker who makes a point of knowing all the answers in advance, and the man from Missouri who never believes any answer, particularly a true one — came back into their own. But the fault of most people at first was not that they were prejudiced or suspicious but that they did not care deeply enough to develop prejudices, let alone convictions. Having had the satisfaction of calling into question the sincerity of their allies and the wisdom of their own agents, they couldn't be bothered to go very deeply into the resulting reports, exposés and arguments. They thus could feel that they were admirably open-minded, and congratulate themselves on it; but also they remained at the mercy of interpreters who had special causes to plead, politicians who had special axes to grind, and hot gospellers who pointed up the sawdust trails of salvation and left their converts, after they had passed on, gasping, disillusioned and ready to renege on all their good intentions.

It was a moment, unfortunately, when mockery, always a convenient refuge from thought, was especially tempting and could be turned against our former allies with considerable effect. Their descriptions of how they had behaved in the critical weeks and days before the war had often been unnecessarily smug; and their orator friends in the United States had played up their philanthropic aims and had glossed over others which though equally proper were more materialistic. This now proved embarrassing, for anyone who took the trouble could easily find excuses to cast

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suspicion on their motives and criticize their methods. The colored books on war origins had so carefully exonerated each Ally in turn from even the charge of contributory negligence in face of the impending disaster that those parts of them which were truthful and complete were at as great a discount as those parts which were truthful but incomplete and therefore misleading. The discovery that in 1915 England, France and Russia had tempted Italy to desert the Central Powers by the promise of large amounts of other peoples' property, and that they had not informed our Government fully of this commitment when we joined them in the war, damaged their reputation for frankness. The admission that Belgian babies had probably never been nailed to barn doors threw discredit on the long record of authenticated atrocities of other sorts ordered in cold blood by the German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian Armies in execution of their methodic policy of terror. In this way all the beliefs of wartime were brought under suspicion, and people began looking for the snare in any profession of disinterestedness and for the catch in every idealistic program.

As already suggested, too, active catalytic agents were present to accelerate the process. The American nation is made up of many nationalities, including those against which it had just been fighting. The Armistice was a signal that sympathizers with our beaten enemies and professional haters of our recent allies could again air their views. The former set to work to whitewash Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter to blacken England and France. Each played the other's game to some extent, and the combined impact was considerable. Citizens of German descent (many of whom, it is fair to note, had writhed under unjust accusations of hyphenated Americanism) were naturally gratified to hear that the old country had not behaved so badly after all. Irish sympathizers were delighted to think the worst possible of Britain, and incorporated into their folklore the tale that she had provoked the war and then persuaded us to win it while she loafed on the sidelines. The myth about the decadence of the French bobbed up again, unimpaired by their exploits under Joffre and Foch. In the Middle West, traditionally suspicious of the older and more cosmopolitan Eastern seaboard, demagogues cultivated the idea that Wall Street bankers had pushed the country into the war in order to make money out of it. Most influential of all, perhaps, a new school of writers and professors discovered that cynicism could be made to pay good dividends

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in a period of reaction from long endeavor and sacrifice. They invented all sorts of half-truths about what had happened along "the road to war" and put the blame for our having been finally caught in hostilities on any shoulders except those of our enemies. One of their favorite theses was that the policy of a nation is by definition "unmoral." The conclusion which they drew from this — very satisfactory to those we had just been fighting — was that attempts to pass judgment on a nation's acts are necessarily "unscientific" and "hypocritical."

The scholars meanwhile were beginning to scrutinize the diplomatic documents of July and August 1914 word by word and to compare what had been done in the various capitals minute by minute. All sorts of interesting hypotheses could be worked out about some leader's good or bad faith from the fact that a certain dispatch probably reached him seven and a half minutes earlier or later than had hitherto been supposed. Research of this sort, while the materials were recent and many witnesses were still alive, ensured that there would be fuller detail and truer perspective in the portraits, individual and national, which historians would paint and repaint for years to come. But the more closely one examined the actual "revelations" the more one found that they had little if any bearing on the fundamental issues of the war and that they altered in only insignificant detail the plain facts on which the American people had based their early judgments as to what it was about and as to who were mainly to blame for its occurrence.

The publication of new hypotheses of war guilt nevertheless had a public effect out of all proportion to the importance of any of the actual discoveries. Few people had time to look into them closely, and the general assumption was that fundamental earlier judgments were being not merely refined but actually reversed. The tidal wave of books and articles launched by the historical "debunkers" did not strike with full force until the later twenties, but the technique came into use almost at once, and to the extent that it gave an appearance of scholarship to various arguments advanced by groups hostile to our recent allies it played its part in shaping our national attitude toward the new political struggles developing in Europe.

A reaction in favor of our recent foes was destined to take place in any event, if only on the grounds of good sportsmanship and amiability. Americans make such a god of sport that they instinctively feel magnanimous toward any beaten adversary; and

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they had been confused as to the nature of this particular adversary by many factors, among them the tendency of a section of the press to report the war play-by-play as though it were a world's series. The disposition to take the side of the underdog did credit to American sentiment. Some Europeans noted, however, that softheartedness may lead you into letting a thug go free before you have made sure that he won't be able to buy a new pistol down the street; and when they spoke thus the general feeling in America was that they were not behaving like good sports.

The Peace Conference was evidently bound to strain American relations with the other Allies. The best of friends are liable to disagree when the time comes to dissolve a partnership and divide up the assets. Nor were the difficulties of the tired statesmen who met at Paris lessened by the fact that they were liquidating a war in which chance rather than choice had made them partners. In the circumstances they perhaps did not do so badly. All the European representatives were accountable to electorates which had been under long and terrific strain and had been stiffened to stand it by the promise of impossible rewards. The English temper was such that Lloyd George found it necessary, or at any rate profitable, to promise that Britain was going to be made a place fit for heroes to live in at German expense. The right criticism of the slogan "Make Germany Pay" was not, of course, that it was immoral or unsportsmanlike but that there simply did not exist in Germany alone sufficient wealth and manpower to make good the net deficit accrued to all the rest of the world in four years of destruction. If the delegates had told this plainly to the folks back home most of them would not have lasted a day in office.

Besides dealing with the enemy states, the Peace Conference had to solve territorial disputes between the Allies themselves, alleviate epidemics and famines in several areas, handle coups d'état and social revolutions, and still retain enough energy to shape long-range plans for restoring the world as a whole to something like order and prosperity. Nothing in the ordinary American citizen's experience helped him to understand problems of such range and complexity or to judge between the specific claims and counter-claims of the various contestants. He was without the exact knowledge to decide whether certain dots on the map should be marked Zips or Spiš, Fiume or Rijeka, Bromberg or Bydgoszcd, and he saw no reason why he should exert himself to acquire it.

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Anyway, issues of that sort seemed picayune in light of the objectives for which the war supposedly had been fought. It was not realized in the United States that the manner in which details were disposed of would be a test of the settlement as a whole and that the perseverance of the American experts who were working to find the fairest possible solution of even the smallest controversy would constitute, in the final reckoning, the best justification of the President's wartime pledges. It was easy enough, unfortunately, to find fault with particular boundaries traced at Paris. Still more unfortunately, any boundary traced in various areas of inextricable ethnic confusion was bound to be open to some criticism. Usually the most vehement critics of certain territorial solutions said nothing about the tremendous improvement which the new ethnic pattern of Europe as a whole represented over the old one; for although 25 or 30 million people were still left outside their national boundaries in "the horrible Europe of Versailles" this figure represented only a quarter or a third of the roughly 100 millions who had lived under alien masters in the old Europe. Later on it became plain that the Peace Conference had paid too little attention to the need for measures of international economic coöperation. But that was hindsight. For most people, the lessons of the evils of economic nationalism were not to become plain until a decade later (if then). Who could have persuaded the American people in 1919 that it was to their advantage to exploit their favorable economic position with restraint? At the time, a more favorite topic of complaint was the financial section of the Treaty. Its faults were glaring; the circumstance that the American delegation had been chiefly responsible for keeping them from being much greater was ignored. American criticism of the size of the German reparations bill was to continue long after the schedule of payments had been revised downwards and, eventually, abolished. Indeed, it did not cease even when Germany was found to have actually received more in postwar loans from American and British bankers than she had ever paid out to all her victims put together.

When the Paris controversies hung fire it was supposed by many Americans that their representatives must be hesitating between clear right and clear wrong. Most of them did not realize how often the perfectly tenable rights of one European nation were in conflict with the perfectly tenable rights of another, sometimes in the same ethnic, historical, strategic or economic category, sometimes in different but apparently equally important

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categories. Hence they did not understand that since both contestants for a province or port or mountain barrier or market town could not receive absolute justice, the only way of effecting a settlement between them was gradually to uncover and invoke overriding common interests and to try to find some general guarantee to replace the unilateral guarantee of proprietorship. They did not take into account that this procedure might require weeks and months of careful exploration and patient argument. When there was a delay in the settlement, therefore, they inclined to lay it not to the intrinsic difficulties of the task but to the rapaciousness of European statesmen; and if they were assured (as of course they were) that these had been abetted in their manœuvres by the ignorant idealism or cowardly weakness or obstinate megalomania of Wilson and his delegation they were in the frame of mind to believe it. Americans had been carefully told, too, that though it was necessary to kill Germans they must avoid hating them or believing too much ill of them. It was a natural conclusion from this to suppose that Europeans like Clemenceau and Poincaré, who did hate them and continued to fear them even in defeat, must be narrow and vengeful. The natural quarrelsomeness which Americans came to attribute to Europeans became the origin of the theory, widespread in later years, that American statesmen had been caught like babes in the wood of tangled European greeds and hates.

We must record, then, as important consequences of Wilson's experience in Europe, that Americans in general became highly susceptible to arguments throwing suspicion on their recent allies and depreciating the capabilities of their own leaders, and that they developed an intense distaste for the whole business of peacemaking and a feeling of mistrust in advance for whatever treaty would emerge from it, regardless of the merits or demerits of its specific provisions.

In broader fields of international policy the pioneer work of the American delegation was noted mainly to be ridiculed or belittled. The Americans aimed, besides working out compromises of specific conflicts, to go further and devise palliatives for certain types of recurring international friction which never before had been treated internationally. The attempt to create a sense of joint responsibility in fields hitherto regarded as the sole prerogative of separate sovereign states was ridiculed by the same smart-Alecs who denied that a nation's acts could be judged by standards of common morality; and of course it was called subversive

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of traditional American rights and privileges by all the elements which were seeking to make trouble between us and our recent allies or between the President and the people. No good was found in the mandates system, an experimental attempt to prevent the exploitation of backward peoples; or in the minorities treaties, an effort to give racial and religious groups in eastern Europe some measure of international protection; or in the proposed International Labor Organization to discuss social problems and perhaps bring them nearer adjustment by mutual agreement. Even some of the liberals who might have been expected to praise these novelties were such perfectionists that they rejected the whole jar of ointment because of the fly in it. Often the specific criticisms were perfectly sound. Indeed, we can see in retrospect that sometimes the whole approach to a particular set of problems was wrong. The unfairness of the attacks was not that they were severe but that they were undiscriminating, usually taking no account of the reasons why perfection had not been achieved and giving no credit for the accomplishments which counterbalanced the failures.

The specific criticisms of Wilson's actions at Paris were discouraging enough. Worse, there could soon be noticed an underlying strain of undiscriminating ridicule for the ideal of international coöperation as such. Like everyone else, Americans naturally felt that their home ways were best; and they now were being glibly assured that they were safest. On the heels of the query whether a greater degree of order and justice could ever be established in the world, even with the best of good will and by the most intelligent effort, there crept in pessimistic doubts whether anything in that direction ought even to be attempted. How far the country had slipped away from its wartime ideals showed itself in the terminology of the twenties. "Impracticable" became the habitual adjective to use with "idealism;" "useless" always accompanied "sacrifice;" and "foreign" was followed automatically by "entanglement."

When the text of the Treaty of Versailles was finally published in May 1919 some American critics attacked it as showing that Wilson had made cowardly compromises under the pressure of his foreign colleagues, while others said it proved how completely he had sacrificed the quick achievement of common-sense solutions to the tedious pursuit of ideological will-o'-the-wisps. But the general reaction was boredom. The Treaty had been discussed too long. The desire to be relieved from listening to

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more discussions of what to do with places with outlandish names and of how to divide up hypothetical sums of money became overwhelming. The war was over, wasn't it? The peoples of Europe were free again, weren't they? Then why in the name of common sense didn't they settle down together to enjoy the peace the United States had helped them win?

With victory secure there certainly seemed less to choose between them all, conquerors and conquered, than in the early days when German U-boats were sinking our neutral ships on the Atlantic or later when, with the French and British holding Arras and the Chemin-des-Dames, our transports were ferrying raw American troops across to Brest. From the day of the Armistice, the friends of Germany and the foes of Britain and France had been busy emphasizing that Europeans were all much of a muchness. Their efforts would have been unimportant if the tide of popular opinion had not been setting in that direction anyway. They made it flow more strongly, carrying the American people further and further away from their wartime convictions, hopes and determinations.

IV

The personal discoveries made overseas by American doughboys worked in the same direction. For the first time in their lives, hundreds of thousands of young Americans had been living among peoples who ate unfamiliar foods, were largely innocent of the use of W.C.'s, travelled in what looked like toy trains and traded in incomprehensible currencies. Some of them spoke the same language as the Yanks; but they called it the King's English, in itself an objectionable term, and the uniformity of the common tongue as a whole made the individual differences, particularly in colloquial expression, stand out all the more prominently as objects of ridicule on both sides. French was, of course, a complete barrier to understanding, for no typically American school or college ever succeeds in leaving a syllable of the language on the tongue of the typical American student after even several years of instruction. On the other hand, French francs and centimes caused less confusion and animosity than British pounds, shillings and pence. Home at last, how sweet it was to taste Ma's pies again, to ride about in the new Model-T Fords, to order a banana split at the corner drugstore, and to pay for things in good old dollars and cents! Every familiar object and custom seemed to reflect particular credit on God's

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own country and awakened the resolution to keep it free from the contamination of alien ways.

Attitudes toward the peoples of Europe varied, of course, with different first-hand experiences. Often the appraisals of friend and foe brought back from overseas were quite a change from those carried abroad at the start. The American soldier was so much better paid than any other that in foreign eyes he was a millionaire and a fair object of exploitation everywhere. In the final reckoning, the Germans often came out better than the British or French. For one thing, they had been beaten and the Americans felt a glow of satisfaction in forgiving them. Those assigned to occupation duty in the Rhineland admired the cleanliness and order of the villages, an attractive contrast to some they had seen in France. Pleased to find that the American soldiers were ready to let bygones be bygones, the people of the occupied zone were punctiliously polite to them from the start. This was a refreshing change for the Americans after the strain of fighting alongside French and British troops who sometimes hardly concealed that they looked on them as greenhorns, and upon whom, in revenge, the Americans put the blame for every defect in their joint military operations. Occasional comments by the French on what seemed to them the indecently friendly relations so soon established between the Yanks and the Heinies did not smooth ruffled American feelings either.

Such were a few of the reasons why returning members of the A.E.F. had revised many of their opinions about Europe long before their transports got in sight of the New York skyline. After they were home the revulsion was carried still further. Accounts of Allied bickerings filled the newspapers. The prizes being grabbed at by the British, French, Italian, Japanese and other statesmen at Paris certainly bore little resemblance to the moral abstractions which American soldiers thought they had crossed the ocean to defend. Since the United States was not seeking any tangible gain out of the war they tended to assume that their mission abroad had been purely chivalrous. The advantage of having been able to defeat German militarism in Europe instead of on American soil ought to have occurred to everyone who had seen the devastation of northern France and Belgium; but strangely enough it did not. The idea that they were the liberators of Europe was too strong to be modified by the conception that they also were defenders of American liberties. The returning soldier seldom was sobered by any thought

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that the world which must be made safe for all the good things he prized so highly included the United States itself. To his first glance, it never had seemed lovelier or in more full possession of the fruits of freedom and democracy. And particularly to him, of course, it had never seemed more invulnerable.

The second impressions of home, however, were not always so agreeable. When the parades were over the ex-serviceman was saddened to find how quickly the tales of his exploits became boring to friends who had stayed behind. Even more aggravating was to find that the friends had taken the pick of the peacetime jobs. Many men had developed new skills while in the service, but often these could not be turned to account in civil life. Few of the temporary officers could find permanent places in the Army and Navy, and then only at grades and pay far below emergency levels. Many had been ruined by rank for the give-and-take of ordinary pursuits. We all remember the ex-officers who expected to "tell the whole cockeyed world" just what to do in the same way they had been telling platoons or companies. And there were those who dreamt of political careers built on their military records — and the smaller the record, often, the bigger the dream.

Needless to say, thousands and thousands of ex-servicemen held in some form or degree to their wartime faith, refusing to let disappointment or rebuffs or the press of everyday affairs crowd out entirely the hopes and ideals which had moved them in the days of their great adventure. They were to be found in newspaper offices and publishing concerns, college faculties and the clergy; they were scattered here and there through all the liberal arts and professions, and were represented in the newer types of labor leadership and in more enlightened business circles. Cranks and exaltés aside, there were enough of them to keep alive through the dissolute twenties something of the crusader's gleam and to see to it that international objectives gradually became included, alongside traditional incentives to social and political reform, in the main stream of those liberal forces which from time to time exercise such a strong effect on our national development. There even were enough stubborn idealists to form a chain of highly unorthodox posts in the American Legion. The pity was that (contrary to popular belief) only a minority of veterans ever joined the Legion, a fact that sometimes left too much influence in the organization to groups wanting to make a profession out of their war service.

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The typical ex-serviceman, probably, was the man who concluded that he had done his share toward setting the world to rights, placed his war experiences resolutely behind him and started in to make up for time lost in business and pleasure. Others, again, were simply out of sorts. The girls they had left behind had forgotten them; or they were disgusted to find that prohibition had been "put over" while they were away; or they were restless "in the sticks" after glimpsing the wide, wide world. Some soured more definitely. Kaiser Bill having been beaten, they forgot what the world would have been like if he hadn't. "We were played for suckers," they commented bitterly, and began abusing the idealists who had dared suppose that the long, long trail a-windin' could possibly lead to any land of dreams. "Hokum!" they said, or worse. The extreme reactions, however, were minor variations on the main theme. The overwhelming majority of the veterans had one ambition — to forget the war and to resume their ordinary lives as quickly as possible.

Generally speaking, their families were of the same mind. Women know best the heartbreak of waiting, and when their men return from the wars theirs is the greatest relief. The worst terrors of some had been justified: their sons or husbands had been left lying far from the hillside burying grounds of home or had come back to them physical or mental wrecks. Many of these women understood precisely the sacrifice which had been made and the engagement it signified, but others could think of the war only with bitterness and found all the talk about organizing a new world society on the ruins of their own lives an unacceptable recompense for such direct and simple tragedy. Most of the fortunate majority whose men returned alive and uninjured were grateful and proud. But often they imagined either that problems of national policy lay too far outside the range of their own experience to be comprehended or else decided that the plans for a brave new world were too theoretical to be directly important in their private lives and too grandiose to depend for fulfillment on their modest support. They joined their husbands in asking nothing better than to face together the familiar tasks and problems of the old world.

These generalizations would be wrong if they left the impression that the A.E.F. as a whole had been short of idealism. When the actual fighting was over, the doughboys wanted to go home, and once they got there they became absorbed in their millions of different personal problems of readjustment. But so long as

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there was a job to be done they did it with the traditional American dash. They paid respectful attention to such attempts as were made to tell them how it had come about that, contrary to any desires of their own and despite the efforts of their government, they had found themselves fighting in Europe. On their behalf be it noted that these attempts at indoctrination were belated, meagre and unrealistic. Furthermore, if the education which they had received before they entered the army had left them almost totally unacquainted with the realities of the world in which they were to live, that had not been their fault so much as a result of the general lag in the American people's coming of age.

On Thanksgiving Day 1918, a few weeks after the victory, an American officer wrote a letter home from France. "It is wonderful," he said, "what our country has accomplished — and it must be especially pleasing to those who, like myself, have felt the sting of the national shortcomings. Instead of a great overgrown nation of self-centered, money-mad, egotistical people, torn by the nation's sectionalism, living an existence of sheer bluff, our country is now strong in its newly acquired ability to do more than bluff. . . . We have . . . gained respect and confidence where before we had tolerance. That is the big thing to be thankful for." And he added: "These men over here were big."

When Hanson Baldwin printed this letter in his column in the *New York Times* on Thanksgiving Day 1942, he gave no indication of the developments which might have occurred in the officer's mind in the intervening 24 years. Did some of the policies advocated in that time by certain veterans' groups make him feel that the unselfish idealism for which he had given thanks in 1918 had been deliberately betrayed? If so, he was wrong. By and large, the fault of the men who had been with him over there was no different in that period of fluctuating national standards and values from that of their compatriots who had stayed behind, whether in training camps or civilian life. So long as they lived, none of them would ever forget the great experience of which they had been a part; but they had not ever understood clearly why the ordeal had been necessary, and they mixed up the victory which the country held momentarily in its hands with the peace of which they had dreamed. They took for granted that from the single fact of victory would flow automatically all the good things they craved and had fought for, including and above all peace in their time and for their children.

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V

Plainly there was no need in 1919 for American preachers to remind their congregations of the Biblical injunction to forgive one's enemies. Civilians and ex-servicemen alike had found reasons of their own to begin practising that Christian virtue. And many not only forgave them, but also forgot the basic reason why they had fought them. Because it takes two to wage a war the American people had supposed that it takes two to start one. The events of 1917 had given a demonstration to the contrary, but this had upsetting implications and Americans endeavored to think about them as little as possible.

President Wilson had gone to extremes in the effort to keep the country out of war. He had sent Germany many notes, first persuasive, then stern, to try to dissuade her from attacking American ships on the high seas. He had relied on diplomacy to counteract German activities against the United States in certain Latin American countries, especially Mexico. He had taken direct action to halt von Papen's spying and Boy-Ed's sabotage, but had limited it to the specific cases and had not let it interfere with the continuance of relations with their chief, Ambassador von Bernstorff, or the government which gave them their instructions. He had been so patient with Germany that Theodore Roosevelt had taunted him with cowardice. Besides working to keep the country neutral in action, Wilson had expressed the desire that it remain neutral even in thought. The hope, of course, had been unrealistic from the start, and properly. It was not in the nature of Americans to suspend intellectual judgment when international treaties were broken or to censor their emotions of disgust when inhuman outrages were committed against peaceable populations. Any idea that they might do so went glimmering as German officers and officials in the occupied countries proceeded to shoot hostages, deport people en masse, institute forced labor and authorize plunder and rape as instruments of *Schrecklichkeit.*

Just as Germany defeated Wilson's attempt to keep the country neutral in thought, so, eventually, did she defeat his program for maintaining neutrality in deed. To cut off Britain and France from supplies in the western hemisphere she deliberately decided to risk making an enemy of the United States. Her decision to resume indiscriminate U-boat sinkings, without bothering to identify the nationality of the vessel or warn the crew, on the

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calculation that this would bring her more advantage than any possible American retaliation could do her harm, extinguished the President's hope for continuing passably good relations between the two countries and turned his patience to flaming anger.

The lesson was obvious. A foreign nation, even one whose economy and manpower reserves are intrinsically weaker than yours, may decide to gamble on your peaceful disposition and unpreparedness and may adopt policies which little by little leave you with only a single choice — to fight regardless of your initial disadvantage or to submit to the equivalent of defeat without a fight. If the gambler nation pursues its policy with enough skill and caution it may even persuade you not to remedy your weakness, stressing that any steps you might take would risk provoking the very conflict you wish to avoid.

But for many Americans a single demonstration was not enough. They seized on the suggestion that Wilson's failure might have resulted from his ineptness or from the machinations of secret financial interests which wanted war, or, on the other hand, might have been due to altogether exceptional stupidity on Germany's part. If the latter, Germany had certainly been permanently cured of her obtuseness, they thought, and so spectacularly that all other nations would take care in future to be wiser. They were simply not prepared to admit that, however much they hated war, however wasteful and wicked they thought it, and however innocent their intentions and unoffending their actions, if some other nation should choose to impose its will on them at the risk of war, fight that nation they must, whether or not they were ready and whether or not they wished; and that the only alternative would be to bow to its conditions, the conditions of a victor.

The tendency to fix on secondary factors as the real cause of what finally came about on April 6, 1917, resulted in many cases from nothing more than the American people's desire to protect their self-respect. To admit that Germany had chosen to antagonize them after a careful weighing of risks meant acknowledging that she had considered them too gullible or too divided to be able to take political decisions and that she had rated their armed forces as presenting a merely incidental hazard, to be disposed of at leisure after she had brought her more important enemies to their knees. It also meant acknowledging that Wilson's policy of neutrality had all along been doomed to failure except at the price of capitualting to every German requirement and accepting any

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German indignity. This admission would have led, in turn, to the humiliating conclusion that the security of the western hemisphere had rested, partly at any rate, on two factors over which the United States could not exercise direct control — the strength of the British fleet and a division of power on the Continent of Europe.

The easiest way of avoiding a conclusion which would have called for a radical and distasteful change in American foreign policy was to alter the premise and to suppose, not that the country had been forced into the war against its will and despite the strenuous efforts of its government, but that it either had entered it spontaneously, with a crusader's fine disregard of costs and consequences, or had been edged into it by the President's blunders. Both these were appealing and both were seized on, sometimes even simultaneously. A difficulty with the second, it might be supposed, would have been that it could be maintained only by deliberately ignoring the real nature and logical conclusions of the German program. Many Americans were persuaded, however, that Germany's success in subjugating all the great military and naval Powers of Europe would not have put the United States on the spot militarily. Those who could perform this mental feat could equally well shut their eyes to the damage which would have been done to America's spiritual and cultural inheritance if Wilson's hatred of war had led him to stand aside indefinitely while Prussian militarism stamped on the peoples of Europe and dragged their civilizations up by the roots.

It was human enough to wish to avoid admitting that the United States had found itself in a position of extreme danger at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, and to assume that the German menace, now safely defeated, had originated from a unique concatenation of circumstances rather than the familiar interplay of dissatisfaction and rapacity on the one hand and self-satisfaction and naïveté on the other. The wish, excusable or not, resulted in the unfortunate decision that nothing specific had to be done to make certain that a similar peril (or even the same one) would not present itself in the future.

The allegation is not being made that Americans are the only naïve people in the world. Every nation which is pleased with itself and satisfied with its lot is under a serious psychological handicap in attempting to understand and deal with nations which are not. A nation which is pleased and satisfied can afford to be, and often is, reasonable. The trouble is that it places reason

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so high in its own scale of values that it tends to forget how attractive unreason may become to those who feel that their talents and virtues and corresponding deserts are forever being ignored by the rest of the world. The satisfied nation pictures itself as being consistently guided by enlightened self-interest and supposes that all other great nations in the modern world must be guided in a similar manner and that the word self-interest has the same meaning to them as it has for it. It remains optimistic about this even when other nations give every indication of having reached such a peak of aggravation and frustration that they might easily risk all the profits accumulated from years of hard work on a single gambler's throw of the dice.

The usual psychological handicaps lay especially heavily on the United States. For over a hundred years the country had not been menaced from abroad. Because many bloods mingled in the veins of its inhabitants their pride was not in one race but in a fusion of races. They knew nothing of the sense of injury that festers in a crowded continent where all the people of each race are not collected inside their own frontiers and so can never marshal their total racial strength in the struggle for survival or get full credit for their racial virtues in the arena of competing cultures. Americans assumed that their own quarters would always remain ample and that their own economy would continue to expand, fed from its own apparently limitless resources. They were grateful for the protective expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific, and hardly noticed how rapidly old geographical barriers were being surmounted. All this made it hard for them to imagine that some day again a powerful nation might abandon its effort to satisfy its needs, psychological as well as material, through negotiation, coöperation, hard work and humdrum competition and turn instead to the hazardous way of unreason, the way of war. They did not want to plan what they would do if that happened, or to think about what might be done to them if they did not plan in time.

Of course, more conscious and purposeful forces were also at work in the country, fostering the easy rationalizations of the day. Realizing that the national mood was bound to change quickly once the fighting was over, practical politicians had laid their plans not simply to ride the new tides but, whenever a chance offered, to augment and exploit them. By far the most practical of the practical politicians, as things turned out, were the clique of Republican Senators who dominated the majority

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party in the Senate and held the key positions there. Their control of the parliamentary procedure enabled them to arrange for the Covenant to be twice defeated with reservations attached, although the two-thirds of the membership necessary for ratification undoubtedly favored it with reservations of some sort; and they achieved the downfall of Wilson and his program without dangerously antagonizing the country, which at the start was generally agreed to be overwhelmingly favorable to the League. By the end of the long Senate debate, which lasted from July 10, 1919, when Wilson submitted the Treaty of Versailles for ratification, until March 19, 1920, the date of the final vote on the Covenant with the so-called Lodge reservations attached, the country was so confused and bored that it no longer remembered whether it had favored the League originally or not. As a matter of fact, that vote settled the issue, despite the President's statement that the coming election would constitute a great and solemn referendum; for candidate Harding's straddle on the League question was so successful that there was no chance for the voters to register any opinion in that connection. The fact failed to annoy them, or even, in most cases, to attract their attention.[2]

The retreat from reality which has been described in these pages was accentuated by the profound and instinctive hatred of all Americans for war *per se*. On every count that hatred was reasonable and right. Besides the traditional humanitarian reasons for hating war, too, thousands of men and women had personal cause to know that it was just as ghastly as sermons and textbooks had always described it, while millions of others had found it the apotheosis of tedium and waste. Without reason or right, however, were the new slogans coined to increase, if that were possible, the unpopularity of war — "in war nobody wins" and "war never settles anything." Their sponsors never paused to notice, of course, that the United States had won its independence in one war and settled the fact that it would remain a national union in another. Their obsession with the moral wrongness of war had simply brought their intellectual processes to a standstill and made them unable to distinguish between the different possible functions of force in human affairs. They could not conceive that the proper organization of force for purposes

[2] The story of the long struggle in the Senate has often been told and will not be repeated here. Personal and party responsibilities were deeply involved, and no appraisal of them would be fair unless it went into great detail.

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of peace might turn the balance against the abuse of force for purposes of war.

The confusion between pacifism and peace added to the ease with which Americans rationalized the course they yearned instinctively to follow. Gradually, in popular imagination, the United States became a sort of cork floating in an enormous thermos bottle, insulated from fluctuating temperatures and pressures without and exercising as little influence on them as they in turn could have on it. The idea that the bottle itself could be smashed seemed preposterous.

The generation which had fought and won the war, after comprehending so much in detail, committed the sin of comprehending nothing in the large; and, after performing so many brave and unselfish deeds, committed the sin of failing to insist that they be carried to their logical end. Its sins have been visited upon its children. Will the children now go and sin likewise? Will they condemn their children, in turn, to the same sufferings which they and their fathers had to endure? That will be mainly for them to say. We from the last generation can tell them, however, how it was done last time, and we can pray that this time they will not miss the chance to use their victory.

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SCIENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

By George Fielding Eliot

THE latest types of weapons — the robot bomb, the rocket, the jet-propelled airplane — are, fortunately, coming into extensive use only as this war draws to a close. If the collective intelligence of mankind is unequal to the task of preventing another war, these weapons and others even more terrible will be used in perfected form at the outset, perhaps with instantly decisive effect. In earlier times those who were the strongest in mere muscular strength were the ones who profited from the anarchic lack of collective security. The stupendous scientific developments of the last hundred years have now been brought to the point where it is entirely conceivable that an anemic professor in an underground chamber may reach over and touch a button and kill a thousand men a thousand miles away.

In considering how to guard against a catastrophe which threatens the total destruction of the civilization built up painfully by mankind through the centuries, we must ask whether we have not reached the point where the discoveries of science must become the common property of all, for the use of all. Can we permit any more secrets if machines secretly produced threaten to destroy us all? Can there any longer be private research, in the old sense of the word, for military purposes or for the commercial processes which can serve those purposes?

Modern war is total war. It demands the participation of every citizen. It absorbs all, or nearly all, the resources of the state. It strikes directly at the person and property of every individual. Because it does this, and because modern weapons have attained such range, speed and destructive power, the civilized nations are joining in a world-wide organization to prevent the recurrence of total war. In this task, the people of the United States are taking a leading part and are likely to continue to do so.

This fact will profoundly affect future American foreign policy and future American military policy. The two policies must be coördinated. Power and objectives must be brought into balance. The degree of preparedness which it is necessary for us to maintain in order to meet emergencies and accomplish our national purposes should be determined: 1, by the nature of the dangers against which we must guard; 2, by the ability of the international organization to deal with those dangers at their source.

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To maintain a just balance between these two considerations will not be easy. There will be those who lack faith in the international organization and urge that we keep ourselves in a higher state of military readiness than necessity demands; and there will be those who insist that to maintain military power as insurance tends in itself to break down confidence in the international organization and to undermine its authority. The only specific by which these conflicts of opinion can be reconciled is ordinary common sense, for the conditions we shall encounter in the immediate future will be new in the affairs of states and we have little experience to guide us in dealing with them.

The bare bones of the problem may be described as follows. The proposed international organization is not a world government, but a partnership of sovereign states to accomplish certain concrete purposes in which all the partners have a common interest. For successful operation, at any rate in its initial stages, the organization requires a certain degree of military readiness on the part of the principal states, especially those which assume the definite military obligations foreshadowed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The question of how to disarm and control Germany and Japan is an additional problem. That task may continue to be the subject of special arrangements or may, in time, become part of the obligations of the international organization. The principal military Powers of the United Nations group will have to consider their armaments both in the light of developing conditions in the world as a whole and in relation to the particular job of keeping Germany and Japan disarmed. They then will have to plan their armaments both from the point of view of their obligations to each other and from the point of view of their individual security.

The very foundation of any successful partnership is good faith between the partners. No partnership which is not based upon mutual confidence can hope to be effective, or even to exist for any length of time. Thus it is to be presumed that the Great Powers will exchange full information regarding their actual armed forces. Presumably, also, under the pressure of economic factors each will seek to relieve itself of as much of the burden of maintaining large armaments as it reasonably can. This will be true of every state which does not cherish aggressive designs. But the desire to disarm will be tempered by the prudence which, for some time to come, will suggest to many minds in all countries that the international organization, after all, offers an untried

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means of protection and that some reinsurance is still necessary in case it does not prove capable of meeting its future task.

II

Let us now, in the light of these general considerations, examine one specific consideration introduced by the nature of modern warfare — the fact that states now strike at one another through the air. Warfare today, as already remarked, draws upon the whole resources of the nation. It is a war of production, of machines and devices, as well as of men. Nations no longer send out soldiers to fight while the mass of the civilian population remains comfortably at home in comparative safety. The nation wages total war, and total war is waged against it; all the national resources are used against the enemy and all are subject to attack.

Nor is it true any longer that these resources — the centers of industry, the internal transportation facilities, even the homes of the people — can be protected by armies defending the frontiers or advancing from them into enemy territory. Similarly, it no longer is true that they can be protected by command of a sea which an enemy must cross in order to attack them. Science, mobilized along with the other resources of a nation, has given to warfare a succession of new weapons which have steadily increased in range, speed, destructive power and terribleness. These new weapons for the most part move through the air, where no material barriers can be erected. They strike at the centers of national power, directly and without warning. In a few years' time it will be possible to aim such attacks from any point on the surface of the earth against any other point.

Means of defense will be developed, of course, against such weapons, partly through scientific research, partly by the device of putting dwellings, factories and military installations under ground. (If we continue to wage wars, more and more men will have to burrow into the bosom of the earth for safety, leaving the open air and sunlight in which mankind has thrived.) If our plan is to depend upon counter-research to provide technical means of defense, the question of time is of prime importance. Those who contemplate aggression will be stimulated to develop some new means of offense against which no defense has yet been worked out. If they were to produce a weapon of overwhelming power, the results might be decisive before there was time to counteract it. The chances that an aggressor nation might come forward sud-

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denly with such a weapon would obviously be much greater if the scientists of every country were working in watertight compartments, each clutching his own secrets tightly to his bosom.

Science in general may be said to move on parallel lines in various localities. There have been many disputes in the past as to just where and when a given discovery was first made; rarely in peacetime is any new advance in science announced without the claim being made that the same goal has almost been attained elsewhere. If the labors of all scientists in all peace-loving states are pooled, the chance of a sudden surprise by a new "terror-weapon" will be greatly reduced.

Obviously, the progress of scientific research and development in the use of such weapons, and in means of defense against them, is a most important factor in future military policy. It is perhaps *the* most important factor. The degree of perfection to which man's instruments of self-destruction have already been carried makes it vitally necessary that the use and even the possession of such instruments be restricted by law — that is, by common agreement. This is the inexorable force which is impelling the peoples of the world to seek safety in union.

But this approach toward union has not yet extinguished nationalism. Suspicion and uncertainty still exist between nations. The practical problem of how to control scientific research and development in the military field is, therefore, far from easy to solve. It may be considered under two headings — as it affects the relations of the United Nations (and particularly the great military Powers which are the pillars of the new organization), and as it concerns the disarmament and future restraint of the present enemy Powers.

In the first category, the vital question is this: Shall there be a complete and continuous interchange of information on the progress of scientific research among the United Nations, without any reservations? An interchange of this sort, on an all-out and completely reciprocal basis, exists today between the United States and the nations of the British Commonwealth, through the media of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other joint agencies. Can and will this sort of interchange be extended to include all the other members of the new international organization, and will it be continued when the immediate pressure of military necessity has relaxed?

We might as well frankly face the fact that the great question mark in this proposition is Soviet Russia. Up to the time of the

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recent Crimea Conference our exchange of information of any kind with the Russians left a great deal to be desired. They told us very little, even about military operations, and they were not members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or of any of the other combined technical agencies. Possibly political reasons, stemming from the fact that Russia is not at war with Japan, have accounted in part for the Russian attitude; but it certainly is true to say that the Russians have kept their western Allies at arm's length in matters even relating to the war against Germany.

The future of the international security organization depends in large part on whether the Russians can be persuaded that this "Chinese wall" with which they have surrounded their country, for reasons which have seemed to them good, need no longer be maintained. Perhaps a beginning was made in this direction at the Crimea Conference; the communiqué of that Conference, referring to military matters, said that "the fullest information was interchanged." But far more is needed. If the new organization is to succeed, there must be complete confidence between partner and partner; and in no field is it of greater consequence than in that of military-scientific research and development. A secret armament race between the United States and Russia would keep the world in terror and would undermine the whole structure of world security which we are hoping to build. It seems almost certain to come unless each partner keeps the others fully informed as to the new weapons which its scientists are developing and as to defenses which they are devising against existing weapons.

It is hard to see how such confidence can be assured without freedom of communication, of travel, of press and radio, and of academic and scientific interchange. The mere statement of these conditions shows how long and difficult is the road that must be traveled. The journey will hardly be completed in a single stage. A step-by-step advance, on a strictly reciprocal basis, will perhaps prove to be the only method of progress. The political and social differences of years and the unfortunate mistrusts which they engendered will not be dissipated easily; but we may hope that the comradeship of arms, the winning of a common victory and the tremendous stake which both peoples have in the preservation of peace may all have an influence in bringing about an eventual solution.

It seems possible that, as one of the results of the Crimea Conference, the Soviet High Command may associate itself more

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closely with the existing Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. As the world passes from the conditions of war to the conditions of organized peace, this enlarged Combined Chiefs of Staff might and should furnish the framework for the Military Staff Committee which is to advise the Security Council of the international organization on military matters. It would lie within the proper duties of this Committee to exchange information between the General Staffs of the participating states regarding scientific matters having a military application.

III

Within each participating state the closest sort of association will have to be maintained among its civilian scientists and research laboratories and its military staffs. This need has already been recognized in this country. A joint statement by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, released Feburary 12, 1945, said in part: "A recommendation from the Committee on Post-war Research has been received for the establishment by Congress of an independent agency to deal with the matter, but pending action on this recommendation and to assist in providing for continued civilian participation in the longer term scientific problems of national security when the Office of Scientific Research and Development proceeds to liquidate its activities as a temporary wartime agency, the National Academy of Sciences is hereby requested to establish promptly within the National Academy of Sciences a Research Board for National Security." The objective of this Board, the news release said, will be to continue the close coöperation between civilian scientists and the armed services which has proven to be such a vital element in the prosecution of the war, pending the creation of an independent agency by Congress.

In their statement, the two Secretaries continued as follows:

> This war emphasizes three facts of supreme importance to national security. (1) Powerful new tactics of defense and offense are developed, around new weapons created by scientific and engineering research. (2) The competitive time element in developing these weapons and tactics may be decisive. (3) War is increasingly total war, in which the Armed Services must be supplemented by active participation of every element of the civilian population.
>
> To insure continued preparedness along farsighted technical lines, the research scientists of the country must be called upon to continue in peacetime some substantial portion of those types of contribution to national security which they have made so effectively during the stress of the present war.

That is the problem as seen from the unilateral point of view of

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American national defense. It is a view which takes into account past experience, and the experience of this war in particular — such, for example, as the realization that if the progress of German research and development had permitted the extensive use of the V-1 bomb against Great Britain a year earlier than was actually the case, that island might have been so laid waste as to be rendered useless as a base of operations for the Allied Air Forces and the Allied Armies. The duty of the War and Navy Departments is to be realistic, to provide for national security in the light of current realities. It is not their province to anticipate a political agreement which lies in the future. Nevertheless, the objectives which they have outlined above must be brought into accord with the commitments of the United States once the charter of the international organization has been formulated and the United States has ratified it. It is perfectly clear that the relationship of scientific research and development to military affairs will offer a similar problem in all countries which are members of the organization, and that in each it will be necessary to take steps to keep civilian research agencies and individuals in close touch with the armed services.

This creates a new set of difficulties. Much of the scientific research which bears on military matters is prompted by commercial competition — competition between states which have government-controlled economies, and between corporations in those which have systems of private enterprise. In the latter, the competition may be either for domestic or for foreign markets. It might at first sight seem simple enough to require all discoveries and all scientific progress to be disclosed confidentially to a suitable national defense agency. But in countries operating under systems of private enterprise the personnel of any such agency would have to be drawn in part from the great laboratories, many of which are the private property of competing firms. And when we go further and say that all information bearing on such matters must be made available to the scientists of every nation, through the medium of the research agency of the Military Staff Committee, it becomes pretty clear that if everybody plays the game according to the rules there are going to be no secrets, except in areas of research which have no bearing on national or international security. It is, for example, asking a great deal of human nature to expect Mr. X, whose livelihood is chiefly derived from his salary as the chief research engineer for the ABC Corporation of New York, but who is also a member of the

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government's research board for national security, and as such in touch with the work being done by the scientists of a competing firm in England, to keep his two functions separate; or to expect a private firm to finance the work of such a scientist if the fruits of his labor are to be used by everyone. This sort of thing may be done in time of war; but it is different to require that it be done in peacetime.

Moreover, we must remember that even a country with a small military potential in the ordinary sense of the word may be dangerous in this new era of science. It is quite conceivable that some destructive weapon might be found which could be developed without enormous material resources. No such weapon is now known. The rocket and robot bomb make heavy drains on industrial facilities, and preparations for their production could not be concealed easily. If research is pooled (and particularly since, as we have noted, scientists everywhere tend to advance on parallel lines), any discovery looking to the launching of a decisive attack without vast preparations would probably be suspected in time to take counter-measures. But the particular problem shows the enormous difficulty of the whole complex of problems. The indications are that possible solutions may entail the loss of a great deal of individual freedom and the curtailment of the search for either commercial or military advantage.

IV

The plans to be adopted for the restraint of the enemy states which have been proved to be enemies of humanity must take into account the virtual certainty that inside those countries keen and patient scientific minds will soon be hard at work seeking to circumvent whatever disarmament regulations are imposed by the victors. It is probably impossible to prevent scientific research in Germany and Japan, but it certainly is possible to prevent these nations from giving their discoveries practical application and development. For this it is necessary to frame adequate regulations and maintain adequate inspection. It further is necessary that the victor nations preserve their wills unweakened by "humanitarian" influences.

Research might perhaps be restricted to a considerable degree if the leading men of science of Germany and Japan, who have devoted their lives to contriving new weapons and new methods of slaughter, were confined on some distant island — South Georgia, for example, down near the Antarctic Circle — where

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the problems of mere existence would occupy their attention and where they would have few facilities for continuing their deadly work. If the younger generation were deprived of the "inspiration" of the great teachers, their progress along dangerous lines might be slowed. But while this might be a helpful means of hampering research in Germany and Japan we clearly cannot depend on it by itself to provide adequate safety.

The exact nature of the restrictions to be imposed upon German and Japanese industry — or what is left of it after victory has been won — remains to be determined. The decisions to be taken seem likely to be based on two major considerations: the necessity for preventing a German or Japanese military comeback; and the realization that if the restrictions are unnecessarily severe in their impact on the lives of the German and Japanese peoples, there eventually will be an unfavorable reaction within the victor nations themselves, especially in the United States and the British Dominions where the terrors of total war have not been directly experienced.

We may assume that Germany and Japan will be forbidden to possess or operate industrial facilities of a directly military nature. The difficulty will come when we begin to distinguish between a factory for turning out cannon and one for turning out steel bridges, or a chemical plant which produces explosives and one which produces dyestuffs. A like difficulty will arise when we come to the matter of scientific research and development. There seems no way of making certain that a group of professors hidden away in a garret will not be experimenting with, say, a death-ray or an atomic bomb. But neither is it going to be easy to make certain that the open and innocent-looking laboratory where a little group is trying to make advances in the production of synthetic dyes is not actually working overtime on a new poison gas; and only the most thorough system of inspection will prevent such experiments from being carried to the stage where they might constitute an actual menace.

There seems a great deal to be said for the development, as a permanent agency of the Security Council, of the corps of civilian technical inspectors suggested by President James B. Conant of Harvard University in a speech on October 7, 1944. "Ways and means must be found," observed Dr. Conant, "for recruiting a corps of civilian experts of the highest caliber. A tradition of reliability and a sense of international responsibility must be developed that will prevent an abuse of the inspectorial powers.

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. . . If an international organization is to have power to keep the peace, it must be provided with unprejudiced information, and if we in the United States are to keep our armaments at a moderate level, we must be confident as to the status of other powers." Dr. Conant thinks it is not too much to hope that such a corps of inspectors, whose first task will be to examine German and Japanese industry for possible sources of danger, might eventually "develop a tradition which anchors their professional loyalties to an association of nations rather than to their own country," and might become a world-wide armament inspection service whose reports would make possible the gradual and multilateral reduction of armaments by all the nations of the world.

These pages can do no more than state the problems inherent in the present situation. No attempt has been made to find specific solutions; these must be found through the process of trial and error, painfully and slowly, by the collective action of many minds. The problems seem plain, and so do the dangers. The problems must be solved and the dangers must be averted, for they menace every human being on this earth, and his children yet unborn. Science can contribute many more discoveries to our prosperity and well-being. But if collective intelligence cannot find ways to control the terrible instruments which individual minds have brought and will bring into being, the human race and all its works will be destroyed in blood and fire.

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AMERICA AT WAR

The Winter Months

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE three-power Conference in the Crimea, the Russian sweep from the Vistula across the Oder, and the American return to Luzon and invasion of Iwo in the Volcano Islands, 750 miles from Tokyo, were the principal milestones of the sixth winter of the war — the fourth of American participation.

Military coöperation among the Allies reached a new high at Yalta. The Conference put an end to the German hopes of dividing the Allies and perfected plans for the last stages of the war in Europe. Another topic of discussion, though one not publicized, was the question of Russian participation in the Pacific war. Some agreements, though incomplete, were reached on the political problems of Europe; but where the Russians agreed to concessions, for example in the cases of Poland and Jugoslavia, it remained a question how far the excellent statements of principle would produce results acceptable in the long run either to foreign opinion or to the majority of the populations directly concerned.

II

In the broad strategic picture, the great Russian winter offensive which commenced on January 12 and quickly spread from the Baltic to the Carpathians compensated for the sharp reverse suffered by the American Armies in the Ardennes at the end of 1944. An attempt has been made by the War Department and by SHAEF to paint the Ardennes reverse as a great American victory. To this writer the attempt seems unnecessary and stupid. The flexibility and efficiency of the American staff work under stress of an unexpected blow, and the indomitable courage and combat efficiency shown by many American divisions, combined to prevent the Germans from succeeding in their maximum objective. The achievement does not call for hyperbole. Yet exaggerated accounts of the battle in the Ardennes have been issued, based apparently on the mistaken idea of too many of our military spokesmen — that in handling public relations it is best to hide errors and inefficiencies and to make reverses appear as victories in order to "protect" our leaders from the consequences of public reaction to mistakes.

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On January 15, for instance, Secretary of War Stimson, in the only official statement yet made of our losses during the German offensive in the Ardennes, estimated the total between December 15 and January 7 at slightly less than 40,000. These figures were characterized as "preliminary" and were obviously released before complete casualty lists were available; yet no corrected total has been made public up to the time of writing nearly two month later. Some 18,000 of the 40,000 American casualties were listed as "missing." At the same time, "estimates" of German losses for the same period were put at 90,000, including 40,000 captured and 50,000 killed and wounded — a figure which seems excessive. Still greater claims were made later. On February 5, an official SHAEF résumé of the Ardennes operations declared that on the whole western front 220,000 Germans had been killed or captured, or were wounded or missing, in December and January (half of these were said to be prisoners). The obvious inference is that the foe's losses in the Ardennes were much greater than our own. Yet closer examination of available but incomplete casualty reports shows that American losses on the whole western front for December and January were 136,750. Obviously most of these occurred in the original German attack and our counterattacks in the Ardennes — a very different figure indeed from the 40,000 estimate which Mr. Stimson was led to make.

Even these figures cannot properly be compared, however, with our own "guestimates" of German casualties during this period. Later events have already invalidated some of the exaggerated claims made by SHAEF and the War Department. For instance, it was widely reported that the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies had been so badly mauled in the Ardennes offensive that they were virtually *hors de combat;* the basis for such reports was the SHAEF official summary of the Ardennes fighting issued on February 5. Yet before the ink had dried on this official claim, the Russians reported the Sixth Panzer Army in action in the east. And on February 15 the 116th Panzer Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, both of them among the units described as very severely mauled in the Ardennes fighting, were found opposing a Canadian offensive at Cleve.

This unfortunate tendency of official and semi-official reports to destroy the enemy on paper was in part responsible for the German success in the Ardennes — a limited success, but a

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definite success nevertheless. We were overconfident. We had wrongly interpreted our sweep across France last summer and our big bag of prisoners as marking the end of the German Army. We now know, however, that the Germans had decided to retire from France before the St. Lô break-through of July 25, that the retirement had already started and that in southern France our invasion forces made contact only with German rear guards. The break-through at St. Lô hastened and confused the German retirement, but it did not trap the bulk of Germany's best combat troops in France. Only a minority of the German Seventh Army were caught in the Falaise-Argentan battle. We now know that we never even made contact with the main bodies of the enemy's First and Nineteenth Armies. Nevertheless, in December 1944 the psychological atmosphere on the western front was one of excessive confidence; we discounted too greatly Germany's remaining offensive ability.

Our own winter offensive which started in November had made important though limited gains. This offensive was general and represented a strategy of continuous pressure to wear down the German Army. To have succeeded, such a campaign of attrition would have had to be complemented by at least equal pressure from the Russians in the east. But the great Russian offensive in the east did not start until January 12. Therefore, the strategy in the west in November and December was in a certain sense a failure. The German Army, free of pressure on the eastern front above the Carpathians, was able to replace casualties and create new divisions for the west faster than we could chew them up.

Because our numerical superiority in the west in ground effectives was only about one and a half or one and three-quarters to one, our adoption of a policy of general pressure along the whole front meant that our line was spread out thin. There was some concentration along the Roer River, opposite the Cologne Plain, where the Ninth American Army (Lieutenant-General William H. Simpson, commanding) held a short front. But generally speaking we were dispersed, and in places our line was quite weak. This lack of concentration marked in particular the disposition of our armored divisions, of which there were only two to four to an Army. The Ardennes was looked upon as a quiet sector in which new divisions could be broken in. The region is mountainous and wooded, communications are limited and winter weather there is bad. The fact remains that the Ger-

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mans had taken this route to victory in the Battle of France in 1940; and in December 1944 they were again to prove that the territory was feasible for mechanized armies.

At the time the German counteroffensive began on December 16 our winter offensive had pushed about to the Roer River opposite Cologne; the Third Army had driven well into the Saar in the south; and the German hold upon the Vosges area had been eliminated except for the Colmar pocket. The stage was being set for an Allied attempt to smash across the Cologne Plain toward the Rhine. At this juncture, to the surprise of the Allied commanders and of most other people also, the Germans struck. Their attack was on a fairly wide front from Monschau to Luxembourg. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, and the Seventh Army, consisting of 20 to 24 divisions, six to ten of them armored (more armored divisions than the western Allies have ever concentrated for any offensive), drove down through the hills toward the Meuse.

SHAEF and other official accounts have indicated that the German offensive was planned by Hitler, with von Rundstedt's coöperation, and that its objective was nothing less than to win the war in the west. Certainly a great deal of "pep-talk" was fed to the German soldiers before the attack. However, SHAEF's contention that the German objective was to capture Antwerp and cut off 38 Allied divisions to the north scarcely stands examination. The shrewd German General Staff could hardly have expected to drive a deep salient into our lines with some 24 divisions and to have held that "corridor" against the attacks of the 38 divisions to the north of it and the many others to the south. The German objective was probably more limited. Strategically, the operation was a "spoiling offensive." The enemy hoped to dislocate Allied strategy, and succeeded. They knew that a Russian offensive was being prepared in the east. They wanted to avoid simultaneous blows in east and west. They knew that the general Allied offensive in the west had reached a stage which would soon make it possible for General Eisenhower to launch his main effort from Aachen to Cleve and in the south through the Wissembourg gap. Their operation was in the nature of a sortie in force from "Festung Germania" to disrupt our communications and our tactical organization, to force revisions in our plans, to inflict casualties and capture supplies.

The Germans succeeded in winning perhaps six to eight weeks of time. Yet they did not achieve what was probably their maxi-

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mum objective — the seizure of the line of the Meuse, including Liége, and possibly Dinant, Namur and Sedan. Had the enemy smashed across the Meuse he would have cut the principal communication lines between south and north and overrun large and almost vital supply dumps. Our hard-won gains in the Aachen area probably would have been lost, for the capture of Liége would have threatened the flank and the supply lines of the American Ninth Army and the British Second Army near the Roer. Such a retirement would have postponed our winter offensive indefinitely and might have prolonged the war with Germany as much as six months.[1]

Skilled staff work and the steadfastness of the undaunted "G.I." averted that catastrophe. The Germans immediately overran the 106th Division, which — new to war — was holding a long, "quiet" sector of the Ardennes front. This division lost more than two-thirds of its infantry components, most of them captured; and the losses of other American divisions in adjacent positions were heavy. At the start, German progress was rapid. The front of the First American Army was split, because of severed communications, and a revision of command was immediately necessary. Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery assumed command of all forces — American and British — north of the bulge, while Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley retained command of the Third American Army and elements of the First Army south of the bulge.

The crisis probably came between December 18 and 21. By these dates the Germans had punched out a salient 50 miles deep and about 50 miles wide at its base. But despite their best efforts they could not widen the salient toward its tip; the "shoulders" were held firmly by the 2nd Division and others. The German torrent was canalized and diverted to the west, away from vital Liége, and then gradually dammed up. In the first days the usual German technique of spreading fear and confusion was employed to the full. Patrols dressed in American uniforms were sent deep behind American lines; parachute troops for sabotage and guerrilla purposes were dropped in large numbers; the dwindling German Air Force was put aloft for close support, despite bad

[1] On December 16, the very day the German counteroffensive started, the first Liberty Ship passed through reconstructed Lock Rochemont at Le Havre, some three months after the capture of the port. The volume of supplies passing through it now exceeds 15,000 tons a day. The fact that Le Havre was available in December meant that the capture of Antwerp by the Germans (if that was their intention) would not have been fatal. It would certainly, however, have been a great blow.

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weather; V-bombs and rockets were used in great numbers. One German patrol, dressed in American uniforms, actually penetrated into Liége.

The American 1st Infantry Division held the German 12th SS Armored Division at Bütgenbach; the 7th Armored Division "found itself" at St. Vith; the 101st Airborne Division (whose acting commander replied "Nuts!" to a German demand for surrender) stood off the enemy at Bastogne; and many other units too numerous to enumerate here were instrumental in holding the German offensive short of its major aim. A break in the weather on December 21, which permitted Allied air power to hammer German communication and supply lines, was a major factor in slowing and then stopping the German tide. But in retrospect it seems clear that the work of veteran American divisions on the ground, particularly on December 20, when the Germans made a major effort to break through to Liége, was primarily responsible for our defensive success.

From December 22 onward, almost till February 1, the battle of the Ardennes really resolved itself into an effort to eliminate the bulge that had been pushed into our lines. Nearly all of the Third Army, which gave up its hard-won gains in the Saar and concentrated with energy, spirit and remarkable speed against the southern flank of the bulge, was employed in reducing the German salient. The First Army drove against the enemy from the north, and one British corps was transferred from Holland for brief operations against the salient's tip. The American troops encountered bitter cold and very heavy snow (for which many of them were not properly equipped), bad weather which often limited their air support, and tenacious German resistance. But gradually, fighting with finer drive and spirit than in any previous campaign, they pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The process was hastened early in January when the Russian offensive began and the Germans pulled out troops to meet the threat in the east. On January 19, General Bradley resumed command of the entire First Army; the Ninth, which was still deployed along the Roer, remained under Field Marshal Montgomery, together with the Canadian First and British Second Armies.

By the beginning of February the harsh Ardennes fighting was a memory, marked by the graves of the men who had given new examples of American courage. Our schedule had been set back at least six weeks; to meet the emergency we had drawn on troops

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in rest areas and held in reserve for future operations; and we had used up much-needed replacements of men and material. The front in the west on February 1 was quite different from the front in the west on December 16.

All in all, the net results of the Ardennes fighting probably showed a balance in Germany's favor. The emergency created by the enemy break-through had made us halt our offensive operations elsewhere in the west (including operations against German-held Dunkirk and St. Nazaire, which seem to have been started and then suspended), and we had been forced to transfer troops to the threatened region from all over the western front. As a result of this weakening of our forces elsewhere, the enemy was able to win local bridgeheads in the north, regain the Saar, eliminate our threat to the Wissembourg gap and mount a threat of his own to Strasbourg. This latter danger was not completely removed until February 9 when the French First Army, spearheaded and very materially assisted by the Twenty-first American Corps, finally eliminated the Colmar pocket in the Vosges. The upshot of the Ardennes fighting was that in January and February the enemy felt it safe to reduce his divisions in the west from about 80 to 60 or 65 (the units transferred to the east included the Sixth Panzer Army); and the Allied winter offensive in the west picked up in February about where it had left off on December 16.

The German and then the American successes in the Ardennes, both of them limited and both tempered by failures, were obscured by the sweeping Russian triumphs in the offensive which began on January 12. The Red Army, striking with greater numbers of tanks than had ever before been used in war, and with a superiority in ground effectives as high as from two and a half to four to one, smashed across the Vistula from the Carpathians to the Baltic, overran East Prussia and in a few weeks pushed to the Oder and across it. This changed the complexion of war overnight; Germany was now in dire peril. Yet by mid-February, with the Russians threatening Berlin, Stettin and Dresden, the bitter consequences of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes still afflicted our arms. For though there evidently was to be a great Allied effort in the west we were not yet able to mount it.

However, by mid-February preliminary Allied gains had been made in the west, and they were considerable. The Allies abandoned their earlier policy of general pressure and concentrated

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their forces on narrow fronts in an effort to break through to and across the Rhine. The fronts in the Vosges and in the Saar became static after the Colmar pocket had been eliminated. The Third Army extended its flank well north of the Moselle and took the communications junction of Pruem. The First Army, holding a smaller front than in December, drove toward the dams controlling the water level of the Roer River and early in February succeeded in taking or dominating them, though not before the Germans had blown the sluice gates of one dam and flooded the Roer Valley. In the north, Canadians and British mounted a strong drive through difficult and inundated country at Cleve and Goch and reached the Rhine, though at a point where the river was broad and swollen.

This Canadian drive was supplemented later in February by a main effort by the American Ninth and First Armies across the Roer River toward Cologne, Düsseldorf and München-Gladbach. By March 1 the Allied winter offensive — modified in its concepts — was in full swing and some 56,000 German prisoners had been captured in the west. All German positions on the west bank of the Rhine between Arnhem and Cologne were threatened and an enforced German retreat to the east bank of the Rhine seemed inevitable.

III

Despite bad weather, the air operations in Europe during the winter were of almost unbelievable magnitude. During 1944 the American Air Forces dropped almost 1,000,000 tons of bombs in Europe; in January 1945, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, based on Britain and Italy, dropped 45,264 tons. The primary targets were communications and the German synthetic oil industry. It was estimated that by December 1944 German production of all types of oil fuels had been reduced to about one-third or one-fourth the April 1944 figure, and many observers believe oil shortages have been a material factor in reducing the mobility of the German Army and hence in facilitating the Russian victories. Nevertheless, this factor can be, and possibly has been, overstated; the Germans apparently found no difficulty in getting enough oil for their counteroffensive in the Ardennes, or for large-scale Panzer counteroffensives near Budapest. An immediate product of the Crimea Conference was the use of Allied heavy bombers against German communications and cities such as Dresden, directly in the rear of the Russian front. Coöp-

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eration between Allied air forces and Russian ground forces reached a new high in January.

The German Luftwaffe made a short-lived comeback during the Ardennes operations, staging in particular a New Year's Day low-level attack against Allied airfields in Belgium and France. They lost heavily themselves, but inflicted heavy losses on us also. The enemy tended to use more and more jet fighters, particularly the very fast, rather long-range twin-jet — the Me-262 — the fastest plane in European skies. Another German jet plane, the Me-163, had some success in intercepting our Flying Fortresses in January; but probably it has been introduced "too little and too late" to affect the course of the air war materially. The fact remains that the Germans are ahead of us in jets, and their use of them is being watched closely, since there is evidence that they have virtually abandoned production of most other types of aircraft to concentrate upon this one.

Other fronts in Europe played subsidiary parts during the winter. The deep snows and bitter cold of the Apennines stalemated operations in Italy, the more so as our superiority there was limited. The 92nd (Negro) Division of the Fifth Army twice made local advances, only to be counterattacked and thrown back to its original positions with fairly sizeable losses. The new American 10th Mountain Division captured the dominating height of Mt. Belvedere southwest of Bologna. Brazilian troops, about a regimental combat-team in strength, continued to hold a sector of the front. American air power supported British operations in Greece and Allied operations in the Balkans and Hungary.

The vital job of getting supplies to Russia was pushed during the winter, but with new facilities. The Persian Gulf Command, which played such a major rôle in this task in the early, more difficult days, was gradually reduced in size when Turkey gave permission for us to use a new and shorter route into the Black Sea. The Murmansk and Alaskan routes continued to function.

IV

Our control of the Pacific by planes and ships enabled us to plant the American flag on Luzon Island and on Iwo Jima, in the Volcano Islands, during the winter months. The new conquests followed rapidly upon the protracted battle for Leyte in the Philippines which up to December 26 cost the Japanese — ac-

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cording to General Douglas MacArthur, who is always liberal in his estimates — 113,221 men.[2]

The backbone of enemy resistance on Leyte had been broken by the Navy's decisive victory in the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, now officially renamed "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." [3] Naval control was extended to the western shores of Leyte, and on December 7 an amphibious force was landed at Ormoc. On December 26, almost two months after he had prematurely "freed" Leyte, General MacArthur again declared that the "Leyte-Samar campaign can now be regarded as closed except for minor mopping-up operations." [4] This time there was good reason for his statement.

In retrospect, the fight for Leyte seems to have constituted the enemy's major attempt to hold the Philippines. He shot his bolt there; and our later Philippine operations by land, sea and air were consequently eased. Even before we had completely broken the Leyte stalemate, imposed by enemy resistance and torrential rains, our troops landed on Mindoro Island and established air strips there within easy fighter plane range of the whole island of Luzon. Subsequently, on January 3, more troops of Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, which had won the battle of Leyte, landed on little Marinduque Island, near the Bondoc peninsula on Luzon, while the American troops on Mindoro extended their footholds.

Under cover of the land-based air power thus provided, and heavily protected by escort carriers and combat ships of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, the invasion of Luzon was mounted on January 9. The strength of the Japanese forces on Luzon at the time was estimated at 175,000, including a rarity in the Japanese Army — an armored division. The Japanese deployed sizeable forces in the south, in the Batangas-Tayabas regions, to meet any threat originating from Mindoro or Marinduque Islands. Perhaps they had 4,000 to 9,000 men in Bataan and Corregidor and more than 20,000 in Manila and the vicinity. Another concentration was in the hills east and northeast of Manila. But the larger portion of General Tomoyuki Yamashita's troops was in the north, with large concentrations around the

[2] Of this total, only 54,338 were "counted dead;" the rest were estimated losses.

[3] *Cf.* the author's article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1945.

[4] These "mopping-up operations" cost the Japanese an estimated 19,000 more casualties on Leyte from December 26 to February 19, bringing the estimated total enemy casualties to about 132,000. The estimate is too high, in this observer's opinion, but it suggests the magnitude of "mopping-up operations" in the Pacific.

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eastern part of Lingayen Gulf in the Damortis-San Fernando-Baguio area. Strange as it may seem, our initial landings, made in the one area of the island where landings were most to be expected, took the enemy by surprise. The Japanese had had three years to fortify Lingayen, yet assault elements of General Krue-



ger's Sixth Army landed on the southern coast of the Gulf against virtually no opposition and encountered no fortifications of any consequence. The warships of the invading fleet which bombarded the shore for three days prior to D-Day were heavily attacked by Japanese planes, however, which bored in relentlessly

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despite terrific antiaircraft fire. The *Ommaney Bay*, an escort carrier, and other vessels were sunk, and many more of our vessels were damaged. (More naval ships have been damaged since the start of the Philippine campaign in October than in any comparable period of the war.) After a few days, however, the air attacks petered out, as Japanese air power, weakened from the Leyte campaign, was blasted from the skies.

General Krueger's progress down the central Luzon plain toward Manila met very limited opposition until the city was reached. The operation had begun with the establishment of a beachhead between San Carlos and Dagupan, which was subsequently extended northward to San Fabian and Damortis. The drive down the central plain was undertaken by Major-General Oscar W. Griswold's Fourteenth Corps, while on the American left flank, the First Corps (Major-General Innis P. Swift, commanding), consisting of the 6th, 25th and 43rd Divisions, tried to push up into the Japanese-held hills to protect the flank of the Manila spearhead. The latter encountered the toughest fighting of the campaign.

The out-manœuvred Japanese commander tried frantically to concentrate his principal forces, split by the landing in the center; and he did succeed in moving some of his troops from the south to the Baguio area. But he frittered away most of the strength of his single armored division (equipped with inferior tanks) [5] in piecemeal attacks, and his threat to our northern flank was never serious. As our northern and eastern flank was slowly extended into the mountains, across Highway Five and eventually across the mountains to Baler on the east coast (reached on February 14), the thrust down the central plain reached Clark Field on January 25. Our entry into the northern part of Manila and the relief of Americans in Santo Tomas internment camp was made on February 4; and two days later General MacArthur jubilantly, but prematurely, announced the capture of the city.

Actually, the toughest fighting of the Luzon campaign commenced with our entry into Manila. General MacArthur's troops, not experienced in the technique of street fighting, had to fight their way from house to house; and the city, devastated by Japanese demolitions, shell fire and planes, was still not wholly in

[5] No American armored division was used on Luzon; indeed, none has yet been used in the Pacific. Tank battalions supported our infantry on Luzon. It would have been interesting to see what an armored division could do to the Japanese — who apparently are not too well equipped for war of manœuvre — on the good roads of Luzon.

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our possession as these lines were written.[6] Nevertheless, the Japanese position was hopeless. Units of a new Army, the Eighth, led by Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger, landed on January 29 near Subic Bay, at the base of the Bataan peninsula, cut off the peninsula and probed landwards. The 11th Airborne Division landed on February 2 near Nasugbu, 50 miles southwest of Manila Bay, but north of the main Japanese concentrations further south in the neighborhood of Batangas. With the aid of a parachute landing on a commanding ridge, they drove to the southern outskirts of the capital. There followed repeated bombings and shellings of Corregidor, an amphibious landing at Mariveles near the southern tip of Bataan peninsula and an airborne and seaborne landing on Corregidor which resulted in a ten-day conquest of the fortress island.

By February 21, the Japanese had suffered some 92,000 casualties on Luzon according to General MacArthur's estimates, which have never been noted for their conservatism. However, thousands of Japanese are still holed up in the Zambales mountains; and there are large forces in the mountains east of Manila and in the north and south. Strategically, however, although months probably will pass before all organized Japanese resistance is broken, the battle for Luzon has been won. In some six weeks of fighting the Americans have avenged Bataan, hoisted the flag again in Manila, obtained room for great airfields on the Central Luzon plain, and secured Subic and Manila Bays and thereby facilities through which the airfields can be supplied. For strategic reasons we may wish other airfield sites somewhat closer to Formosa, for example in the Cagayan Valley in the north; if so, an amphibious landing near Aparri on the north coast can secure them.

The quick results achieved on Luzon without the great showdown battle that had been expected can be attributed in major measure to overwhelming American superiority, particularly at sea and in the air. This superiority made it possible for us to pick our points of attack, to outflank the Japanese concentrations ashore and to be well informed of the enemy's dispositions while blinding him to our own. Even so, the Japanese defense was remarkably ineffective, considering the large numbers of troops at the disposal of the enemy commanders. General Eichel-

[6] The last considerable organized resistance in Manila was crushed in the Intramuros section in the closing days of February, and the city, burned out and devastated by deliberate Japanese demolitions, was virtually ours by March 1, except for small-scale mopping-up operations. The first American supply ship to enter Manila Bay steamed past Corregidor about February 27.

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berger expressed the common bewilderment when he remarked: "Those Jap generals must have gone crazy. Where in hell are they going to fight?" His comment was provoked by the Japanese failure to defend the Luzon beaches against any of our amphibious landings, despite the fact that any amphibious assault is weakest while it is half ashore and half afloat.

A number of factors can be cited, however, to explain the Japanese failure on Luzon:

(1) Our information about Japanese dispositions was excellent; after enemy airpower was shot out of the air, his knowledge of our dispositions was meagre. Filipino guerrillas and American coast-watchers in Luzon, communicating by radio with our headquarters, were able to supply invaluable information.

(2) The Japanese exerted much of their strength on Leyte, particularly the air and sea strength they had allocated for defense of the Philippines. Control of the sea and air is the key to victory in any island war; when the enemy irretrievably lost that, his defense of Luzon was doomed.

(3) General Yamashita may have expected reënforcements for the Luzon garrison, and Admiral William F. Halsey, in his January sweep through the China Sea, may have actually intercepted such reënforcements, bound northward from French Indo-China. If General Yamashita had decided not to oppose our Lingayen landings seriously until the reënforcements had arrived, his behavior makes more sense.

(4) The Japanese were outguessed. The American strategy was well conceived and well executed. There is not much doubt that the enemy did not expect landings at Lingayen (or those made later) in the exact areas where they occurred. The southern coast of Lingayen often presents difficult surf conditions. Also, the fish ponds and rice paddies which line the shore are major obstacles after a rain; fortunately, most of these were fairly well dried out when we landed. The Japanese apparently expected us to by-pass these obstacles and land further north on Lingayen.

(5) Our overwhelming superiority, not only in the air and at sea, but also on land — particularly our mechanized superiority — may have convinced the Japanese commander that his forces would quickly be chopped to pieces on the open Luzon plain. He may therefore have elected to string out the fighting — even though it seemed futile — by making his main stand in the jungled mountains, behind the concrete and steel of Corregidor and in the maze of buildings of Manila.

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(6) The friction between the Japanese Army and Navy, mounting as Japan nears defeat, may well have been a factor in the defense of Luzon. The Japanese Army probably expected some Japanese naval intervention.

(7) The false reports made by Japanese junior officers to their seniors, which have characterized so many previous actions of this war, may constitute another partial explanation for the failure of the Japanese commander to take earlier and more energetic counter-measures. The Japanese officer is taught from youth that Japan cannot be defeated, that the Japanese cannot be pushed onto the defensive and that any reverse involves loss of face. Accordingly, he rarely reports a reverse or asks for reserves until it is too late. Division and corps commanders often do not know the real battle situation until it is too late to do anything about it. Inadequate and inflexible Japanese leadership is one of the enemy's major weaknesses.

(8) Inadequate training in defensive tactics and in the war of manœuvre is another weakness. The Japanese have always emphasized the offensive and neglected the science of defense.

(9) Limited motor transport, and our overwhelming command of the air, made the Japanese unable to concentrate their forces quickly.

But the most important factor in the Japanese defeat was our overwhelming superiority in numbers. We employed ten divisions on Luzon — the 1st Cavalry, 6th, 11th Airborne, 24th, 25th, 32nd, 37th, 38th, 40th and 43rd, plus the 158th Regimental Combat Team and 6th Ranger Battalion and many ancillary units. This made it the largest operation of the Pacific war. At the time of writing, a number of Australian divisions apparently scheduled for use had not even been landed. Great credit should be given to our troops and commanders; but it must be remembered that any team, or any commander, appears to advantage when enjoying superiorities as great as we have had on Luzon. [7]

Indeed, in the light of our difficulties in western Europe a strong case can be made against the use of such large land forces in the southwest Pacific. General MacArthur has had between 20 and 25 divisions — possibly more — under his command, including American troops not used in the Luzon campaign, and Australian and New Zealand divisions. The Pacific war has been

[7] Announced American casualties in the Luzon operations up to February 21 (presumably Army only) were 12,929, including 2,676 killed. The total has been considerably increased since.

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largely a naval and air war; no large numbers of troops were ever employed by General MacArthur until seven divisions were used on Leyte. Twenty divisions is a very sizeable army, more than one-third as large as all the American forces in western Europe. It is, of course, very desirable to have overwhelming numbers whenever possible, but in a global war the needs of any one theater must be constantly balanced against the needs of other theaters. Events during the winter showed that we lacked a sufficient margin of superiority in ground troops in Europe; four or five of the divisions assigned to General MacArthur could probably have been put to much better use against Germany.[8]

Before the Luzon campaign was finished, the Navy struck new blows much closer to Tokyo. Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet swept the waters along the China and Indo-China coasts in January to cover the Luzon invasion, after previous strikes against Formosa and against Okinawa in the Ryukyu group. The Formosa-Okinawa operations claimed 111 enemy aircraft and 27 ships destroyed; the raids on Indo-China scattered or sank four enemy convoys and cost Japan an estimated 25 ships, including a *Katori*-class light cruiser. Combined, these operations cost Japan an estimated 250,000 tons of shipping and about 400 planes, plus other ships and planes damaged.[9] Following these great strikes, the Third Fleet was inactive for a few weeks, but on February 16 and 17 (East Longitude date) the Fifth Fleet, or major carrier elements of it, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, fulfilled the long-cherished ambitions of every Navy man and struck with hundreds of carrier-based planes against the Tokyo area. This protracted air raid destroyed 509 enemy planes and sank at least 13 ships, including three or four men-of-war, according to official claims. Not a ship was damaged. In a later carrier strike on February 25–26 we claimed 158 enemy planes and a number of small craft destroyed. We suffered minor damage to two light fleet units. This raid was complemented by a 200-plane B-29 raid against Tokyo. Heavy damage by the raids was done to Japanese industry.

These operations covered one of the most difficult amphibious assaults which we have attempted — the invasion of Iwo Island in the Volcano group, 750 miles from Tokyo. This tiny island,

[8] Part of the trouble in Europe was plainly due to a miscalculation about the date the war would end. Official estimates put V-Day in October. The enemy had different ideas.

[9] These figures, like MacArthur's, are subject to considerable downward revision. Early reports of enemy combat losses nearly always have been exaggerated in the Pacific.

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five miles long, rugged and honeycombed with gun galleries and caves, was invaded February 19, after a three-day bombardment, by the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. Some 800 ships were in the invading armada. A long though shallow beachhead was quickly established, but enfilading fire from hidden guns exacted considerable casualties.

By March 1, the Marines, in the hardest battle in their history which had cost them 5,372 casualties up to February 21, had captured more than half of Iwo. Iwo has been an enemy air base,



From Manila to Hong Kong is 695 miles; to Formosa, 505 miles; to Tokyo, 1,865 miles. From Saipan to Iwo is 725 miles. From Iwo to Tokyo is 750 miles. The effective bombing radius of a B-29 is about 1,500 miles.

and Japanese planes taking off from it sometimes raided our B-29 Superfortress bases in Guam, Saipan and Tinian. The capture of the island was in part a defensive measure, but also constituted a direct offensive threat to Tokyo. Fighter planes based on it can accompany our long-range bombers on their raids over Japan. In time we may also be able to develop bomber strips there, from which B-29's or shorter-range Liberators can launch attacks also.

Iwo is thus an important milestone in the development of our bombing campaign against Japan. B-29's based on the Marianas,

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carrying three to six tons of bombs for unprecedentedly long distances, have been bombing the Japanese mainland frequently ever since November 24. The results are in no sense vital, and it now seems probable that bombing alone will not knock Japan out, just as it has failed to knock out any other major determined nation. But the Japanese aircraft industry, one of the three A1 priority targets in Japan (the others being shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, and Japan's highly combustible cities), has already been hurt: its production of some 1,400 to 1,800 planes a month has been reduced and factories have had to be dispersed.

V

The war also went well on part of the Asiatic continent during the winter. At long last, the Ledo-Burma Road, the link by land between India and China and the dreamchild of General Joseph W. Stilwell, was opened to at least limited traffic;[10] and in January the Air Transport Command carried some 44,000 tons of supplies over the "hump" to China. With the siege of Mandalay starting, only pockets of the enemy remained near these roads to China. The battle of North Burma had been virtually won. It has been won chiefly by British and Chinese troops with the help of native troops and labor, aided by the American "Mars" task force (Lieutenant-General Daniel I. Sultan commands all troops in north Burma) and American engineering ability and air power.

The situation in China was not as bright as that in Burma, for the enemy widened his land corridor from Manchuria to Singapore in the winter months, extending his hold on the railroads from Canton to Hankow, and also seized isolated American airfields to the east. The Japanese are now filling gaps in the railway system in the area by constructing new lines. Obviously fearful of a landing in China, they also have strengthened their hold on the coastal regions. The domestic situation in the country appears to have improved slightly with the help of Lieutenant-General Albert C. Wedemeyer and our new Ambassador, Major-General Patrick Hurley. More and more, too, the shadow of Russia looms over Manchuria and the Japanese Kwantung Army.

[10] *Editor's Note:* See maps in Brigadier-General Horace S. Sewell's article, "The Campaign in Burma," p. 497 and 501.

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THE CHICAGO AIR CONFERENCE

Accomplishments and Unfinished Business

By Edward Warner

THE representatives of 54 nations — all the world except the enemy states and the Argentine Republic, which were not invited, the Soviet Union, which did not attend, and Saudi Arabia, which did not accept — gathered in the Stevens Hotel in Chicago on November 1 last. When they dispersed on December 7 some of the problems of international flying were well advanced toward solution, others were more clearly defined than they had been previously, and the difficulties still lying in the way of complete solution had become better understood. The Conference also had two other achievements to its credit: it had increased our store of experience with attempts at international organization and it had revealed some limitations of such attempts in the present mood of national governments.

It is pleasantest to speak first of the accomplishments. There were several. The most important, in its effect upon the legal status of international air transportation, came by surprise within a few days of the end of the Conference. The transit agreement, colloquially known as the "two-freedoms agreement," was formally proposed by the senior Dutch representative — a very appropriate sponsor, in view of the unremitting struggle of the Netherlands for greater freedom in the air for more than 20 years past — and was vigorously supported by the French delegates. It was introduced after a dramatic plea made by Mayor La Guardia and following a statement by Lord Swinton that the United Kingdom would view a transit agreement with sympathy. The agreement was thereupon made a conference document, open to separate signature then or later. By February 20 it had been signed by 33 nations. The number included all the great colonial empires with the exception of the Portuguese, and all the other leading aeronautical states and all states covering large enough territories to make the right of flying over them a matter of practical importance with the exception of Australia, China, Brazil and the Soviet Union. The signatures have been attached *ad referendum* and most have not yet been formally confirmed; but it is clearly possible to expect widespread acceptance.

The transit agreement does two things. It gives the accepting

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states a free and unlimited right of passage for the planes of each state through the air-space of every other; and it gives their aircraft a general right to interrupt their passage for refueling or mechanical attention. To realize what a landmark this is in aeronautical history one really needs to have lived with the subject during the years between the wars and to have seen at first-hand how firmly almost every state has repulsed any attempt to release international transport from its cocoon of multiple national restrictions. For the first time, nations which wish to trade with one another through the air can plan to do so, feeling assured that they can reach each other's territories without needing to meet the terms imposed separately by every state along the way. They are assured that, except for non-stop ocean crossings, they can halt for refueling at intervals which are economically desirable and will not have to carry enough fuel for roundabout flights. The participants to the transit agreement undertake to abstain from the rôle of feudal baron who levied private tribute on all the commerce passing along the highroads within his grasp. Some nations will gain by this more than they give; others will give more than they gain. For some it represents a large concession of a major bargaining-point. The drive toward the goal of freedom of transit has nevertheless found vigorous sponsors everywhere. They have been fired by the conviction that the maintenance of barriers to international commerce by parties having no relation to it except the accidental one of geographical position would represent an intolerable retrogression toward a closed world.

The second notable result of the Conference was a plan for an international aeronautical organization of much wider scope than any of its predecessors. The International Convention for Air Navigation which met in Paris in 1919 set up a Commission composed of members from all the participating states. Ultimately they numbered 33, but their meetings, usually held only semiannually, were concerned almost solely with technical problems. The Conference of Lima in 1937 proposed a similar body for the Americas, but it never was formally constituted.

Under the Chicago plan the international organization will be set up in two phases. There will be a provisional body, to become active as soon as 26 states have accepted the compact and simple Interim Agreement,[1] which will give way to a permanent organization, similar though not identical in structure,

[1] Up to February 20, 41 states had signed it, but only 4 have formally ratified their signatures.

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when 26 states have formally ratified the much bulkier permanent Convention. The Interim Council will act through committees and a secretariat. Its primary tasks will be to study and distribute information on problems of international air traffic — routes established and planned, costs of operation, subsidies, tariffs, airport facilities, etc. — and to develop standard rules of the air, regulations for equipment and personnel, and operating practices on airways. The participating states agree to provide the Council with copies of all agreements relating to routes and services and to require their international airlines to file full traffic reports and financial statements.

The permanent Council, which will probably come into existence in 1946 or 1947, will be authorized in addition, at the request of any contracting state, to investigate any situation which appears to present avoidable obstacles to the development of air navigation. Still wider duties are given it. If it believes that a contracting state's airport facilities (including radio and meteorological services) are inadequate, it may, at the request of that state, provide and administer the airports and other facilities used by international air services. It may, with the assent of the contracting states concerned, assess the costs and specify charges for the use of the facilities. In short, the new agreement offers an opportunity for great progress in welding the world's airways into a unit. It does not assure uniform economic practices by the different states — in regard to subsidies, for example — but it offers hope of eliminating at least some of the differences of opinion as to what these practices actually are.

The Council will have 21 members, and will be elected by an Assembly in which every state will have an equal vote. In the first election for the Interim Council, held at Chicago, representation was given to the following: the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, El Salvador, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India,[2] France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, China. Canada was chosen as the seat of the interim organization.

The Council will elect its own president, who will be a salaried official, representing no nation and pledged to be influenced by none. Each state is to have a right to participate in the work of every committee except two. Potentially, therefore, each com-

[2] In the original election Cuba's name stood in place of India's, but the senior Norwegian delegate, protesting the omission of so vast a territory, traversed by so many air routes, spontaneously arose and resigned in India's favor. The Cuban representative thereupon generously insisted upon the withdrawal of the Norwegian resignation in order that Cuba might resign instead.

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mittee will have more than 50 members. This number is unwieldy, but it was argued that most committees will be created for highly specialized purposes and that only states which feel a particular concern with the subject will take the trouble to send representatives. Some states insisted firmly that they must have the right to name a representative for every discussion, if they cared to do so.

The Committee on Air Transport, one of the exceptions to this rule, is defined merely as a body chosen by the Council from its own membership. The Air Navigation Commission, the other exception, which is to deal with technical matters, will be composed of members selected as individuals. The states will make nominations and the Council will choose from among them, presumably having regard both to personal qualifications and a regional distribution of the membership. Though membership will be personal, the members will not lose their national identities as do the staff of the secretariat, but will remain representatives of the countries which nominated them. The device of blending personal and national qualifications in selecting members of an international organization is a new one, but may prove valuable.

Continuing the precedent established under the International Convention for Air Navigation the permanent Council will have the power to adopt or amend technical annexes to the Convention, acting by a two-thirds vote and upon the advice of the Air Transport Commission. Standardization in such matters as rules of the road is essential, and a large degree of uniformity is highly desirable in regard to such questions as the qualifications of flying personnel and the standards of safety of aircraft. Common decisions are also needed on unexpected problems. For example — as was pointed out in Chicago — countries which have large areas of forest or jungle may repeatedly be put to great expense in searching for lost foreign aircraft, and there should be some agreement regarding apportionment of the costs. Topics like these were the subject of study by 11 subcommittees in Chicago, and a remarkable unanimity was achieved even in matters on which national practices have varied widely in the past. The subcommittee on maps, for example, agreed fully upon the symbols to be used for denoting airports, etc., and upon the tints to indicate various altitudes — an agreement of immense practical aid to pilots.

The attachment of provisos on technical standards to an inter-

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national agreement creates some interesting legal problems. The permanent Convention will have the form of a treaty; but nations could scarcely be expected to ratify a document which might be greatly changed without renewed reference to the ratifying authorities. Yet the arts of aircraft design and air navigation are constantly developing, and standards governing them must obviously be kept highly flexible. Hope of keeping the standards up to date would disappear if they were to be incorporated in the Convention and fresh ratification by all the participating governments were required whenever a change were made. The expedient chosen was to give the permanent Council full power to adopt, amend or annul technical annexes to the Convention at any time by a two-thirds vote; but those annexes are not to be given compulsive force. There will be no binding obligation on any nation to keep to an international standard. I am confident, however, that when the Council has actually adopted a standard practice of any sort, individual states will wish in their own interest to keep to it.

The Chicago Convention also breaks new ground in escaping from the rule of unanimity which puts a single reluctant (or merely dilatory) state in a position to prevent action. The terms of the Convention itself will be subject to amendment by a two-thirds vote in the Assembly, but an amendment will give obligations and privileges only to states which accept it. The Assembly will, however, have the power of cancelling the membership in the organization of any state failing to accept a crucial amendment.

Last among the noteworthy achievements at Chicago is the so-called "five-freedoms" agreement, which will bring about virtually complete freedom of the air for transport purposes among the states accepting it. Transport planes of the signatories will have full rights to pick up and set down passengers and goods in each other's territory, except that each nation may reserve its own internal traffic (cabotage) for its own nationals, and subject to a specification that an airline must start in its own metropolitan territory and proceed to its most distant terminus with reasonable directness. In other words, it is not permissible to lay out routes that wander and wind in search of local traffic. Within those two limits, the nature and volume of the operations allowed will be unlimited.

The five-freedoms agreement was strongly advocated by the spokesman of the American delegation. As of February 20, 19

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states had signed it without reservation, including Sweden, China, Afghanistan and Lebanon, together with Mexico and ten other states of Latin America. Turkey and the Netherlands signed with a reservation restricting the privileges extended.

New Zealand, supported by Australia, proposed a complete internationalization of control and operation of major routes. New Zealand's senior delegate at Chicago, Mr. D. G. Sullivan, Minister of Industries, Commerce, Supply and Munitions, presented his case with deep conviction. But few governments seem likely to surrender the hope of running long-distance airlines under the national flag, and even in the delegations where Mr. Sullivan's aims were most respected there was doubt whether the proposal was practicable. The strength of national feeling makes it hard to conceive of employing personnel and selecting equipment without reference to nationality, as would be necessary in any true internationalization of airlines.

II

The main unfinished business at Chicago concerned the rights of conducting trade. The two-freedoms agreement on transit will enable commercial aircraft to go wherever trade is to be found; but actually to engage in picking up and discharging passengers and goods will be possible only in the territories of the limited number of states which have signed the five-freedoms agreement. If trade is to be carried on, either a new attempt must be made to find a general formula or a network of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral pacts must be negotiated. The latter is currently being done. Agreements between the United States and Spain, Sweden, and Ireland have recently been announced, and no doubt there will be more. Though resort to this method is disappointing it at least does not represent any retrogression from the past. The common prewar practice was to negotiate bilateral agreements, complicated by the necessity of including in the negotiation all the countries over which the proposed route was to pass, whether or not commercial rights were sought in all of them. Sometimes commercial airlines obtained permits directly from foreign governments in their own names. That practice had been common in the operations of Pan American Airways in the western hemisphere, but rare elsewhere. Most informed Americans felt that bilateral negotiation would continue to be necessary, not because of any lack of sympathy with the idea of an inclusive agreement but because they doubted that an acceptable formula

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could be found. Unfortunately Chicago justified their pessimism.

One feature of the five-freedoms proposal, to be sure, seemed to have unanimous support. In theory, no exception was taken to the idea that every state should have a right to run its own airlines from its homeland to any other part of the world and to engage in commerce where it would. There was an initial difference over whether the privilege should include taking and discharging cargo at all the points touched along the way, or whether it should cover only the carriage of traffic originating in or destined for the airlines' own national territory;[3] but even that difference was fleeting, and the broader version was agreed to. The difficulty arose over the conditions which would govern operations over the routes thus universally authorized. Specifically, the insuperable obstacle proved to be the determination of the type and degree of limitation, if any, that should apply to the "capacity" of the carriers of each nation over each of its routes.[4]

Such restrictions were common in the past, usually taking the form of a maximum limit on the number of schedules to be operated by each party to a long-term agreement. For example, when the United States and the United Kingdom made the agreement under which they started transatlantic commercial flying in May 1939, each party was allowed a maximum of two round trips a week between its territory and that of the other state. But since the hope that the sky will be less restricted after the war has been general, a reëxamination of the question of limitations seems in order. There are five general alternatives, all but one of which had earnest examination at or before Chicago: (1) No limitation; capacity to be determined solely at the discretion of the airline or its own government. (2) Fixed limitation through the terms of a route agreement; in the past, as noted above, this was common. (3) Flexible limitation through the terms of a route agreement as, for example, through a provision that the operating capacities initially established may be reconsidered at any time at the request of either of the parties, and that revisions will be made as necessary to fulfill an initially agreed set of principles, purposes or standards. (4) Limitation by reference to the continuing jurisdiction of an agreed tribunal, giving it power to determine and redetermine capacity, either in accordance with previously agreed

[3] The latter alternative is popularly referred to as "four-freedoms" operation.

[4] "Capacity," in this sense, is the total capacity to transport commercial load over a given route in some convenient unit of time. It may be expressed, for example, as the product of the number of schedules operated per week multiplied by the average commercial carrying capacity of one of the aircraft of the type used.

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general standards and principles or in the light of such principles as the tribunal itself may develop. (5) Limitation by a formula which is sufficiently complete and specific to be applicable automatically to each case that may arise, leaving no room for reasonable doubt as to interpretation.

The first three can be passed over lightly. The preference of the American delegation at Chicago for the first has already been noted, as also the unwillingness of some of the other states to concur, for reasons to be commented on below. The second has the obvious defects of rigidity. With air transport developing so rapidly, almost any figure fixed upon to define a reasonable operating capacity for a new route would probably look absurd within a couple of years. Also, this procedure reduces competition and hampers the choice of the customers among competing services, since there is a natural tendency for each party to resist modifying the terms so as to allow an increase of capacity to the other party unless its own airplanes are running full. If patrons filled the planes of one country while leaving those of the other empty, the less-favored state would scarcely agree to revise the agreement so as to authorize its rival to increase its service and acquire still more of the traffic. The third alternative, designed to escape the rigidity of the second, has not been tried. I believe it has possibilities which should be explored, but I shall not attempt the analysis here.

The other alternatives — control by an accepted tribunal and control by a self-operating formula — have been in the foreground in the discussions of recent months. Both raise large questions of principle and practice.

Early last spring, both the British and the Canadian Governments declared themselves in favor of referring the problems of operating rights to an international board. However, the American Government has consistently refused to accept the idea of giving an international air authority compulsory jurisdiction. This position has been widely criticized as being inconsistent with the governmental regulation of air transportation within the United States. A frequent comment is that it is very odd for the United States, which devised the Civil Aeronautics Board and has made good use of it, not to be willing to extend a system of proven value into the international field.[5] Even the London *Times*, which has presented the position of all parties in these debates

[5] The flattering comment on the American Board is a paraphrase of what has been said by foreign observers, not the author's praise of an agency of which he happens to be a member.

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with scrupulous balance and exceptional understanding, has said that the opposition of the American delegates "to the International extension of a system which has served them so well wears an air of paradox." [6] An American ought to explain, then, why the criticism appears ill-founded.

The argument seems to us to fail on the score of imperfect analogy. There has been no serious proposal to create an international tribunal that would have the actual character of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Americans have presented two major objections to regulation by an international authority, aside from the general objection to any regulation or limitations: 1, that no set of principles has been proposed for the authority's guidance; and 2, that in such circumstances its decisions would be as uncertain as those of a judge with no law to guide him. The first objection might be overcome. It would be difficult for all nations to agree upon a set of principles as specific as the prefatory declaration of principles and purposes in the Civil Aeronautics Act, but it should not be impossible.

The second objection is more serious. The members of the Civil Aeronautics Board, like those of other specialized tribunals in Washington, are appointed by the President. They are chosen as individuals and are responsible to no interest except that of the nation. The present members happen to come from five widely-separated parts of the United States, but in their official capacity they are associated in a common purpose. They often disagree; but their disagreements are those of individuals who arrive at different conclusions from the same set of facts, not of partisan advocates of conflicting interests.

In contrast, the only type of international board that has been seriously considered is one in which the states would have unlimited power to appoint and replace their representatives. Inevitably, the primary loyalty of such members would be to the states that appointed them rather than to a collective interest. They might be men of the highest character, deeply concerned for the welfare of all mankind and anxious to see the benefits of air transportation shared as widely as possible; but their primary responsibility would necessarily be to look after the interests of their respective states. They would be in the position in which the members of the Civil Aeronautics Board would be if, instead of being appointed by the President, they were chosen and re-

[6] The London *Times*, November 23, 1944.

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moved at will by the governors of the five states of which they are residents. They would be advocates; and, though there is nothing unrighteous about advocacy as such, there is a vast difference between it and the processes of adjudication. No international agency composed of representatives of states could be expected to bring judicial detachment to the consideration of particular cases in which large national interests were involved. The Council that is now to be created can, and I believe will, do work of immense value. For some of its purposes, the form that has been adopted would be the only one possible. The Council as a whole can hardly be expected, however, to function judicially.

Some may feel that the difference is of minor importance, but to me it seems vast and decisive, as I think anyone who has had personal experience in the field of administrative adjudication would agree. Having said as much, however, I must go on to say that in the present state of world opinion there seems no indication of a genuinely judicial international tribunal — that is, an organ of government dissociated from direct national participation or control — finding wide acceptance. Enthusiasts in many countries have dreamed of electing individual members to specialized tribunals regardless of nationality, by devices designed to assure the choice of men of internationally recognized competence, integrity and judicial temper. No government, however, has sponsored such proposals. The members of the World Court are so chosen, and Professor Jessup has called attention [7] to the number of instances in which members of that bench have cast votes in particular cases against the countries of which they were citizens; but it remains an isolated example.

Such moves as have been tried in the direction of individual membership of an international aviation board have been unsympathetically received. The Canadian Government included in its original draft of an air convention a proposal that the members of the international board should be individually elected. In the revised draft produced at the conference, the original position was abandoned in favor of a provision that the members of the board "shall in all cases be appointed by the governments concerned." Similarly, the draft convention introduced at Chicago by the American delegation proposed that 6 of the 15 members of an international council should be chosen as individuals, each to represent a geographical region comprising a number of states.

[7] Philip C. Jessup, "The Court as an Organ of the United Nations," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1945.

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This, too, had a poor reception and disappeared. In private discussion, representatives of a number of countries agreed that they could name citizens of neighboring states to whom they would entrust their national interests with perfect confidence; but as representatives of governments they were not ready for such a break with tradition.

III

The Chicago Conference, then, failing to agree either to dispense with regulatory control altogether, or to put regulatory powers in the hands of an international authority, turned to the last of the five courses mentioned above: regulation by a self-operating formula. The Canadian Government proposed that the rôle of the regulatory board be reduced to a minimum and that any airline be granted an inalienable right to increase its operated capacity whenever, for a substantial length of time, more than 65 percent of its total available capacity had actually been occupied by revenue-paying commercial load, and that conversely it must decrease the capacity whenever the proportion remained less than 40 percent. The British delegation introduced a proposal somewhat similar in principle and including rules for determining the capacity to be allotted new services, as well as for establishing the conditions governing later changes of capacity. Both suggestions, and many subsequent alternatives and variants, underwent microscopic examination. The Canadian delegates labored with special zeal, and were tireless in their efforts to find common ground.

It would be fruitless to review the discussions in detail but their trend can be summarized. As they progressed, some of the obstacles that arose were circumvented and misunderstandings clarified by the addition of more language or the adoption of new statistical devices. But while the area of disagreement was progressively narrowed, mathematical and phraseological complexity mounted until it became alarming. To statistically-minded experts it was all perfectly clear, specific and logical, but to a lay audience, or even to the entire membership of a legislative chamber, it would have been most difficult to explain. A good principle of government is that matters in which there is large public interest should not be dealt with by devices which are beyond general public comprehension. Looking back at the Chicago discussions, that principle alone would make me doubtful whether the quest for an automatic formula could ever have led to a satis-

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factory solution of the problem of regulation of air transport, even if the experts had been able to agree. There would also have been substantial administrative difficulties, entailing much work for statisticians and auditors. Still another reason to doubt the feasibility of a self-regulating formula lies in the variety of conditions confronting international air transport in various parts of the world. Western Europe, Caribbean lands and coastal Africa are so different in economic conditions, climate and terrain that no single scheme of mathematical control could be devised to fit commercial operations in them all. The final British proposal was that the methods of adjudication by a commission and control by formula should be combined, the latter being applied to homeland traffic and the former to the fifth-freedom type.

One aspect of the search for a formula should have special attention, less because of its real significance than because the press made so much of it. Some British journals in particular spoke very critically of the distinction between four freedoms and five freedoms, and of the sudden broadening of the problem presented to the Conference "when the Americans introduced the fifth freedom." The introduction of the fifth freedom was in fact an attempt to include within the area of general agreement what would otherwise have had to be accomplished through bilateral discussions. It complicated the work of the Conference to the extent that any attempt to substitute a single agreement for a large number of separate arrangements always does. But the issues raised would soon have arisen in any event, since without at least some measure of the fifth freedom the operation of long airlines extending through a number of countries would in most cases be economically impossible. The fifth freedom — to explain the terminology once again — is the right to handle traffic which neither originates nor terminates in the airline's national territory. Without that right, an outward-bound aircraft would either have to carry a solid load of passengers and goods for a single destination or, after discharging part of its load at its first stop, would proceed with part of its normal commercial capacity unused. On the homeward trip the process would be reversed, the commercial load mounting progressively. No one would be willing to run an airline on such a basis, unless it were at government expense. If a plane had to be loaded fully for a single point, with intermediate stops used solely for refueling, trips would have to be so infrequent that economical operation would be impossible. On that basis, for example, only about one through schedule a

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week could be run between the United States and the Argentine.

The opportunity of obtaining some local traffic along the way is likely to be a real condition for the survival of many intercontinental through services. Under an agreement which made no provision for the fifth freedom and which was not supplemented by bilateral arrangements, United States airlines to Europe and Africa probably would have been forced to offer service only as far as the major capitals of western Europe, with transfer to local lines there. Similarly, the companies of west European nations probably would not have been able, unless aided by heavy subsidies, to extend their eastbound routes beyond India or to supply commercial service to more than one or two intermediate points between western Europe and an Indian terminus.

To be fair one must note that some European opinion would heartily approve limiting United States airline operations across Europe and Asia. It is argued that since European transatlantic airlines would not in any case be allowed to pick up traffic in New York for interior points in the United States, American lines ought not to expect to pick up traffic in Europe for points in or beyond the Continent. American opinion generally does not find the analogy acceptable, in view of the different political organization of the two continents. It seeks the right of access by air to all the independent states of the world, under conditions permitting reasonably economical operation. For this a substantial measure of fifth-freedom rights is essential.

As the Chicago discussions proceeded the impracticability of operating long lines without fifth-freedom traffic came to be generally conceded. But there remained a clear difference of opinion as to whether fifth-freedom traffic should be placed on an equal footing with traffic originating or terminating in the homeland. The American delegation held that no distinction should be made and that an airline should be free to obtain whatever traffic it could wherever its airplanes touched, in accord with the long-established custom of the sea. The British view was that the primary purpose of an airline should be to carry its own country's traffic and that other traffic should be incidental to the operation. Some concessions were made on both sides, but not enough to effect an agreement.

IV

It may seem that I have analyzed each of the available courses to the point of destruction, but I do not think so. I have every

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confidence that we shall reach further accords and that they will cover all the main air routes of the world. In outlining the subject of regulation, I listed five alternatives. No one of the five is a finally closed door. All offer possibilities for further investigation; but all present obstacles and the nature of the obstacles must be plainly seen before their removal can be undertaken.

Much of the discussion of the subject since the Chicago Conference, however, has been more likely to arouse mutual suspicion and distrust than to contribute to ultimate agreement. In such an exchange of unbridled comment black easily becomes white, and white black, depending upon the point of view. A British proposal presented as a means of avoiding cutthroat competition and achieving decent order in the air has been unflatteringly called "cartelism." Conversely, proposals which their American advocates think offer the best air transportation for the whole world, and the greatest assurance that services will develop in accordance with the needs of the customers, are labelled in some transatlantic comment as "economic imperialism." There is little to be gained by exchanges on that level. Agreement is not to be found through mutual recrimination but in an honest and continued effort to understand one another's positions and problems and to discover new solutions that will approach the requirements of all parties.

The American and British positions on air transport typify two different points of view toward the postwar economy as a whole. Britain inexorably needs to export goods and to perform international services for others to cover the cost of her indispensable imports; and the handicaps she is under in returning swiftly to peaceful production after six years of dislocation and direct destruction by enemy action are continually in her mind. Americans realize their own productive strength, newly revealed in its full dimensions, and are reluctant to take even the slightest risk of hobbling it; and there is a widespread American conviction that the coming peace can introduce a period of unprecedented material progress, with universal benefit. The problem of air transport is a part of the broader question: Shall each nation's rôle in international trade be determined exclusively in a struggle for the favor of customers, or shall the full effects of competition be limited by international agreement, at any rate during a period of postwar transition and perhaps permanently?

The British are convinced that unrestricted competition in international air transport would result in extravagant operations in which each competitor would have to turn for support to its

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national treasury. They believe that the ill-feeling caused by the race in subsidies would handicap the coöperation of the governments for other purposes. In their thoughts, the problem of civil aviation mingles constantly with questions of security. To Britons who in the past five years have seen one-third of their homes blasted by missiles from the sky — and to the other peoples of Europe also — the airplane has more often seemed a curse than a boon, and they are more concerned with preventing a recurrence of present perils than with exploring the opportunities contained in air transport. British discussion takes it as almost axiomatic that, at any rate in Europe, a large measure of control of civil air operations is indispensable. The London *Times*, in summing up the Chicago Conference, concluded: "The international control of civil flying through the world may as yet be unattainable; but it is an urgent and patent necessity in Europe where security is an overriding consideration."[8]

The characteristic American opinion, resulting from a different experience, is that measures of security against renewed air attack must be focused upon military aeronautics, and that international air transport is of negligible significance in that connection. In the American dream, air transport offers a bright promise of more and easier intercontinental travel, better acquainted and friendlier peoples, and higher standards of living — to be realized in full only through the freest possible expansion. Americans admit that certain consequences of competition may be wasteful and destructive and that every effort should be made to prevent unfair competitive practices; but they also remember that contestants for home markets have been able to compete with one another vigorously and still remain on friendly terms, and they refuse to admit the probability that evil consequences will flow from competition in international air transport.

It seems to be a common belief in Britain that in the long run one or two nations which possess well-established aircraft industries and other advantages will dominate the world's air routes. Britain fears that the United States will enter the competition with so long a lead over the rest of the field as to make the contest an almost hopeless one; and there is an occasional intimation that the advantageous American position is due solely to our good fortune in being far removed from the battle fronts or the plunging V-2, and to our production of such great numbers of transport aircraft during the war.

[8] London *Times*, December 4, 1944.

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A corresponding American view is that if a single country could win a predominant position in civil aviation in a freely competitive economy that would be only a parallel to the historic accomplishment of British shipping in a field also closely associated with national security. Indeed, the analogy is recognized in recent British comment, some of which notes with strong disapproval the American hope for "mastery of the air comparable to British mastery of the sea in the past." Many Americans who are deeply sensible of the magnitude of British losses and sacrifices during the war, and who recognize prospective British handicaps and Britain's need for measures to protect her postwar position, still think it proper to rebut some of the current British comment by reminders that in so far as the United States now leads in civil aviation, the preëminence is not merely the result of the war but is a continuation of the situation established some years before 1939. Americans likewise point out that the present predominance of the United States in the production of transport aircraft is not unconnected with the fact that, as early as 1936, an American manufacturer already had in full production a plane which is still the mainstay of the United Nations for military air transportation.

These varying opinions and points of view must be taken into account in preparation for a resumption of the tasks left uncompleted at Chicago. There is no dogmatic answer to the question whether international competition should be left free to work out its own pattern or whether some check should be laid upon it. What nation has had a consistent record of supporting either unrestricted trade or the application of a particular principle of control? There are drawbacks to limitations on competition. There are drawbacks to the absence of any restrictions. From the experience gained at Chicago we shall have to go forward pragmatically, in search of a solution which no one will find ideal but which all can accept with reasonable satisfaction. Collective ingenuity may discover a principle for universal application, and collective goodwill may win acceptance for it. Alternatively, there may be a large number of separate solutions, not identical, yet with some features in common, defining the terms of commercial association between particular pairs of nations.

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RECONCILIATION IN INDIA

By Chakravarti Rajagopalacharia

WORLD peace and security demand that there be reconciliation in India on a stable basis. But what kind of reconciliation? The Indian people cannot be reconciled to foreign rule. It is Britain that has to be reconciled to a free India. But there must be a spirit of accommodation on both sides and there must be a concrete program, based on that spirit, for the interim period while the war is still being carried on. India needs a national government which will work to establish democracy in India as early as possible and which also will coöperate fully in the war. It is to that end that British statesmen have to be advised, and advised pretty firmly, by their friends abroad.

The continued incarceration of the leaders of the Indian National Congress makes it exceedingly difficult to recommend any proposal contrary to the ideal for which these leaders are suffering imprisonment or which modifies it materially. The intelligentsia who shape the feelings of the people of India are very sensitive. They may even be described as hypersensitive. They would prefer to stick to the ideal, however forlorn it appears, than venture on a compromise in their leaders' absence. This is a fact which cannot be set aside by argument.

The British authorities should examine the policy which keeps the Congress leaders in prison and makes it difficult for anyone to put forward a scheme of reconciliation. The policy is dictated by fear, not by a spirit of vengeance. Fear is a bad word also, but it is true that, except for a few individuals, British statesmen of all shades of opinion seem unable to get over the distrust that was generated in 1942 and are unwilling to take the risk of a popular government in India during wartime. That the fear is unfounded does not alter the reality. Governments everywhere in the world give themselves the benefit of the doubt on questions which they believe affect their security during wartime. Even if the people in India who can speak on behalf of the national leaders suggest a settlement which definitely commits the leaders and the Congress to coöperation in war measures, the risk of a breach of faith looms large in the eyes of the British authorities so long as military operations require the exploitation of Indian resources. Hence no scheme of settlement in India, however reasonable, gets the genuine support of the Governors of the provinces or of the

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Governor-General of India. And without their firm support the distant British Cabinet cannot summon up the confidence to order any change. The result is a complete deadlock in India.

International statesmen seem to have decided to be content with the British policy. Nevertheless, the effort at reconciliation should not be postponed until the war is over. To think of reconciliation simply as a part of the problem of postwar reconstruction is dangerous. I say this in spite of what Lord Wavell and even many friends in America may be inclined to think. It should be remembered that distrust tends to harden into hatred. Whenever one talks in India of reconciliation — whether to a literate city man or to an illiterate peasant, to a university undergraduate or to an official off his guard — one is asked, "Do you really trust Britain? Do you think that Britain will ever set up a constitution amounting to real independence?" The grim implication of this doubt is that men are shifting their thoughts to anarchy and to revolution based on force. One notes a loss of faith in non-violence and in constitutional methods of change. I repeat: it is dangerous to abandon plans for remedying the present situation and to be content with the idea of postwar reform.

Recent developments have made it fairly obvious that the war will not solve world conflicts. Asia, in which India occupies an important position in every respect, is likely to be the principal contributing factor to another world war and to be the principal scene of it. Size of population is one of the ultimate decisive factors in world politics. The risk offered by an India which remained in a state of ferment would be far greater than any that could be created by friction between an interim national government and the Allied Eastern Command. A program for the exploitation of Burma and India by the Great Powers in the name of world reorganization ought not to be tempting to those who really want world peace.

It is not wise to assume that the war will be over so soon that not much will be lost in India by waiting. British imperialists will not be inclined to consider the war in the East ended simply because the war position has eased. As far as India is concerned, the war in the East will continue for a good many years, and political considerations will continue to be subordinated to military exigencies. There will be a strong temptation to continue all war controls in India, to maintain the present authoritarian régime and to be dilatory with constitutional changes.

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This should not happen. The Indian issue is not a domestic one which concerns Great Britain alone. The world has shrunk, and everyone has a vital interest in India and in her political and economic condition whether aware of it or not. To make India a center of stability in Asia, consciously working for Asiatic peace and progress, is a task in world policy for the statesmen of all civilized nations.

II

Let us shut our eyes for a moment to questions of world peace and consider only India's specific problems. The Indian Government, at the center, is responsible to no one in India. The Governor-General acts under the direction of the British Cabinet and has no responsibility, under statute or convention, to the Indian legislature. The Viceroy's Council is responsible only to the Governor-General, who appoints and summons its members at his pleasure, and there is not the slightest bond between them and Indian public opinion. In Madras, Bombay, Bihar, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces the constitution is suspended and all powers of the ministers and the legislatures under the Government of India Act are exercised by the British Governor, who has advisers of his choice to assist him, mostly tired Britishers who are members of the senior grades of the permanent civil service. Each Governor acts under the private guidance of the Governor-General in matters of all-India importance, but otherwise is as powerful in his province as the Tsar was in Russia a century ago. This state of things in big and important provinces affects the others. Legislatures and ministers which are still functioning are losing power, so to say, by infection. The authoritarian régimes in neighboring provinces set the standard. Even in provinces where the Government of India Act is not suspended the British Governors are the actual rulers, enjoying unlimited authority.

Such administrations cannot be anxious to undertake a program of economic or social reconstruction which demands the close coöperation of the people. There will be make-believe programs, of course, but they can serve no purpose. Millions who have been recruited for the various war services will be rewarded, but that alone will not be real reconstruction. In every other country in the world the immediate postwar period will be a time of intense national activity. If India continues in her present unsettled state she will lose most valuable time in political con-

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troversy during the crucial postwar period, and her relative backwardness in industry and agriculture will be aggravated.

Indian national aspirations have not been and can never be extinguished or reduced by the imprisonment of leaders or by other repressive measures. The people of India demand the freedom that other nations enjoy, neither more nor less. As a result of this war, all the free nations of the world will be more interdependent than they are independent, and India would be content to accept such conditions for sovereignty as other free nations accept. But she resents being asked to reconcile herself to a position of inferiority. Indian national leaders have made demonstrable mistakes and are paying for them. But in spite of all that may happen in the immediate future, the quality and the numerical strength of the Indian people are bound to bring India freedom and to make her a leader in Asia.

I have been appealing to the Indian people on the basis of this faith. I want them to believe that under any decent settlement, whatever its shortcomings at the outset — provided it does not commit them to a course that takes them away from the goal — they can achieve their desire. I have ceaselessly appealed to the Congress to abandon the policy of abstention, to seize opportunities for exercising power as and when they come, and to use it to heal the diseases developed by subjection to external rule. I have stood out during recent times for accepting a settlement and for using the opportunities obtained under it to form the habit of a common purpose which will cut across clans, creeds and communities and establish social and economic conditions that will free India from the delusions generated by foreign rule and help her to become a strong and united people. I have faced the odium of repeatedly urging this policy of apparent surrender when the air was surcharged with rebellion and resentment against Britain.

I have done this because duty and honesty demanded it; to remain in the wilderness and allow full rein to reaction could not help the people. But my appeals for a practical course of action could have a chance only if a spirit of reconciliation animated the British authorities also. Such suggestions as I made were taken by these authorities as symptomatic of a general breakdown of Congress resistance. They made no move toward reconciliation, but on the contrary waited for a more complete collapse. And when they found that instead of a collapse of the National Congress there was a hardening of hearts and increased bitter-

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ness all around, they adopted the philosophy of drift and the slogan of "reconstruction after the war." For propaganda purposes meanwhile they found that the Moslems and the princes offered handy complications, and they used the issues which they provided to divert any attack on Britain's good faith.

When war broke out in 1939 and threatened to spread over the world the Indian National Congress desired that the people of India be declared free and fully self-governing so that they might be enabled to play their part in it. The Congress made clear in repeated resolutions that it did not adopt a pacifist attitude toward this war. It declared itself ready and willing for the fullest association with the Allied Powers, provided India's claim to independence and equality with the other free peoples of the world were admitted. The Indian National Congress stressed this positive aspect of its policy no less than it emphasized its protest against being coerced into belligerency. The issue was not properly handled by the British Government, and mutual distrust developed until it became so chronic that even the Government's declaration on the floor of the House of Commons on March 11, 1942, to which no exception could be taken, made hardly any impression on the people of India.

Even so, had more patience been shown by the British Mission in the negotiations that took place in Delhi in April 1942, and had more earnest coöperation been forthcoming from the Viceroy, the gulf might have been bridged. As everyone now knows, less attention was directed to settling the issue itself than to preparing propaganda to show who was to blame for the failure to settle it. I do not claim that the Indian leaders made no mistakes. And it is true that faults on one side can never bring disaster if compensating tact and statesmanship are developed on the other side. India could have saved the situation in spite of Viceregal non-coöperation if the Indian National Congress had displayed these qualities in more than ordinary measure. In any event, the British Government was not prepared to take risks to appease Indian nationalism nor did it display the Christian virtue of trusting those who showed distrust. It contented itself with such coöperation as it could get on its own terms, and banked on the resources it could commandeer in India by the exercise of its own physical authority. It decided to fight Indian nationalism as well as the Axis. It met every symptom of discontent with repression and offered passive resistance to all proposals for solving the deadlock. This policy still continues.

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III

A friend in Canada recently sent me a marked copy of a Canadian magazine containing an article by the British High Commissioner in Canada, the Right Honorable Malcolm MacDonald. Mr. MacDonald says that even among the primitive races in Africa the primary purpose of British administration has been and will be to train colonial peoples to stand firmly on their own feet, socially and politically. No one can predict, he says, when any particular colony will reach the goal of self-government, but so far as the British Government and the British people can determine, the time for its arrival in India has been fixed. But certain practical difficulties prevent fulfillment, he continues, and the source of these difficulties lies not in British policy but in the people of India. We are told that the princes complicate the issue and that the Hindu and Moslem communities have not yet been able to compose their political differences and to agree upon a constitution for a self-governing India. The British High Commissioner in Canada is certain that if the people of India can agree among themselves, their complete national freedom is assured at the end of the war, as a dominion or as an independent nation outside the Commonwealth. He points out that the British Government has agreed to implement this policy "in the letter and the spirit" as soon as the war has ended.

While I admit that these promises have been made and that the British people are morally bound to see that their Government fulfills them, I must say that judged by present conduct what the British High Commissioner in Canada has written and British propagandists are saying is not the whole truth; and a half truth is often worse than a complete fabrication.

Does Britain wish to present these two points about the princes and the Moslems as mere excuses for a policy of drift? Or does Britain feel unhappy over these two difficulties and wish to overcome them? If the latter, what prevents her from setting up a court of arbitration to settle these two difficulties? India is prepared at once to accept any just and fair award that will end them. Why should she wait for the end of the war in the Far East as well as in the West? Will the establishment of a representative government in India be a greater distraction than, for example, the presidential election in America? Surely there are compensating advantages even if India did have to suffer a temporary distraction of that kind.

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IV

The Moslem League's demand is contained in the following resolution which it adopted at Lahore in 1940: "It is the considered view of this session of the All-India Moslem League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Moslems unless it is designed on the following basic principle, *viz.* that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

Mr. Jinnah was approached by Mr. Gandhi in September 1944 with the following terms, which go by the name of the "C. R. formula:"

"Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League to which Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavor respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve: (1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Moslem League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will coöperate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period. (2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed to demarcate contiguous districts in the northwest and east of India, wherein the Moslem population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favor of forming a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either state. (3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held. (4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defense, for commerce and communications and for other essential purposes. (5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis. (6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India."

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Mr. Jinnah refused to accept these terms and demanded that partition should be agreed to without any plebiscite and that the areas to be demarcated into a new state should include the whole of Bengal, the whole of Assam and the whole of Punjab as the administrative boundaries now stand. This is a demand which if accepted would force the eastern half of the Punjab and the western half of Bengal (which have no Moslem majorities) into a Moslem state. As for Assam, all but one of the districts in that province contain a vastly preponderant majority of Hindus. The Pakistan conceded in the "C. R. formula" — *viz.* the provinces of Sind, the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan, those districts of the Punjab and Bengal which contain a Moslem majority, and Sylhet in Assam — would consist of two contiguous areas in the northwest and east, as described in the Moslem League resolution, which in size, population and resources would be comparable to most free states in the world and would be larger than many European states of established importance. The population would be more than 60,000,000, occupying more than 150,000 square miles with splendid river basins and a great port.

Mr. Jinnah's refusal of this offer, his demand for partition without ascertaining the wishes of the people in the areas concerned, and his demand for the inclusion of definitely Hindu areas, indicate that he has for some reason lost confidence in the soundness of the policy of separation for which he ostensibly stands. The demand for separation made by the Moslem League in 1940 was a bold adventure; but it is ever the case that we show more courage when demanding something which the other party will not give than when what we demanded arrives and we have to accept it and take responsibility for it. The difficulties of sustaining a separate sovereign state become more obvious when the claim to the state is granted. To overcome these difficulties additional claims are made. Not the champions of a unitary Indian Government but the Moslem League itself dealt a severe blow to the Pakistan scheme in September last. If the League's contention is that Pakistan cannot maintain itself without the inclusion of non-Moslem areas within its boundaries, any international tribunal would deem the admission fatal to the case for separation.

The breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks last September gives everyone an opportunity to think about Pakistan in more clarified terms. If the Moslems can reconcile themselves to a united and federated India, they can have it and even enjoy a

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privileged place in it. Many responsible Moslems in provinces throughout India in which they are in a minority accept this solution. If Moslems want a halfway house in the shape of a confederation of free units in voluntary combination, without prejudice to the potential sovereignty of the units, they can have such an arrangement. If they do not want to be a unit in any federation or confederation, but desire to form the separate sovereign state outlined at Lahore in 1940, they can have that. Just, fair and feasible conditions under which they can have it have been stated, and it is not easy to see how they could be improved. The Indian National Congress has definitely committed itself to recognizing the right of regional self-determination; but it cannot agree to partition without ascertaining the wishes of the people concerned, for to do so would be inconsistent with modern notions of constitution-making.

Sir Frederick Puckle has given the readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS a study of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks.[1] He seeks to extract from their breakdown the largest possible amount of material to justify the British policy of drift. He says that the issues responsible for the breakdown are: (1) Mr. Jinnah insists that the Moslems and the Hindus are two different "nations." (2) Mr. Jinnah desires partition *before* Britain retires from India and hands over responsibility to a provisional government.

It is remarkable how gently British critics have dealt with Mr. Jinnah since the episode of last September. Plainly they are pleased. In no other case would obvious intransigence be so generously analyzed and so readily excused. The great fact that Mr. Gandhi has agreed to the partition which the Moslem League demanded — on conditions framed so as to satisfy any impartial tribunal — is brushed aside, and attention is diverted to the theory on which the claim for partition is said to be founded. The Lahore resolution of the League makes no reference to the "two-nations" theory. Let us assume, however, that the League's demand is based on the notion that the Moslems of Bengal, Punjab, Sind, the Frontier and Baluchistan (who speak the four different languages of those four areas and belong to four or more ethnic stocks) have coalesced into a nationhood which is distinct from that of the Hindus of those areas (who speak these same languages and come from these same stocks). Let us assume further that as a result of the religion professed and the political

[1] *Cf.* Sir Frederick Puckle, "The Gandhi-Jinnah Conversations," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1945.

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events and controversies of the last few years there is a subjective necessity, associated with group-identity, which makes the Moslems of these areas demand a separate existence, whatever name we might give it. It still does not stand to reason that when the demand for partition is accepted, the particular theory propounded for justifying the demand must likewise be accepted. Mr. Gandhi could not accept the theory; but he did not for that reason refuse to agree to the partition, provided the people to be separated voted for it.

Nor is there more in the second reason for the breakdown put forward by Sir Frederick Puckle. Mr. Jinnah does not imagine that the British will leave an army in India to maintain the partition when they retire. It is idle to imagine that the order in which the two constitutional events take place — withdrawal of British domination and partition in terms of the Moslem League demand — makes any material difference in the situation. The power to sustain a separate state must come from within, not from without, whether the actual partition is prior to the transfer of responsibility or subsequent to it. Mr. Gandhi's proposal was that a definite agreement be reached now, when the British are ruling from Delhi, and that Mr. Jinnah himself should appeal to all the people of India to accept that settlement. There was no question of one party being bound when the other was not. With great respect I must say that Sir Frederick Puckle's analysis evades the point.

V

We come to the seemingly greater constitutional obstacle to Indian democracy — the treaty-protected Indian princes whose territories sprawl all over India. These princes and their ministers claim the privilege of creating difficulties for democracy without opposing it. They rely for this on the terms of treaties entered into with the British East India Company and with the Governor-General acting on behalf of the British Crown. Against the claim of Indian nationalism they claim alliance with the King of Great Britain, and therefore sovereign status. They claim as a corollary the right of non-accession to any Indian federation based on democracy to which they do not individually and specifically give their approval. They claim the right to lay down conditions for joining such a federation, one of which is that their representatives on the Federal legislature shall be persons they nominate and not persons elected by their subjects. In internal

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administration they refuse to march with the times and to give to their own people the political rights that the people of the provinces in British India enjoy under the Government of India Act; there is, however, no difference whatever in the condition, education and culture of the people of the two intermingled areas. They talk of the genius and tradition of their areas and propose that they be developed along these lines, not along the line of constitutional reform followed in British India. All this is just dust thrown in the eyes of the foreign critic.

They use the phrase "internal autonomy," meaning thereby the maintenance of their own personal rule as against the movement for democracy percolating into their domain. They actually claim under the treaties that British military forces should uphold their authority against their own subjects. Any effective movement for constitutional reform, however non-violent, is given the name of revolt. The legislative assemblies functioning in some of these Indian states are mere durbars, as Professor Coupland has stated in his recent book.[2] The princes try to create the illusion of democracy with the help of large blocks of members who are not elected by the people but appointed by the executive. Some of the Indian states can point to economic prosperity and industrial progress; but that does not mean that they have made political progress. In some fields autocratic rule can quickly achieve results that take considerable time and troublesome work in democracies. For instance, in the province of Madras the provincial government had to pass difficult legislation and struggle through endless litigation in order to throw open the temples to the so-called untouchables, whereas the Government of Travancore merely issued and enforced a proclamation to that same end. In matters that do not affect the personal authority of the princes and their ministers much can be done in some of the advanced states; and much has been done. But good government is no substitute for self-government.

Princely India cannot complicate the issue if Britain makes up her mind not to permit it. British Governors-General have dealt firmly with the princes in the past and are still dealing with them without much difficulty. Minority problems present themselves wherever democracy is established. In the modern world, where racially and religiously homogeneous populations are a thing of the past, we may and should conciliate every minority. But even

[2] Reginald Coupland, "The Indian Problem." New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

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the most powerful minorities cannot be allowed to veto for all time the lawful aspirations of the majority. The majority in India has never objected to an equitable distribution of power and responsibility or to the most careful and particular protection of the civic, economic and political rights of minorities.

VI

If the British Government makes up its mind to find a solution for the present deadlock in India more than one can be found and more than one method could be adopted to form a satisfactory central authority based on popular support. The simplest solution would be for the British Government to restore the autonomous provincial governments under the Government of India Act of 1935 — ordering fresh elections if it wishes to do so — and to ask each of the 11 provinces to send a representative to the Viceroy's Council. The British Government would then invest that Council with full authority to coöpt a few other members and to run the interim Government of India for the duration. It is wholly wrong to maintain the present absolutist government — wrong because to foster bitterness and hatred in a vast population is most unwise. In 1935 the British Parliament after great deliberation passed a statute, the Government of India Act. Part of it was put in operation in 1937; the other part, dealing with the Federal Government of India, was not then brought into force. Either an *ad hoc* government or a federal government formed according to the plan in the Government of India Act of 1935 should be brought into existence at once.

Only then can the demand of British statesmen for an agreed constitution be accepted as genuine. Further, only this will promote a reasonable attitude on the part of minorities who are now unwilling to give the majorities what must be given under any form of working democracy. There can be a definite understanding that as soon as fresh terms are agreed to as a result of mutual adjustment or arbitration, such terms will replace the relevant provisions of the federal constitution laid down in the present Government of India Act (1935). There is no reason why a constitution approved by Parliament after great deliberation should lie in the archives without being put into effect.

At the end of the war the British Government's declaration of March 1942, relating to the granting of dominion status to India with the right of secession conceded to other dominions, should be brought into full effect. In the interim period all the safeguards

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needed to make sure that the war effort is carried on in full strength and without friction can be applied. The Indian National Congress has never questioned the propriety of keeping military affairs in the hands of the British Cabinet during the war period, whatever arrangements were made to transfer sovereignty to the people of India. This was made perfectly clear in 1942 and it was reiterated by Mr. Gandhi after his release in 1944. Where complicated group-motives which work against democracy have been generated, a sanction is required to quicken the urge for mutual accommodation. That sanction, I suggest, can be found in the interim enforcement of the statute already adopted by Parliament and assented to by His Majesty the King of Great Britain in accordance with the British Constitution. A move forward, and a threat to stragglers that they will be left behind, are the conditions necessary to create the will to agreement.

After this war the doctrine of non-interference by the state in economic fields, as well as the political doctrine of individualism, will have to give way to the need for state-planned civil life. We cannot go back to the old order without courting disaster. Unless a popular government takes charge in India there will be no possibility of moving effectively toward a harmonious development of planned civil life. Even measures which are in themselves good will appear to be wrong if taken on the initiative of a government like that now in charge. The forces of reaction and corruption are not slow in organizing pseudo-patriotic opposition to any plan for reconstruction or reorganization that threatens to hurt private capital. Propaganda in India is not all done in the newspapers. Without going into details, one would be correct in saying, in general, that unless there is a popular government in India it will be impossible to save proposals for national planning from becoming suspect.

If India is put right she will play a great part in the advance of Asia as a whole. As things now stand she is entitled to leadership in Asia by every test except that of self-government. It is the moral responsibility of Britain to perform the double function of putting things right in India and of retiring in favor of a stable democracy. To see that this double task is performed has become the moral responsibility of the Allied nations also, for they have helped Britain to hold her position. They must see to it that their rôle does not degenerate into merely helping maintain British imperialism.

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SWEDEN: A CASE STUDY IN NEUTRALITY

By Bruce Hopper

AFTER two world-scale wars in one generation the possibility that neutrality can again be made the permanent basis of foreign policy of a Great Power seems to be precluded. Some go further and predict the end of small states, thus of all neutrality. In this view, small states are destined to become appanages of their most immediate Great Power neighbors, enjoying, perhaps, a cultural autonomy but without effective control of their foreign affairs or their own defense. This assumption of the "withering away" of small states, suggesting at least the partial obliteration of the identities of peoples with long traditions of freedom and independence, plus the discard of the institution of neutrality which once served as a refuge for small nations — such a prospect must make the historian pause to search for proof or disproof of the contention.

I. SMALL STATES AND NEUTRALITY

The nation-states system, comprising the European family of nations, came into being in response to the realities and needs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The end of feudalism and the emergence of nation-states were hastened by the Reformation which broke the unity of Christendom and fragmented the Holy Roman Empire. In that historic struggle to gain the right to particularism the regions which were to become small states in western Europe assumed a disproportionate share of the total effort (*e.g.* Switzerland, the Low Countries, Sweden). They then rated high. And their important functions in the community were duly recognized in the precepts of the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, which ended the religious wars and made the first great architectural blueprint of the European nation-states system.

It was in this period that international law, already formulated by Grotius and his predecessors, became recognized as the desired guide for the behavior of the relatively new state sovereignties. Rules were imperative to replace the repudiated restraints of the Church upon secular princes. Also, the doctrine of Balance of Power, emerging from the condition of shifting political affinities in the sixteenth century, was likewise admitted to be operative, although never erected into formal law. This

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atmosphere of respect for state sovereignties, regardless of size, permitted small states to develop their own "personalities" according to their own resources and the genius of their own peoples. They served as buffers between their expansion-minded big neighbors. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were active participants in Balance of Power politics, and were often drawn into the dynastic wars to restore the equilibrium. But whether the small states took part in hostilities or not, the ideal of a reign of law and the reality of a Balance of Power were the *sine qua non* of their existence.

The first change appeared early in the nineteenth century. Small states began to avoid military participation in the process of preserving the Balance of Power; they sought security in neutrality. This change was not a matter of choice. It was dictated by the "nation-in-arms" concept of the French Revolution, by the spread of conscription, and by the advance of war techniques. States with great traditions but small manpower could no longer afford the luxury of military prestige.

Notable amongst such small states are Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (comprising the Oslo Group, so called after the conference in the Norwegian capital, 1930). With the sole exception of Denmark (attacked in 1864) these five states enjoyed the benefits of respected neutrality for nearly a century. They used the historic opportunity to cultivate the garden of their own material and spiritual resources. The creative energies of their cultural centers contributed in large measure to the unparalleled development of western civilization in the nineteenth century. But, as they dropped out of active participation in politics of the Balance, and sought a presumed security in neutrality, they became more vulnerable. The Prusso-Austrian attack on Denmark was the first warning. Belgium barely escaped being sucked into the war of 1870 — which escape was considered a "miracle." She was overrun in 1914 — when the Netherlands escaped, also by a "miracle." Neutrality was no longer a safe refuge for a small state which happened to lie athwart the line of war.

It is not surprising, therefore, that "the Oslo States" were the most ardent supporters of the Geneva collective security system, which promised them a new basis for foreign policy. Their statesmen of the time — Paul Hymans of Belgium, van Karnebeek of the Netherlands, Munch of Denmark, Nansen of Norway, and Branting of Sweden — represented the best there was in the

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Geneva spirit. But like many other liberal statesmen they seemed to be unwilling to pay the final cost of the League method to maintain peace — military sanctions. They did support economic sanctions against Italy; some proposed, on a voluntary basis, to boycott German goods as well. But the failure of the sanctions, and the acceptance by the Great Powers of German rearmament, killed any remaining hope in collective security. New dangers appeared. The British-German Naval Agreement of 1935 changed the naval Balance of Power in the Baltic. Acceptance of the German remilitarization of the Rhine in 1936 likewise exposed the frontiers of Belgium and the Netherlands. And the appeasement policy which produced the Munich Agreement led to the dismemberment of a small state, Czechoslovakia — a final warning to all the others.

The portentous collapse of collective security forced the Oslo States back to their only alternative, neutrality, which they all promptly declared in September 1939. During the "sitz" war their faith in miracles was supported by the mere fact of having survived at least the opening chapters. The first victims were Denmark and Norway in April 1940, to be followed a month later by Belgium and the Netherlands. According to statements since made by political leaders of these four states, they intend never to return to the principle of neutrality hereafter. The reduction of the number of Oslo neutrality aspirants by 80 percent turns the highlight on the remaining member — Sweden, an oasis of neutrality encircled by war.

Sweden may be considered a case study in the survival of neutrality. Switzerland, one of the other two European democracies not drawn into the war, is not typical since she has long been recognized as a permanent neutral; while Eire's case is likewise in some degree special because of her geographical position. How explain Sweden's effective preservation of neutrality through five and a half years of war on her borders? The true answers will be possible only when the archives, especially in Germany, are opened to scholars. Meanwhile, however, one may note some of the peculiarities of Sweden's position and interpret her performance in so far as the facts can be made known.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF SWEDEN'S NEUTRAL POSITION

Sweden's northern position, on the flank rather than on the immediate line of war, made it unnecessary at first for the belligerents to cross Swedish soil to come to grips with each other.

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That situation was somewhat altered by the presence later of German troops in northern Norway and Finland, between which the rail connections are on Swedish soil.

Most of the Swedish coast faces east. It is not without significance that whereas Danish and Norwegian Vikings pursued adventures along the Atlantic seaboard, Swedish Vikings went east, and founded the Rurik dynasty in Kievan, Russia. The Swedes acquired and Christianized Finland seven hundred years ago. They expanded into the area recently known as the Baltic States. Sweden lost her Eastern Baltic Empire, the mouth of the Neva and surrounding areas, to Peter the Great (1721), and Finland to Alexander I (1809). The memories of Sweden's warrior centuries still linger in the Swedish mind; and the sympathy felt toward small peoples once under her beneficent rule — especially the Finns — is like that of a mother toward a remembered child.

German influence in Sweden has always been significant, as in that of the Hanseatic League, Protestantism, German science, etc. But the Swedes, free from immemorial times, early took the road to democracy, a road which diverged from that followed by Germany. After sharing in the creation of the nation-states system, and in the Balance of Power politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they turned inward in the nineteenth century to develop their forestry and iron-ore industries, their water power and shipbuilding and the carrier trade. Sweden became prosperous. In the process, the people developed a social democracy, high in welfare, and dramatized it as the "Middle Way." Of the six million Swedes, half of whom are workers in industry or on the soil, the overwhelming majority are emotionally and intellectually devoted to the cause of the great American and British democracies. In some districts of Sweden there is scarcely a family which cannot claim relatives amongst the million Swedes resident in America.

III. CHANGES IN THE CONDITIONS OF NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE WARS

Swedish neutrality during the First World War was facilitated by the Balance of Power, which existed almost to the end. German armies were engaged on two fronts. Moreover, the Swedish Army was relatively strong and well equipped; and the Baltic at that time was a barrier to aggression in the given stage of war techniques.

The Second World War broke on a different scene. In the

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1920's Sweden had radically disarmed, and her belated efforts to strengthen her defenses had not produced significant results. The tremendous development in the range and complexity of weapons, moreover, placed all small states at an enormous disadvantage. In particular, the Baltic Sea offered no protection against bombers.

The constellation of the Powers also had shifted. The rearmament of Germany altered the Balance of Power in Northern Europe. Then came the bombshell of the German-Russian Treaty, August 23, 1939, announcing that the two greatest Powers of the Continent intended to "collaborate." It was recalled that a previous "collaboration" between the Germanic Powers and Russia was for the purpose of partitioning Poland; that "collaboration" between Napoleon and Alexander I initiated at Tilsit led like an arrow in 1809 to Sweden's loss of Finland, the Aaland Islands and part of Swedish Lapland. Even the Swedish mainland was thought to be slated for partition in 1809. Statesmen of small nations have ample historic reasons to dread the *dénouements* of collaboration between Great Powers. In 1939 they had not long to wait.

IV. SWEDISH NEUTRALITY, SEPTEMBER 1939 — JUNE 1940: EUROPEAN POLITICS FOCUSSED IN THE NORTH

The fourth partition of Poland was the first territorial seizure of the Second World War. In October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed agreements permitting Russian military use of their territories; the following summer they were absorbed into the Soviet Union as constituent Soviet Republics. There were also Russian negotiations with Finland to acquire territory near Leningrad and to lease a naval base at Hangö; these dragged on for nearly two months, until on November 30 the Russian air bombardment of Helsinki opened the "Winter War."

Sweden now faced fateful decisions. Innumerable bonds of tradition and common history united the Finnish and Swedish peoples. The Finnish seaboard (especially the Aaland Islands at the doorstep of Stockholm) is of immense strategic importance to Sweden. Urged by their own sympathies, and encouraged by the intense reactions of public opinion in Britain, France and America, thousands of young Swedes enlisted as volunteers in the Finnish Army. Swedish workers collected funds to send the Finns arms.

But in spite of the public clamor at home and abroad the

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Swedish Government stood steadfast in its policy of neutrality. The reasons were various. Sweden's armaments were very unsatisfactory. Also, the policy of neutrality had become a tradition. Of even more significance was the prevailing belief that the western Powers would have welcomed a diversion of warfare from the stalemate of the Siegfried Line to the iron-ore fields of northern Scandinavia. So while volunteers and arms were allowed to go to Finland, official intervention was rejected. Criticism of the government was called "cowardly" both inside and outside Sweden.

On March 2, 1940, the British and French Governments announced to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments their intention of sending an expeditionary force to aid Finland against Russia. They requested transit privileges, and promised aid in case of a German attack. The Swedish Government refused instantly, the Norwegian within three days. On March 12 the Russo-Finnish peace was signed. In the light of subsequent events it is reasonable to presume that the Allies do not now regret the Norwegian and Swedish refusals.

Meanwhile, the Swedish Foreign Office had assumed the rôle of intermediary between Russia and Finland. An agreement could not be reached so long as the Finnish Army was successful and expectant of Allied help. When Russian numerical superiority was brought to bear the end came quickly. To the credit of the Soviet Government, it did not increase its demands of October 1939, except for adding the town of Viborg. It was resolved not to be drawn into the general war through a crisis in Scandinavia. Certainly, however, the Soviet Government never trusted in its "collaboration" with Germany (as shown by its reluctance to deliver promised supplies) and fully expected Hitler to attack eastward after he had made his west wall secure.

The Russo-Finnish peace brought Sweden but a few moments to catch her breath. The British and French continued to press the Northern Kingdoms. In early April they laid mines in Norwegian waters. German propaganda subsequently tried to prove that the Allied mine-laying was sufficient justification for the invasion of Norway. As a matter of historical fact, the Germans could not have known of the mines when their troops set sail for the attack. The Swedish Government actually had inklings of the pending attack late in March, and passed the information on to Oslo and Copenhagen; but there it was not taken too seriously.

During the Norwegian campaign Sweden lived in daily ex-

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pectation of attack. By the end of April the Swedish Army was fully mobilized. Stockholm was partly evacuated. What was not obvious then, as it is now, was that the Germans wanted control of the two countries bordering the North Sea only as a flank for the intended assault on Britain. Only if the German Army experienced great difficulties in Norway would Sweden have been in imminent danger because of the German transport problems. The speed of the German advance in Norway postponed the actual threat. Only in the north, around Narvik, were the Allies able to inflict serious losses on the German divisions. As General Dietl's position became serious the Germans requested permission to transport arms and munitions across Sweden to Narvik. The Swedish Government refused. Dietl's position became even more critical at the end of May, and German demands for transit were underlined more definitely with threats. Swedish officials have stated that a German attack on Sweden was impending on June 7, 1940. At that moment the Allies evacuated Narvik. Sweden was saved.

In viewing the events of this first period one finds an illustration of the dictum that the neutrality of a small state is possible only when the Balance of Power is in operation. German-Russian "collaboration" radically changed the previous balance in the eastern Baltic. That meant disaster for many Poles, Balts and Finns. The Germans obviously had no desire for complications in Sweden, however, unless compelled by military necessity. They also at the time were obliged to consider Russia's interests. According to Swedish sources, the Soviet Government had let it be known in Berlin by mid-April that Russia's interests included respect for the neutrality and independence of Sweden. The internal politics of the upset Balance of Power thus operated in Sweden's favor. Her escape, however, was of the narrowest kind, depending on the timing in the Allied evacuation of Narvik.

V. SWEDISH NEUTRALITY, JUNE 1940–JUNE 1941: ISOLATED SWEDEN FACE-TO-FACE WITH GERMANY

The capitulation of France in mid-June of 1940 changed the whole outlook. The frightening success of the German armies spread a pall over the Allied cause, brightened only by the British heroism during and after Dunkirk. Moscow's gloom over the disintegration of Russian influence in the Balkans should have been an index to events in store. Finland began to formulate hopes for German support against Russia. It was at that darkest

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hour for the existing and prospective opponents of the Nazis that Sweden suddenly found herself completely isolated — face-to-face with an all but triumphant Germany.

On June 15 Germany renewed the demand for transit privileges to Norway. It was pointed out that as fighting had ceased in Norway, facilities for transit could not alter the *de facto* situation. The Swedes managed to whittle down the demands. The Transit Agreement signed July 5, 1940, permitted transit over Sweden of unarmed German troops and war materials under Swedish control. It was agreed that the number of troops moving each way should balance, so that no military change would result. Criticism within Sweden flared up at once, and never ceased until the agreement was cancelled three years later.

It will always be difficult for a foreign observer to understand why the Swedish Government did not admit that the Transit Agreement was a violation of neutrality, accepted under the threat of *force majeure*. Allied forces certainly could not at that time have supported Sweden. A parallel in reverse might be found in the closing of the Burma Road at the behest of Japan. Further, the Balance of Power in northern Europe had ceased to operate; the neutrality principle went into abeyance.

In the interim between the summer of 1940 and the late spring of 1941 formidable German armies were unemployed on the Continent. Did Germany during this lull meditate an attack on Sweden? Occupation of the country would have facilitated the task in Norway and provided an excellent flank position for the attack on Russia. The Nazis had no reason to sympathize with the Social Democrats who made up the majority of the Swedish Government, and even less for the Swedish press which had carried on a violent anti-Nazi campaign since 1933. Were there economic reasons for the hesitation to attack Sweden? The coveted open iron mines of Kiruna are in northern Sweden, protected by the icy terrain; the power plants of the mines were marked for instant destruction in event of a blitz assault. These considerations may have carried weight. What is more likely is that the German leaders, elated by the success in France, felt it was only a question of time before the Balkan countries, Switzerland and Sweden would all pass under German control without a struggle. Also, the arch-enemy, Britain, was shaken but unbowed. The German hope in the air blitz to conquer Britain was not abandoned until December 1940. Meanwhile, Mussolini, at the end of October 1940, without German approval and possibly

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against German advice, began his ill-fated attack on Greece. The Balkans forthwith demanded German attention. The focus of European politics moved south, but for some months Sweden's position remained precarious.

Observers in Stockholm believed that Hitler in March 1941 had already taken the decision to attack Russia. The tension between the two erstwhile "collaborators" increased as German armies moved eastward. Swedish military experts again expected that as a preliminary to the German campaign in Russia their country would be attacked. Their fears were more intense than at any moment since the Allies evacuated Narvik. The break in the spell came with the military rising against the appeasement government in Yugoslavia. The German armies, fresh from long unemployment, began their preliminaries in the south rather than the north; early in April 1941 they marched to the campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece. The Germans were delayed two months too long in their race against the Russian snows, as the sequel proved in November when German tanks froze in their tracks — Moscow was saved by the Red Army in alliance with King Winter. When the two giants of Europe were joined in struggle the pressure on Sweden was lifted and the country again had a breathing space.

During the twelve months of this second period Swedish foreign policy could only mark time, waiting for new German demands, postponing decisions and giving away as little as possible. Parliament was virtually unanimous in support of the government policy, but discussions in the press were often very bitter. The Finnish problem was always present. German propaganda persistently played on historic Swedish sympathy for Finland and fear of Russia. The trend in Finland was to hope for the recovery of the provinces lost in March 1940. Finnish-German relations, which had been cold in the spring of 1940, were suspiciously cordial a year later. The Swedish Government did seek to widen the base of its neutrality by establishing permanent collaboration with Finland, and went so far as to suggest a formal union. That effort failed, probably because of opposition from both Germany and Russia. Finland drifted rapidly into the German orbit. Though a German-Finnish military alliance was out of line with Sweden's vital interests, the Swedish Government made no serious attempt to prevent it. Sweden's tender attitude toward Finland often baffles foreign observers in Stockholm, and in this case it is indeed difficult to understand.

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VI. SWEDISH NEUTRALITY, JUNE 1941–FEBRUARY 1943: THE BALANCE OF POWER RESTORED

The movement of the war to the east *ipso facto* restored a semblance of the Balance of Power and permitted a more active Swedish policy. In Stockholm opinions were divided as to the outcome of the gigantic struggle in Russia. To some it seemed obvious that a German victory in the east would again destroy the equilibrium and reduce Sweden to a status like that of Vichy.

The Swedish Government did not seem to endorse these conclusions, though in dealing with German demands it moved with characteristic slowness. When Germany launched her attack on Russia she asked Sweden for additional transit facilities. This was granted with the explicit understanding that only one German division could be shunted from Norway over Sweden to Finland. The Germans likewise requested permission to fly over Swedish territory and to lay mines in certain areas of the Baltic. These demands were supported by Finland. Many Swedes, especially in conservative and military circles, were led by their sympathies and concern for the fate of Finland to swing over to the German side. It is a matter of history that during the hurried summer weeks of 1941 Sweden accepted the most important Finnish-German demands. She had reason to regret it in the years that followed.

It is interesting to note that the free press of Sweden rendered extremely valuable service to the Allied cause during the confused months when the German armies were slashing through Ukraina to the Don. Had Sweden, like Finland, adopted a censorship which would have befuddled alike the minds of the people and the judgment of the censoring government itself, the difficulty of disentangling and reëstablishing the permanent interests of Swedish policy would have become too great. As it was, the emotional pressure of the first few weeks was offset by the free exchange of ideas and opinions in press and parliament; and thanks to the public discussion of its policy the Swedish Government was able to grope its way back to true neutrality. German demands for further transit facilities were rejected. Those who advocated the suppression of the Communist Party were frowned upon. Already before the Battle of Moscow Sweden was carrying on economic negotiations with Russia, planning her future relations with a country which German and Finnish propagandists painted as "the eternal enemy of Swedish independence."

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In February 1942 the Swedish Army was again fully mobilized. To the foreigner in Stockholm the recurrent rumors of impending attack seemed exaggerated. It must be remembered, however, that the Swedish Government was beginning to reassert the principles of strict neutrality. As German difficulties in Russia increased Berlin's irritation at this increased. The main factor in Sweden's renewal of confidence was her armament program, under way since 1939. As a matter of fact, in the view of Allied military experts Sweden could not have resisted German troops in 1940 very much more effectively than did Norway. But by 1942 the training program had begun to yield gratifying results, and stocks of arms had vastly increased in spite of the fact that trade relations with the west had been severed. Even so, it is to be doubted whether Sweden could have waged a successful defensive war until the autumn of 1943, by which time Germany had been fatally weakened by her reverses in Russia. By then Sweden was ready.

The factor of foreign trade should also be taken into account because it is relatively of great importance in Sweden. The country's export industries — timber, pulp, paper, special steel, engineering products — are the backbone of her economic life. At the beginning of the war the Swedish Government negotiated in both London and Berlin to find "a basis for Swedish foreign trade within the framework of neutrality." War Trade Agreements were concluded in December 1939 with Britain as well as with Germany. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway, however, closed down the western trade, which before the war had taken 70 percent of total Swedish exports. The dilemma was made more serious by the threat of mass unemployment in the export industries. Also, Sweden badly needed coal, coke, fertilizers, non-ferrous metals, etc. At that moment Germany offered to supply Sweden's needs from the greatly enlarged areas of German control on the Continent, and at the same time to absorb Sweden's exports — on the single condition that her trade with the western Powers, already reduced to a trickle, be definitely ruptured. The Swedish Government dragged out negotiations through 1940, and then finally gave a flat no to the proposal of exclusive trade with the German "Raum." In September 1940 substantial Swedish credits were provided for the promotion of exports to the Soviet Union. And a trade relationship was maintained with the western Powers, first through Petsamo, later via Gothenburg. The fact remains that trade with Germany

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was increased in 1941 and 1942, for the purpose of obtaining necessary coal, coke and fertilizers; and unemployment was avoided partly by the export of timber and pulp to the Continent, and partly by diverting labor power into rearmament.

VII. SWEDISH NEUTRALITY REËSTABLISHED, 1943

As the war dragged on, and especially after America's entry into it, the Allies increased their pressure on Sweden to diminish exports to the Axis. After Stalingrad (February 1943) they insisted that Sweden's position had become strong enough to curtail such deliveries drastically. The Swedes invariably replied that their exports were necessary as payment for imports, such as coal, which were essential to their economic life, and incidentally to their rearmament. Matters came to a head in the spring of 1943 when a Swedish delegation came to London for discussions with British and American representatives. A general understanding resulted. The Transit Agreement of 1940 with Germany was denounced. Swedish exports to Germany were steadily diminished.

This swing back to strict neutrality naturally affected Germany's ally, Finland. Swedish deliveries to Finland were also cut down. And Swedish public opinion began openly to criticize Finnish policy. Already in the autumn of 1943 the Swedish Government had attempted to bring about peace discussions between Finland and Russia. A basis for an understanding was created in early 1944; but President Ryti made a brusque *volte face* and reaffirmed the entente with Hitler. Finally, in July 1944, contacts between Finland and Russia were reëstablished by the Swedish Foreign Office, and the long-delayed peace was concluded.

The trade policy which Sweden initiated in the summer of 1943 was accentuated in the following months. In August 1944 all Swedish ports on the Baltic were closed to seaborne trade with Germany. Swedish exports to Germany were reduced to almost nothing.

It remains to add that on November 9, 1944, Germany proclaimed that the Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia were an operational area, and that vessels found there would be sunk without warning. This policy obviously was directed against Finnish coastal traffic and possible Russo-Swedish trade in Finnish vessels, as well as against the delivery from Sweden to Finland of sorely needed vital supplies. The Battle of the Baltic still impends.

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The focus of European politics may again shift to the north before the final chapter of the war.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

From Sweden's experiences as a neutral in this war it is possible to draw several lessons of a general nature.

(1) The neutrality of a small state is dependent on the existence of a Balance of Power. Between September 1939 and June 1941 the military balance was upset by the "collaboration" between the two greatest continental Powers. In that period Poland and the four small states of the eastern Baltic and the four small states bordering on the North Sea were all mowed down by the two "collaborating" Great Powers of the Continent. Sweden had three moments of imminent danger — when the Allies sought transit for an expeditionary force to aid Finland, early in March 1940; just before the Allies evacuated Narvik, early in June 1940; and when the Germans were preparing for their campaign in Russia, late in the spring of 1941.

Sweden's escape in the early period may be attributed to the internal politics of the upset Balance (*e.g.* Russia's intercession) and to the skill of the Swedish Government in manœuvring between German demands and an emotionally aroused Swedish public. After the fall of France, it was natural that Sweden, relatively unarmed and isolated and facing Germany alone in the north, should make concessions to her under duress. Even after June 1941, Sweden, an encircled and prosperous democracy, still lay like a ripe apple between the jaws of German armies in Norway and Finland, and such concessions perforce were continued. Not until the summer of 1943 (after Stalingrad) was Sweden in a position to reassert the principles of strict neutrality. Not until the autumn of 1943 was her rearmament sufficiently advanced to permit her to consider waging a defensive war with any hope of success. Overt defiance of Germany before that time would probably have meant the occupation of Sweden by German armies; and this could not have been other than a loss to the Allied cause, whatever the cost to Germany.

Credit must also be given to the Riksdag, the free press and the people of Sweden for preserving the moral climate of neutrality and for providing ready shelter and food for refugees from Norway, Denmark, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and other oppressed countries. For holding up a constant mirror to Nazi monstrosities in bleeding Norway, the Swedish free press de-

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serves high praise from all men. Sweden has been, in fact, a most important lung for stifled Europe.

(2) Our present knowledge of the behavior of states would indicate that existence of small states is essential to the nation-states system. It is doubtful if the Balance of Power (which was operative even within the short-lived system of collective security) could function without the fluidity provided by independent small states. Small states should bear their proportionate share in the costs of the military establishment of any general or regional system of interdependence and security. But if the Great Powers prove unable to collaborate on a basis of justice, then neutrality should remain as an emergency exit for the small states.

The argument is frequently advanced that the compulsions of air war, and the development of new long-range weapons such as rockets will dictate the formation of larger political units. That can mean only multinational states, of the Russian type. It should be pointed out, however, that what is feasible and even desirable for the backward peoples of Russian Asia (or even those of eastern Europe) is not *ipso facto* applicable to western Europe, where the small nations are often more politically and culturally advanced than their large neighbors, and enjoy more sound economic foundations. Moreover, many of these same small states are citadels of social welfare democracy, and offer many valuable lessons for the solution of the economic and social problems of the era. In this war they are the psychological breakwater of the western democracies against the tides of authoritarianism.

It is often said that if the small states had not reverted to neutrality after the collapse of collective security they would have been in a better position to defend themselves. But Czechoslovakia did not seek neutrality, and was dismembered, then occupied. Even if a Scandinavian bloc had been formed and armed it probably would have had no other important result than the occupation of Sweden as well as the other four Oslo States.

The failure of collective security was the failure of will of the Great Powers. Only the Great Powers can make the moves which preserve peace or lead to war. In asserting the truism that only collaboration between the Great Powers can insure a security system some observers advocate the clustering of small states around the big zones of power. Such exclusive dependence on any one Great Power would reduce the small state to the

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status of a protectorate unable to make its own characteristic contribution to civilization. Also, such security would be only relative. If, for instance, the states of western Europe join a Western Pact, and those of eastern Europe a Russian security system, that would leave Sweden out in the cold between west and east, with no recourse but the lonely path of neutrality.

The trend indicated by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, however, is not toward exclusive security blocs but toward the dominance of the Great Powers in a Security Council. In view of the many partitions which throughout history have resulted from the collaboration between Great Powers, small states might well fear new disasters if the Great Powers are not restrained by respect for international justice and the rights of the small states to exist and to share in the maintenance of international authority. If the small states of western Europe did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them to keep the international conscience.

In sum, it is difficult for an historian, viewing the long record of the behavior of states, to find sufficient support for the thesis that small states are doomed, and along with them neutrality and the Balance of Power. One might raise the question of how to define a small state. There is, of course, a constantly shifting incident of power. A century and a half ago France was the greatest effective Power. Great Britain is a Great Power today with 45 million people, plus another 25 million whites in the Empire. It is quite possible that within 50 years the Soviet Union will have a population of more than 300 million. It is also possible that the United States will one day be a smaller Power than the Soviet Union or than industrialized and modernized China. Relativity is as important in the long-range policies of nations as it is in current politics.

Finally, the problem of creating and maintaining a security system must be solved by all nations, great and small. The small states can lend additional strength to the collaboration of the Great Powers. The exclusion of the small states, or their absorption into vague regions, with the consequent loss of control of their foreign affairs and defense, could mean only the disintegration of the security system and a threat to the nation-states system itself. The sole refuge for small states would again be precarious neutrality. That seems to be the ultimate lesson of the strange case of Sweden's neutrality in the war.

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THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

By Walter R. Sharp

THE proposals agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks set the debate over regionalism versus universalism in postwar international organization in new terms. The plan for world security there evolved makes concessions to regionalism in a much more explicit and positive form than the League Covenant did in Article XXI.

Section C of Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks draft frankly contemplates that regional arrangements and agencies "for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are *appropriate for regional action*" may coëxist with the permanent United Nations system, "provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are *consistent with the purposes and principles*" of the over-all organization. The plan further proposes that "the Security Council should *encourage settlement of local disputes*" through appropriate regional arrangements or regional agencies "either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council," and that the Council "should, where appropriate, *utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action*" under its own authority. A third provision stipulates that "the Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The italicized clauses pose the key questions: (1) What problems are "appropriate for regional action?" (2) How is consistency of regional "purposes and principles" with those of the world organization to be determined in the event of disagreement? (3) How can regional arrangements for the settlement of disputes be related to a global peace system without complicating its operation, or perhaps weakening its effectiveness? (4) Under what conditions, if at all, will it be practicable to devolve upon regional agencies the responsibility for the execution of security measures authorized by the world Security Council? These questions are not all of equal import. But the answers given to them may vitally affect the future of the United Nations.

By the same token the postwar rôle of organized Pan American-

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ism is at issue. Official circles take for granted that the inter-American regional system will remain intact after victory. Speaking before the assembled diplomats of the American Republics on Columbus Day 1944, President Roosevelt declared: "The bonds that united the American Republics into a community of good neighbors must remain strong. We have not labored long and faithfully to build in this New World a system of international security and coöperation — merely to let it be dissipated in any period of postwar indifference. Within the framework of . . . this world organization of the United Nations which the governments and the people of the American Republics are helping to establish, the inter-American system can and must play a strong and vital rôle."

Recent rifts in the façade of hemispheric solidarity may suggest to skeptics that the structure of inter-American coöperation does not provide quite such "a solid cornerstone for a future world order" as the President, Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. Sumner Welles and others have liked to believe. Irrespective of the turn which may be taken by the immediate problem of Argentina, however, it is clear that most of the existing inter-American machinery will continue to function after the war. Accordingly, its working relations with the new United Nations system will require careful adjustment at a number of points if duplication, confusion and friction are to be avoided.[1] The direct assumption by the United States of world security commitments will give Pan Americanism a radically different context from that which it had yesterday.

II

There is no real inconsistency between the basic tenets of inter-American collaboration and the "purposes and principles" of the Dumbarton Oaks plan for a world peace system. In each case, the "sovereign equality" of states is the professed point of departure for coöperative action. In slightly different language, the members of both systems agree not to resort to force in the conduct of their relations with other states, and they undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means. It may be assumed that most, if not all, of the American Republics (including the United States) will become parties to the statute of whatever international court of justice is eventually made "the principal judicial organ" of the new world organization. For the pacific settlement of intra-American disputes, moreover, there

[1] The Inter-American Conference at Mexico City may act in this connection before this article appears.

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exists a plethora of procedures in the various treaties, conventions and protocols which have issued from Pan American conferences during the past twenty years. Although these agreements in their present form are confusing and unnecessarily complicated, the task of simplification and codification, temporarily delayed by the war, is now proceeding, the Inter-American Juridical Committee having recently transmitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union two excellent alternative drafts of an instrument of coördination.[2]

Elaborate procedures for pacific settlement, through mediation, conciliation and arbitration, may abound on paper; but in the final analysis their utility will depend upon the direct initiative of one or both of the parties to a controversy before it has reached the explosive stage. What is still lacking in the inter-American system is any permanent representative mechanism which can effectively and expeditiously take cognizance of situations resulting from the failure or refusal of the parties concerned to invoke any of the procedures available. Neither the Governing Board of the Pan American Union nor the consultative meetings of American Foreign Ministers can, as they are now constituted, serve as a permanently functioning *political* council for the Americas comparable to the proposed world Security Council.

The Governing Board still labors under a "constitutional" restriction (laid down in 1928) which prevents it from exercising functions "of a political character." Meetings of Foreign Ministers were initiated in 1939 as an informal arrangement for political consultation in the event of any threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere; but plainly the objection of any one of the major American Powers — certainly the United States and probably Brazil or Mexico — or of any considerable number of lesser states, is enough to block favorable action on any government's request for a meeting. Only after a general agreement to call a meeting has been reached through diplomatic channels does the Governing Board of the P.A.U. have authority to convoke one. At best, this procedure is cumbersome and slow-moving; at worst, it may result in manœuvre like the calling of the Mexico City Conference, outside the jurisdiction of the Pan American system, in order to exclude one or more American Republics — in this instance Argentina and El Salvador.

[2] For the text of these drafts see Appendix A and B of the report on "Pan American Postwar Organization," by the Executive Committee on Postwar Problems of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union (Washington, Pan American Union, 1944).

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Both the Governing Board and the consultative meetings of Foreign Ministers suffer from further defects. They are rather too large to act rapidly and they can reach substantive decisions only by unanimous vote, with the result that frequently they produce some watered-down compromise or no positive recommendation at all. Neither body, it need hardly be added, possesses any executive powers of its own.

In contrast to these rudimentary consultative arrangements the proposed United Nations organization will have in permanent session a Security Council, limited to 11 members and empowered to act immediately by some as yet undetermined *majority* vote. There have been indications that our Latin American neighbors would like to be given direct regional representation on this body, either by the designation of one of them (Brazil presumably) as a permanent member or by the assignment to Latin America of a fixed quota of seats to be filled by election. Whether or not they realize this desire, their combined voting strength in the General Assembly will be such that, as in the case of elections to non-permanent seats on the League Council, they should easily enough secure the election of one, if not two, Latin American members to the new Security Council.

Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals endows the Security Council with authority to consider "any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." This power has no geographical limitation. If, for example, the relations between Brazil and Argentina were to reach a point of serious tension along about 1947, the issue might be brought before the Council in any of the following ways: by the direct initiative of either Brazil or Argentina; by the United States, as the permanent Council member most vitally concerned with a peaceful adjustment of the controversy; by some other member of the Council, including any of the lesser Latin American countries that might then be represented on that body; or by action of the Secretary-General of the organization. If, for some reason, the United States preferred that the Council refrain from making any positive recommendations, it could hardly prevent a full airing of the situation by the Council. At the same time, it might be able to persuade its associates on the Council to refer the controversy to some inter-American agency or procedure for investigation and report. Even in this contingency,

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however, the Council very possibly would insist upon utilizing its own mechanism of inquiry in order to avoid the sort of "crossing-the-wires" or "passing-the-buck" which so tragically delayed the settlement of the Chaco affair.

The Leticia dispute of 1933 between Colombia and Peru affords a clue as to how such a situation might be handled. In this case the United States, although not a member of the League of Nations, welcomed its intervention at the outset. The League Council appointed an advisory committee to investigate the controversy on the spot and the Governments of the United States and Brazil collaborated wholeheartedly in its work. A contingent of Colombia troops under the auspices of the League and wearing League arm bands was placed in charge of the disputed territory pending the negotiation of a definitive settlement.

The point to be emphasized is this: The world security organization must and will have authority to deal *initially* with any threat to international peace that may arise within, or be directed against, the western hemisphere. In view of the weapons of war which will be at the disposal of the world of tomorrow any attempt to wrap up security problems in nice geographical packages seems futile. In some border disturbance involving two militarily weak Latin American countries the expedient course may be to "encourage" an adjustment of the matter by distinctly inter-American means, provided the right of the Security Council to intervene is always preserved. But responsibility for determining basic policy in the maintenance of peace should, for the Americas no less than for other regions, rest primarily with the United Nations.

III

Thus far we have touched only non-coercive aspects of the security problem. In considering what the Dumbarton Oaks plan calls "enforcement action," we enter a field that offers a wider range for speculation. The inter-American regional system has never developed any machinery for the imposition of forcible sanctions. The obligation to consult, first agreed to in 1936 at Buenos Aires and elaborated two years later at Lima, does not carry any obligation to act collectively in case hostilities occur. In the words of the Buenos Aires Convention, the High Contracting Parties pledge themselves merely to "adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude." By the

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Declaration of Lima they proclaim "their determination to make effective their solidarity . . . using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable," but with the explicit understanding that they will "act independently in their individual capacity."

The studied vagueness of these commitments was due mainly to the implications of the rigid "neutrality" policy then still being pursued by the United States. Since 1940, and especially since the entrance of the United States and 13 of her Latin American neighbors into the war, certain coöperative steps, such as the reciprocal use and development of bases and airfields, have been taken for the defense of the Americas. In addition, the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro authorized the establishment of two advisory bodies for the furtherance of hemispheric defense. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, with headquarters at Montevideo, is of a temporary character and will no doubt be liquidated at the end of the war. The Inter-American Defense Board, however, might usefully be continued to perform various technical tasks connected with the negotiation and administration of the special agreements between members of the United Nations in this hemisphere, stipulating what forces, bases and other facilities they will make available to the Security Council.

The further question arises whether the Security Council might not designate the Inter-American Defense Board as its subsidiary "regional" agent for the execution of security measures affecting the Americas. The Dumbarton Oaks plan authorizes the Security Council to create regional subcommittees of its Military Staff Committee. Since the actual employment of force on behalf of the organization must, in every case, have the sanction of the Council, we may infer that such regional subcommittees would ordinarily be of an *ad hoc* character. On the other hand, there is nothing in the plan to preclude setting up these subcommittees on a permanent basis if the Council so desired.

At first glance the idea of delegating quasi-executive functions to the Inter-American Defense Board seems to offer an ingenious method of interlocking the world-wide and regional security systems. Two objections, however, are to be noted. In the first place, the Inter-American Defense Board, comprising military, naval and air experts from *all* 21 of the American Republics (at any rate, when all their governments are "in good standing"!),

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would not be particularly suited to "combined" staff planning and the direction of forces to be used against one or more of the participating countries. The strategic importance of Canada, not a member of the Board, further complicates the problem. Secondly, since the Board is appointed by and responsible to the governments represented, there would not be any direct line of authority from the central Military Staff Committee at world headquarters down to the forces in the field. For the handling of the complex problems of strategy, logistics, and the assignment of national contingents, any such "federalistic" division of staff control strikes a layman as not a good way to begin to develop an international policing system.

To be sure, the foregoing difficulties could be overcome in time by altering the composition of the Inter-American Defense Board. Representation on it might be reduced to the major military powers of the hemisphere — the United States, Brazil, Mexico [3] and presumably, in due course, Argentina, together with a small rotating or *ad hoc* representation of the remaining states. Further, the American members of the United Nations might, by special arrangement, agree that the staff officers appointed to the Board would be responsible to the orders of the central Military Staff Committee in so far as concerned the planning and execution of military operations against an American aggressor.

The Latin American nations might be induced to accept some such *modus operandi*. From the standpoint of military efficiency, of course, nothing would be gained; but there might be some political advantage in that the responsibility for keeping peace in the American region would, nominally at least, be shared by the United States with other American Republics. In other words, the onus for action would not fall exclusively upon the Power which, "good neighborism" notwithstanding, is still believed south of the Rio Grande to be capable of developing a policy of "hemispheric neo-imperialism" during the years ahead.

Under the flexible provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks plan a similar result could be achieved without the intermediation of a regional agency. In the event of a serious dispute between two Latin American states the Security Council might call directly upon certain other Latin American countries to collaborate with United States air or naval forces to prevent or check hostilities. The contribution of a relatively strong South American Power like Brazil might be considerable, including, perhaps, a con-

[3] Canada's rôle would be a problem here also.

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tingent of land or air forces; while that of lesser countries might be merely of a token character, involving the right to use airfields or communications facilities.

Obviously, neither procedure could be applied if the United States were alleged to be the aggressor. Such a possibility may seem remote in these times, but suspicious Latin Americans will not dismiss it from their minds. Indeed, it doubtless accounts for their keen interest in the question whether the Great Power members of the Security Council are to be allowed to sit in judgment on themselves. Considering the overwhelming superiority of military power which will be concentrated in the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth, the voting issue has much less practical importance than would appear at first glance. Neither Russia in eastern Europe nor the United States in the western hemisphere could be restrained merely by a formal decision of the Council if it ever determined on expansion at the expense of militarily weak neighbors — that is, short of a general war. Nor would any *regional* combination be sufficient to deter either nation under such circumstances. Pan Americanism has been historically possible only because of the policy of self-restraint practised by the United States. When this self-restraint is not in evidence, inter-American coöperation wanes. This is why so few continental Europeans (including perhaps Stalin) have ever been able to understand that Latin America is not just a Yankee "sphere of influence" in the traditional power politics sense of the term.

One fundamental point must not be overlooked in assessing the probable position of the inter-American system within the framework of the United Nations. Many argue with reason that the entire process for the maintenance of international security is — as Litvinov said years ago of peace itself — indivisible. They contend that the process cannot be separated into sections or assigned for handling to different agencies. To "wage peace" successfully requires continuous effort on many fronts, but the various segments of the effort must be correlated with one another. The economic and social conditions which lead to serious friction cannot be remedied except through world-wide collaboration; and the imposition of economic and financial, if not military, sanctions against any aggressor nation with substantial resources requires world-wide action. It follows that regional security arrangements can play only a very restricted and subordinate rôle in the *total* business. Undue "encouragement" of such arrange-

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ments detracts from the authority and prestige of the world system. Moreover, in this country, it might play into the hands of former isolationists who now pose as "American nationalists" armed to the teeth!

When the United Nations Charter is put into final form, then, it is to be hoped that the American negotiators will resist every pressure to make further concessions to regionalism. It would be particularly unfortunate if anything in the Charter could be interpreted by American opinion or by Congress as indicating that this country is any less committed to help prevent acts of aggression originating outside rather than inside the strategic zone of the western hemisphere, no matter how broadly that zone is defined.

IV

The word "regional" is not to be found in the chapter of the Dumbarton Oaks plan outlining "arrangements for international economic and social coöperation." This is not surprising because the approach here is entirely "functional," the assumption being that through the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the central Secretariat the activities of a loose congeries of specialized agencies can somehow be woven into a coherent fabric of policy. Realistic recognition is given to the fact that international institutions for purposes of economic and social welfare will emerge at different times and assume varying forms, and that, accordingly, each should enjoy considerable freedom of action. While only one important agency of this type (the I.L.O.) is now in operation, several (*e.g.* the Bank and the Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Civil Aviation Organization) are already at the blueprint stage, and plans for others are reported to be under discussion in Washington and London.

Interestingly enough, the *non*-political activities of the inter-American system have evolved along lines not wholly unlike those envisaged for the new United Nations structure. Well over a score of semi-autonomous specialized commissions, bureaus, offices and institutes have come into being during the past 40 years through the initiative of many general, special and technical conferences of American states. For a few of these agencies the Pan American Union serves as permanent secretariat or fiscal agent; but many of them have complete operational independence, with headquarters in various American capitals — Wash-

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ington, Havana, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Panamá. Their activities cover a multiplicity of subjects — postal and radio communications, maritime shipping, economic development, regulation of trademarks, agricultural research, standardization of statistics, public health, the promotion of child welfare, and so on. Most of them operate on exceedingly modest budgets and with tiny staffs. A few, such as the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, are doing highly useful work; others seem little more than "paper" creations.

As the United Nations system gets under way, the problem will arise as to how many parts of this loose, unintegrated Pan American machinery should be continued and under what conditions. Certain of them handle problems which not only are "appropriate for regional action," but could be treated only in that way. Such, for example, is the case with the Inter-American Coffee Board, the Pan American Highway Confederation and the Inter-American Indian Institute. But where the activity is substantially interlocked with the world's economy or the world's cultural life there is sure to be a good deal of duplication of effort, and possibly some working at cross purposes, unless the inter-American agency concerned is closely articulated, both in policy and in administration, with the corresponding world agency.

Nowhere will this articulation be more needed than between the central Secretariat of the United Nations and the Pan American Union. Absurd as it may seem in retrospect, the Union and the League of Nations Secretariat scarcely recognized each other's existence until the middle 1930's, when the League Assembly adopted a resolution authorizing the regular transmission of League documents to the P.A.U. At the American end, it was not until the Lima Conference of 1938 that action was taken recommending that the P.A.U. and related inter-American agencies "make available to other international bodies the information they have at their disposal; exchange points of view and, as much as possible, coördinate the investigations they may carry on in the fields of economic, social, cultural and juridical activity." Since then, the Union has sent its publications and reports to such bodies.

But the exchange of documentation represents only a small step toward effective administrative liaison. The research and informational work of the permanent staffs of the world agencies will crisscross with that of various inter-American bodies. Both

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sets of agencies may be asking the same governments at the same time for the same statistical or other data. Overlapping investigations and surveys may be undertaken by different agencies operating more or less in the same field. One agency may try to outbid another for the services of scarce technical experts. All these phenomena, so familiar in the relations of the federal and state bureaucracies of this country, may easily be repeated in the international sphere unless steps are taken early to combat them.

What should such steps be? One might suggest that, soon after the Secretary-General of the United Nations is appointed, he should invite the directors of the major functional and regional international agencies to a series of conferences to plan for administrative coördination. Out of such discussions might emerge joint standing committees or even joint services, say, on research and publications; on personnel standards (training, recruitment methods, compensation, retirement, etc.); on budgetary and fiscal management; on the organization of international conferences; and on the handling of international documentation. These are all matters which affect international administration wherever and on whatever scale it may operate.

While no miracle need be expected from such joint endeavors, they would at the very least get the administrators of different agencies into the habit of going to one another for help and advice. In addition, arrangements should certainly be made for a constant if limited flow of staff personnel from one international agency to another, vertically as well as horizontally, by loan or special detail. There is nothing like a change of air to freshen the outlook of a professional bureaucrat — whether of a municipality, a province, a nation or an international secretariat.

The new world organization should also tap available regional facilities for the performance of subsidiary technical, economic, social, or other services of concern to the international community generally. Thus existing inter-American bodies might, in some instances, become the regional "section" or "committee" or "office" of the corresponding world agency. The United Nations Economic and Social Council might request the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee to act as one of its "commissions of experts," with definitely regional responsibilities. Similarly, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization might find it expedient to combine a regional office for northern Latin America with the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences recently established in Costa Rica. To cite

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only one other case: the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, now lodged in the Pan American Union building, might be expanded and serve as the western hemisphere section of whatever new world health and welfare organization may be established. Various economies of personnel, equipment and supplies would result. But the chief gain would come from the day-to-day contact of staff specialists working on similar problems.

The temporary isolation of Europe has stimulated a number of undertakings which show how inter-American action can fruitfully supplement the work of related world agencies when there is adequate joint planning in advance. An example may be found in the Statute of the Permanent Inter-American Committee on Social Security. The initiative for this novel instrument came from a meeting of social security administrators convened jointly in December 1940 by the President of Peru and the Director of the International Labor Office. An inter-American committee to promote social security was set up at this gathering. Under its auspices the Government of Chile invited the First Inter-American Conference on Social Security to meet at Santiago in December 1942. Delegates attended from 21 American countries, including Canada, together with representatives of the International Labor Office, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau and the International American Institute for the Protection of Childhood.

Besides issuing a general declaration of continental solidarity in the pursuit of social security and adopting 14 technical resolutions, the Santiago Conference decided to create a permanent coöperative agency to work in concert with the International Labor Office. This agency will include a Conference of representatives of the social insurance institutions or funds of all participating countries, and a Permanent Committee to prepare the sessions of the Conference and to give effect to its recommendations. This Committee is composed of one regular member and at least one substitute member from each country represented. A tripartite delegation appointed by the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization, the Director of the International Labor Office, the Director General of the Pan American Union, and the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau may also serve as members of the Committee; and in fact these agencies and officials have accepted membership. The Committee has appointed an Executive Body consisting of the representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

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Mexico and Peru. To quote from the Legal Adviser of the I.L.O.: "The Statute thus has something of the nature of an agreement between the Inter-American Social Security Conference and the International Labor Organization defining a *modus operandi* for coöperation between them."

This ingenious form of collaboration by an inter-American and a world-wide organization may pave the way for similar experiments in other fields. Already, according to the Report of the International Labor Office to the Philadelphia Conference, the First Inter-American Conference on Population Problems has requested the I.L.O. "to develop its work relating to migration."

Economic development offers another area for associated planning. When the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is passing on requests for loans for industrial projects in Latin American countries it might appropriately ask the Inter-American Development Commission to act in a consultative capacity. Conversely, the Commission's work, in so far as it relates to agriculture, should either be transferred outright to the Food and Agriculture Organization or be carried on in the closest possible coöperation with this new agency. In the latter event, the Inter-American Development Commission might well be invited to nominate a delegation of its own members to serve as non-voting members of any regional committee for Latin America the F.A.O. may decide to set up. Comparable arrangements for "joint" standing advisory committees of world-wide and regional agencies could be multiplied without encroaching on the "constitutional" autonomy of either.

Collaboration will be no less desirable when basic policies are formulated. Reciprocal participation, without right of vote, in the meetings of related agencies should be made a matter of right and not remain subject as at present to the hazards of special invitation. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union would thus be entitled to send representatives to the United Nations General Assembly, and vice versa: and similarly in the case of specialized agencies. Further, the Director of the Pan American Union ought to have a right to submit suggestions relative to the agenda of the world assembly, and the same privilege should be extended to the Secretary-General of the world organization as regards Pan American conferences. In this way there will be more assurance that the programs of the latter will usefully supplement and implement the broad international action proposed by the world organization.

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In some instances it may be advisable for the competent authorities of related organizations to negotiate formal agreements defining the responsibilities of each and laying down methods of coöperation. This is actually foreshadowed by Article XII of the draft Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization, and subsequently a similar provision was inserted in Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, according to which the relationship of any specialized organization or agency to the over-all organization may be "determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly." There is no reason why the same technique should not be employed, where appropriate, to adjust the jurisdictional boundaries between cognate parts of the United Nations system and inter-American agencies. International "federalism" might thus evolve piecemeal.

V

It is encouraging that the official leadership of the inter-American system is at last giving serious attention to how it can best meet the requirements of the postwar era.[4] Even its most loyal friends will admit that it would benefit from a general stock-taking and some overhauling. The accumulation of dead wood in Pan Americanism should be cleared away. There is urgent need for a closer coördination of its institutional parts. Functions now performed indifferently by certain of its bureaus and commissions might advantageously be transferred to stronger world agencies. In the interest of dispatch and efficiency, it should expand its mechanisms of "selective" representation, enlarging on the admirable precedent of the two limited-membership committees which have done such outstanding work during these war years — the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. Sooner or later, the ill-defined and unsatisfactory relationship now existing between the Governing Board, the consultative meetings of Foreign Ministers, the full-dress Pan American conferences, and the various technical conferences will have to be rationalized.

The period of transition from war to peace will also offer opportunity to consider once again how the Pan American Union

[4] The recent report of the Executive Committee on Postwar Problems of the Governing Board of the P.A.U., cited earlier, contains a number of constructive, if cautious, proposals for modifications. An admirable monograph by M. Margaret Ball on "The Problem of Inter-American Organization" (Stanford University Press, 1944) weighs feasible changes in less timid fashion.

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can be made an instrument of greater service, not in the relations of the United States and the Latin American republics but in the relations between those republics. Agencies of the United States Government, lavishly endowed with funds, now carry on extensive programs for the former purpose. Why should the Pan American Union attempt to duplicate on a small scale what these agencies can do in more impressive style? Not only should the Union shift the emphasis of its work "southward," but the time has surely come to add a number of distinguished Latin Americans to its staff — including the election of one, probably, to the directorship when that post becomes vacant. The Union now struggles along with a staff which, although devoted and hard-working, is underpaid and undersized. Recently some increases have been made in its budget; but it still has only a half million dollars at its disposal and will be hard put to compete with the new United Nations agencies for properly qualified personnel after the war.

In the long run, the fate of Pan Americanism will depend upon whether sufficient political unity can be maintained to prevent dangerous crosscurrents or hostile alignments from emerging on the southern continent. If a common front can be preserved — or restored — the regional system of the Americas should be able to play a not unimportant part in the future organization of world peace. At some points, notably in the enforcement of security, its institutional rôle will necessarily be modest, perhaps negligible. In other respects it will have considerable scope and can usefully implement policies and services sponsored by the United Nations system. The working interrelationships of the two systems will be varied in character; but they must be sufficiently flexible to adjust themselves to changing conditions of world power and the changing demands of the world economy.

One fact is clear. If Pan Americanism is to contribute as it should to shaping "the better world" it must be ready to yield to the overriding authority of the United Nations whenever the interests of the wider international community, functioning under a régime of law sanctioned by force, so require. Only in this way, paradoxically, can the historic ideals of Pan Americanism continue to flourish.

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CHINA'S NEED FOR TRANSPORT

A Problem in Stability and Democracy

By Chang Kia-ngau

WHEN Chinese planners survey the work of reconstruction which must be done in their country a multitude of projects demand attention. Most of them are indeed necessary; but plans which are too diffuse will defeat themselves. The financial resources of China are limited, and the amount of aid from outside will be limited too. If Chinese resources and energies are not to be dissipated, the men who plan their country's future, and the foreign statesmen, technicians and business men who collaborate with them, must take things in the proper order. The first and foremost task is the creation of a modernized system of communications. Without that a strong and democratic China cannot be built. The low standard of living of the farmers, who form about 85 percent of the population, cannot be lifted until better transportation facilities enable them to send their goods to a wider range of markets. And until this standard of living is raised, in turn, the rural millions of China cannot buy the manufactured products of other countries. Integration of the national transportation system is the primary essential for the country's economic health and political stability and for mutually advantageous trade relationships between it and other nations.

China had just begun to develop a modern transportation system when the war with Japan broke out in 1937. Except on the eastern seaboard, the 450,000,000 people of this vast country of nearly four and a half million square miles still depended for transportation chiefly, as in ages past, on river junk, pack animal and human carrier. The limited seaboard communication system, including use of the Yangtze River as far as Ichang, was lost to China soon after the war started. The Chinese, "trading space for time," fell back into the deep and undeveloped hinterland of the southwest and northwest. The very shortage of railway and highway systems in the remote provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan, Shensi and Kansu was helpful in the crisis, for it deterred the enemy from invading the west and gave the Chinese Government time to organize resistance.

In the face of almost insuperable odds, China made heroic

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efforts to construct connections between the interior of the country and friendly neighbors — Russia, Indo-China and Burma. She met with one frustration after another. Just as the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway to Indo-China was nearly completed, the Japanese occupied Nanning and brought the project to a halt; and later the Vichy authorities in Indo-China capitulated to the Japanese and shut off all hope of access to the sea by that route. The effort to reach the sea at Rangoon by the Burma Road and the Yunnan-Burma Railway was likewise defeated. The Road was open for about three years, then was severed by the Japanese. In 1942, China's only contact with the outside world was by plane over the snow-capped peaks of the lower Himalayas.

But meanwhile, a network of highways was developed in southwest and northwest China, river communications were extensively improved, and air routes were rearranged to handle interior traffic. These improvements were of importance militarily, and were a great aid to political unity, but in spite of them, interior communications remained most inadequate. Free China possessed only about 1,700 miles of railways, 20,000 miles of usable highways, 8,000 miles of navigable riverways, and air service with very limited mileage. Troops often had to be moved about the country on foot; a march from Sian to Chungking, for instance, took two months, and left the soldiers exhausted. The handicaps imposed on the economic life of the country by this lack of communications can readily be imagined. For example, cotton from Sian, transported to Chungking, sold for four or five times its original price. Such experiences made the Chinese realize the urgency of developing interior communications.

In the following pages the author attempts to suggest the basic requirements of a postwar program for the development of Chinese railways, shipping, airways and highways. He has been guided by certain principles: the development of all types of transportation must be integrated; the prewar policy of simultaneous development of government and private projects will be continued; inland and agrarian communities as well as urban and coastal areas must be served by the new communications system; and lastly, government transportation projects must be run on businesslike principles.

II

The construction of China's first railway began in 1866. In 1942, three quarters of a century later, there were 12,036 miles

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of completed railways in the country, all but 1,001 miles of which had been finished before 1937. This was about 27 miles of railway for each million of population, compared to 1,940 miles to every million in the United States. About thirty years ago, Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated the building of 100,000 miles of railways, apportioned on a regional basis. If that were ever done, China would still have less than half the railway mileage of the United States.

The railways are not only inadequate, they are unevenly distributed. Manchuria has approximately 3,700 miles, north China 4,000, southeast China 3,000, southwest China 1,000, and northwest China 300. There are no railways in Ningsia, Chinghai, Kansu, Sinkiang, Sikang and Szechwan or in such extensive outlying areas as Tibet and Mongolia. Even with the completion of the Paoki-Tienshui and the Kweichow-Kwangsi lines (now under construction) and of the Yunnan-Burma, Suifu-Kunming and Chengtu-Chungking lines and the section of the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway between Liuchow and Chennankwan on the Indo-China border (work on all of which has been suspended because of the war), only about 1,800 miles will be added in the southwest and about 100 miles in the northwest.

A program based on postwar national requirements and on the ability of the country to carry the financial burden entailed should begin with a two-year period for the rehabilitation of railways destroyed during military operations (1,279 miles up to 1942) and for the completion of work suspended because of wartime shortages (about 1,900 miles).[1] The total of lines dismantled and destroyed may be greatly increased in the course of the Japanese retreat from China. But on present figures alone, the railway construction program for the first two years after the cessation of hostilities would amount to at least 3,000 miles.

In the opinion of the writer, a ten-year building program should then be undertaken, divided into two five-year plans, to create 14,300 more miles of railways. The first five years would be devoted to building lines linking main political centers and exploiting essential natural resources such as oil and wool from the northwest, tin, iron and copper from the southwest, and tungsten and antimony from the southeast. During the second five years, the main purpose would be to develop the frontier regions and to establish lines to Russia, Burma and India, besides extending railway lines to various seaports along the southeast coast. It

[1] *Cf.* the author's "China's Struggle for Railroad Development," New York: John Day, 1943.

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will be noted that this ten-year plan puts the expansion of railways in the interior of China first, and the extension of the lines to the frontiers and the coastal region second. If the entire program were completed the nation would have a total of about 28,000 miles of track (approximately 10 percent of the mileage in the United States), well distributed over the various regions. China would have a network of surface communications.

About 160 tons of steel rails and parts will be needed for each new mile of railway, and one locomotive and ten carriages for every six miles. The two-year rehabilitation program would require approximately 480,000 tons of steel rails and parts, 500 locomotives and 5,000 carriages, and the ten-year program about 2,288,000 tons of steel rails and parts, 2,216 locomotives and 22,160 carriages. Moreover, about one-half of the rolling stock on national railways in 1937 will probably have to be replaced, creating an additional need for 800 locomotives, 1,400 passenger cars and 10,000 freight cars. By a rough calculation, then, the two-year program would cost from $150,000,000 to $200,000,000. The ten-year program would require the expenditure of another $350,000,000 to $400,000,000.

The railway projects will have to carry a double financial responsibility, for they must become currently self-supporting and at the same time service the prewar foreign railway loans of about $265,000,000; but with efficient management it should be quite possible for them to do so. Chinese railways showed a minimum increase of 30 percent in revenue and a maximum increase of 100 percent, during any given five-year period in the past. Their remarkable prosperity was due to the virtual monopoly of transportation service which they enjoyed (and would continue to enjoy under the plans outlined above), the abundance of cheap fuel along the railway routes, and the exceedingly — though deplorably — low labor costs in China. To ensure financial soundness and efficient management, the expanded railways must be integrated into one system, however. A central administration with regional offices, supervised by a board of directors representing various public and government interests should shape policy and appoint administrators; but there will not be efficiency unless the chosen executives are permitted to work without political interference. Under such a setup, the old railway obligations could be converted into a consolidated loan, backed by a common sinking fund established from the revenues of all the lines. The fund could be supervised by a loan service

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committee composed of representatives of the government and the creditors, and new loans might be handled in the same way if the creditors so desired.

Private ownership and operation of railways in China was permitted before the war, under certain conditions, and the government will need the aid of private enterprise in building the railway network. In particular, private companies can construct a system of feeder lines serving special economic and regional interests under general government planning; and their competitive service can stimulate the government railways to be on guard against inefficiency and bureaucracy.

III

In 1937 there were about 1,200,000 tons of merchant shipping along the China coast and on the Yangtze River, approximately 500,000 of which were Chinese. When the Japanese invasion began, some Chinese ships were scuttled to block strategic channels, and others which had taken out foreign registry were seized by the enemy. About 110,000 tons of Chinese shipping are safe on the upper Yangtze, where about thirty of the vessels are in use and a number are lying at anchor, most of them smaller than 200 tons. It is hard to say now how much of the commandeered shipping will be available after the war, but to cope with immediate postwar requirements, which will be especially heavy until the railroads are in running order, China will need at least 1,000,000 tons over and above what may be saved from the Japanese.

The problem of postwar shipping, like that of railroad development, can best be dealt with in two stages — rehabilitation and then expansion. The minimum needs of the first two years are 100,000 tons for use on the Yangtze, and 300,000 for service in coastal and neighboring waters; and about 600,000 tons more of replacement shipping will have to be built soon thereafter. In addition, the wharves and installations which will presumably be destroyed by the retreating enemy at Shanghai, Tsingtao, Dairen, Hankow and elsewhere will have to be repaired. A rough estimate of the cost of a two-year rehabilitation program is $300,000,000. A national objective of 10,000,000 tons of shipping was set by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the early days of the Republic, and it has recently been proposed that a goal of 2,000,000 tons should be set for the first ten-year period following the war.

Now that the United States, Great Britain and other nations have relinquished their extraterritorial rights, ships carrying

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traffic on inland waterways and between coastal points will fly the Chinese flag and be owned by companies registered under Chinese law. But foreign investments in Chinese shipping firms will be possible on a percentage basis to be determined by the government, with the understanding that over a fixed period of time the foreign capital will be retired. With government consent, foreign shipping en route to or from a foreign port could carry cargo between coastal points, provided that a contract to cover each consignment were agreed upon with a Chinese shipping concern. Such an expedient would greatly ease the burden on Chinese shipping, which will be insufficient to meet the country's needs during the immediate postwar period.

For years ten large Chinese private shipping companies and about one hundred smaller ones have done business side by side with the government-owned China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. This government company is in need of reorganization, to achieve more businesslike methods of management, but the principle of coöperation between private and government concerns is a sound one. The government should allocate routes for private lines and specify minimum shipping capacities; and in postwar years the government company should give greater attention to ocean transport, since private enterprise may not be able to provide the capital outlay or take the risk involved. If Japanese shipping lines are not permitted to resume their prewar operations and their routes are apportioned among other nations, China will be particularly interested in sharing the traffic between her homeland and Japan, and between Japanese ports and those of the South Seas and beyond.

There are perhaps half a million tons of smaller river craft in China, including 20,000 tons of new wooden vessels recently built with government aid; and under the stress of war, about 2,500 miles of formerly unusable waterways have been opened. But further development of river and lake shipping is a primary essential to help the Chinese farmer market his produce. The smaller rivers and shallow lakes now need to be dredged and dikes built where necessary for maintaining channels. For use on these rivers and lakes, light wooden craft driven by Diesel or gasoline engines would save labor, time and freight costs, though their usefulness would obviously depend upon the availability of cheap fuel; and light draft tugs and barges would be of great value. Considerations of efficiency demand that machine-age power be substituted for sails on inland waters and for human muscle along towpaths.

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IV

Although China planned to develop civil aviation as early as 1916, not much progress was made until, in 1930, the China National Aviation Company was organized to maintain a domestic air service. CNAC is a joint company with 55 percent of its capital of about $3,000,000 contributed by the Chinese Ministry of Communications, and 45 percent by Pan-American Airways. In 1931 the Eurasia Aviation Corporation was capitalized at about $1,000,000, an amount later increased to about $3,000,000, the Chinese Ministry of Communications contributing two-thirds and the German Lufthansa one-third. This corporation intended to open a route between Shanghai and Germany across Soviet Russia, but for political reasons the plan was abandoned and the company limited its services largely to the northwestern area. After China went to war with Germany in December 1941, Eurasia became a purely Chinese company.

In 1939 another joint corporation was formed with Chinese and Soviet capital, totalling about $1,000,000 — half supplied by the Chinese Ministry of Communications and half by the Soviet Government — to operate a thousand-mile route between Hami in Sinkiang and Alma Ata in Russia, via Tihwa (Urumchi). China-based air routes totalled about 7,500 miles before the war, and about 5,000 miles of new routes have been added since 1937. Although CNAC ran a deficit for the first four years of its operation, there has been a surplus of revenue over expenditure ever since 1933. Eurasia, though less prosperous than CNAC, showed profits for 1937 and 1938.

Following the war, China will first have to strive to reconstitute her domestic air services, in order to supplement the greatly overburdened surface transportation, but she also contemplates the construction of a network of airlines to India, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, the Philippines, Japan and Korea. Besides these routes, she hopes eventually to establish a system of airlines through the East Indies to Australia, across India to Europe, Africa and South America, and across the Pacific to the United States, Canada and the West Indies. In the period 1931–1938 there was an eightfold increase in mail cargo on the CNAC and Eurasia routes, and a tenfold increase in passenger traffic. In the writer's opinion, the total route mileage (including domestic and international lines) can be raised to 40,000 within a period of five years after the war, with a tenfold expansion of traffic vol-

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ume (including passengers, mail and freight). Between 200 and 250 planes of various types will be required. Although the DC-2 and DC-3 types may continue to be used on trunk and feeder lines, it is probable that planes of the C-46 and C-54 types, or others more economical or more efficient, will be used on the international routes. An expenditure of about $150,000,000 will be needed to equip the country with adequate aircraft, airports and technical installations in the immediate postwar years.

The policy of maintaining government ownership of main routes, and private ownership of feeder or subsidiary routes, will be continued in the field of civil aviation, as in other fields of transportation. But foreign capital now invested in Chinese domestic airlines will gradually be retired and the lines in which it is invested transformed into purely national enterprises. There is, of course, nothing new in a policy of exclusive national operation of domestic airlines; this principle of reserving the right of cabotage for domestic operators is generally accepted and was incorporated in the agreements drawn up by the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1944. The postwar application of the principle in China will not preclude the fullest coöperation with foreign interests on technical matters.

Since China is eager to establish airlines to neighboring countries, and eventually to nations overseas, she is prepared to welcome foreign planes within her borders. But she has consistently emphasized that both in the case of commercial and private flights the establishment of reciprocal rights of commercial entry with foreign Powers is a prerequisite to her granting rights of transit and "technical stop" (landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail). At the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, she therefore maintained that the so-called political rights, *i.e.* rights of transit and technical stop, are inseparable from the so-called economic rights, *i.e.* rights to carry traffic to and from the homeland and foreign countries, and between intermediate points on an international route. That is to say, China is ready to accord both political and economic rights on a reciprocal basis, but not the former without the latter.

V

The first modern road in China was a 30-mile military highway built in Hunan in 1912. By 1937 there were about 60,000 miles of roads, although most of them were poor. They had not been laid

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out as part of a national network of highways, only about half were usable for motor traffic, and only about a quarter had all-weather surfacing.

When the war broke out, the government undertook to connect China with neighboring countries by a road from Lanchow to the border of Sinkiang (joining a road to Soviet Russia), a road from Hengyang via Kweilin and Nanning to Indo-China, and a road from Kunming to Burma. At the same time, it constructed about 5,000 miles of new highways behind the front and inland, and improved or rebuilt about 15,000 miles of the older roads, following a national plan, particularly in the northwest and southwest. With Kweiyang as a radiating center, there is now a network of highways extending through Hunan, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan. In the northwest, with Lanchow as a center, there is another network which covers Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ningsia and Sinkiang. Joining these two networks is the Shensi-Szechwan highway with Chengtu as a center, and with a spur running out to Sikang. An elaborate network was also planned for southeast China, covering Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi, but the military situation halted the project.

Trucking and travel on the highways under both private and government auspices grew steadily after the National Motor Carrier Act was passed in 1918. Private bus lines operated in southeast China before the outbreak of the war, provincial lines had been started elsewhere, and by 1937 there were about 10,000 commercial busses and 13,000 commercial trucks on the roads. Following the evacuation of Hankow in 1938, the Ministry of Communications operated a highway transportation service in the northwest. A similar service in the southwest was later taken over by the China Transportation Corporation, a company specially organized to handle traffic in that area.

Before the closing of the Burma Road there were approximately 10,000 government and private trucks in use in Free China, but many of them were later forced out of service by lack of spare parts and fuel; today there are perhaps only 5,000. When the fighting ends, the absence of adequate rail and river communications will throw a heavy burden on the present highways, and the restoration and maintenance of the existing roads must have priority over new construction. Then, as soon as possible, existing roads should be surfaced, graded, provided with adequate bridges and converted into feeders to the integrated system of railway, riverway and airway communications. During the period of re-

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habilitation, special attention should be paid to bettering the roads connecting airports with urban centers, to stimulate the growth of civil aviation. Trunk highways, designed as the backbone of a coördinated road system, will come later, as circumstances permit: the objective is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's million-mile network, apportioned among national, provincial and village roads. In the past there has been too much emphasis on through highways, with a damaging neglect of the welfare of small counties and villages. The construction of about 20,000 miles of rural roads a year, suitable for the use of rubber-wheeled vehicles and tractors, would be a minimum government program to meet the needs of China's agricultural population.

Actual experience during wartime has shown that private highway transportation companies operating in local areas have offered more efficient service than government enterprises. In the immediate future, the government should limit its activities in this field to traffic allocation and control and to road maintenance — for which a good deal of labor-saving machinery will be needed — leaving the actual operation of highway services to private business. The government should concentrate its resources on the development of railways, waterways and airways.

To conclude: the first cost of the over-all program to modernize China's communications, the two-year rehabilitation plan, is roughly $650,000,000 — allocating $200,000,000 for railways, $300,000,000 for shipping and $150,000,000 for aviation. The estimate excludes the cost of equipment for building and maintaining highways. In view of China's dire need for transport, the sum cannot be considered excessive. More and better communications are not only the basic requirement for the improvement of living standards of China's rural millions; they can also form a focal point of the desired industrial development of the country through the gradual introduction of the manufacture of railway and other equipment. This would not only lower the costs of modernizing transport but would tend to lift the low standard of living of the Chinese worker.

This is not the place to analyze the question of how these programs are to be financed. Perhaps the capital can be supplied by international agencies, perhaps by private investment, perhaps in part by both. In the past, Great Britain, more than any other of the Allied Powers, has perceived the importance of communications in the development of China's potentialities. Her share of the approximately $265,000,000 of foreign investment in Chinese

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railroads is about $66,100,000, or one-fourth. Her share in foreign shipping tonnage in Chinese waters before the war was about 300,000 tons, or roughly one-half. Railway investments of the United States were only $11,589,930, and American shipping interests almost nil. However, the United States was the first foreign nation to invest in civil aviation in China.

Given businesslike administration, the projects sketched above are reasonable and possible. Railway and aviation enterprises have demonstrated their profitability in China; and in the face of depression and sharp competition in prewar years, shipping interests expanded. Efficient and businesslike management — which, as we have noted, implies freedom from political interference once central policies have been established, and sufficient power and security of tenure for executive administrators — cannot but make the field of transportation development an attractive one to foreign investors. But surely, commercial profits aside, it is to the interest of other nations to aid China in the completion of this task, on which her orderly and democratic development depends. Need it be argued that an orderly and democratic China is the basis of peace in the Pacific?

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MEN AND CIRCUMSTANCE

By Harold Nicolson

IN WATCHING history weave its intricate tapestry one is left uncertain whether the warp or the woof is the more important, whether the concealed and underlying framework determines the shape of history or whether history is composed of the countless little threads and knots which display its apparent pattern. At a certain moment one feels that the desires and energies of individual statesmen are but straws floating on the surface of some hidden tide; at another one becomes convinced that although the great river of history may flow slowly in a certain recognizable direction, it can be impeded, accelerated or even diverted by the force of a few dominant personalities or by the trivial and momentary barrier of some chance circumstance. When one reads the history of transactions analogous to those which have come within one's own orbit of experience one suspects that the historian, working upon documents, is apt to underestimate or to ignore the influence exercised upon events by the elements of chance and personality, and to be overinfluenced in his appraisal by the apparent sequence of cause and effect. At some international conference, for instance, a statesman achieves a given result which in the end proves of the utmost advantage to his country. In his subsequent memoirs he will almost surely disclose a greater degree of prevision, a more definite consciousness of motive, than he was himself aware of at the time, thereby establishing a logical (and personally creditable) sequence of cause and effect.

To those who have watched great political events forming and reforming before their eyes the simplifications of history do not seem so convincing. They have become aware of the immense part played by the incidental and the fortuitous in human affairs; they know the influence exercised upon day-to-day transactions by such forgotten and unavowed causes as personal friction or friendship, momentary impulse or bouts of ill health, or the chance alternation of hours of energy with hours of lassitude. The historian observes that certain results have accrued from a long course of negotiation; he analyzes the motives which induced the protagonists either to further or to impede those results; and, in all scholarship and sincerity, he produces a sequence of ordered and logical events, beginning with an ascertainable

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motive and leading to an inevitable end. Motives which at the time of some negotiation were subsidiary or even nonexistent become, in retrospect, the determinant ones, whereas motives which at the outset seemed to be central to the whole controversy suffer changes or disappear.

Such considerations tempt one to ask again certain questions that long have puzzled the observer. Do men mold events or are they molded by them? What part is really played by conscious motive in the long and unending processes of international negotiation? How far, again, does the fortuitous, the unavowable, the incidental and the trivial affect decisions in great affairs?

The malady of our age — as of all periods when the majority of men tend toward the determinist or materialistic interpretation of human endeavor — is cynicism, or more accurately, distrust. The doctrine that man is essentially an economic animal, intent only upon his own material advantage, induces disbelief in the purity of any motive. In revolutionary epochs such as the present those who represent the old order suffer commonly from a loss of self-confidence, while those who wish to establish a new order spread and intensify distrust of the old. The task of the latter is facilitated by the fact that suspicion is the easiest of all moods to inculcate, being the philosophy of the unphilosophic; whereas confidence demands that form of resolute tolerance which is acquired only through humanism or faith. People are easily persuaded that those in power assume virtues for purposes of propaganda and deception and that their defects furnish the real clue to their character and motives; they are with difficulty convinced that sincerity and unselfishness are in fact a major and recurrent constituent in the moods of public men. Yet my own experience has been, on the whole, that public men are motivated by worthy desires, and it is in the light of this generalization that I shall approach my questions.

The determinist contends that the individual is little more than the symptom, or at best the personification, of the spirit of his age; the humanist imagines that men of outstanding character or genius are enabled by superior will power, initiative or imagination to shape events according to their own program. What seems more probable is that the stream of human evolution is liable to long periods of placidity interrupted by sudden rapid spurts of disorder and change. During the periods of repose or lethargy, the man of genius is accorded small opportunity for personal influence; it is the man who in his own personality re-

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flects the stability and mediocrity of his age who becomes the representative, and therefore dominant, figure. The genius, being inconvenient, has little chance; the Chamberlains and the Coolidges occupy the foreground.

It is when the phase of placid acceptance begins to move into the phase of energy or discontent that the man of outstanding personality or energy is at last afforded his opportunity. To that extent he is the product, rather than the creator, of events; yet no man who has observed in practice the impact of personality upon circumstance could deny that the temperament or genius of the men who are then called to exercise power does in fact give to events a particular tendency and tone. The Russian Revolution, for example, produced three men of outstanding genius: Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. Lenin succeeded in giving to it a definite personal development, different from that which, under Stalin, it has since assumed; and had Trotsky instead of Stalin succeeded to Lenin a third alternative of development might have startled and alarmed the world. Again, the tremendous economic anxiety which gripped the heart of Germany after the depression of 1929 would in any case have created widespread effervescence and rendered the mediocrities of the later Weimar Republic unrepresentative of the spirit of their age; but it was the intense concentration of Hitler's phenomenal temperament which gave the Nazi revolution its extreme and curious form. A German social revolution was in any case inevitable. It may have been inevitable also that such a revolution should assume a nationalistic mood and that anti-Semitism of some sort should appear; but it was the driving force of Hitler's hatreds and obsessions which gave the revolution that peculiarly aggressive, embittered, self-pitying, rancorous and cruel impetus which roused the world against it.

Some less dramatic illustration of the relation between circumstance and personality is perhaps more instructive. From 1920 onward the French people were denied those physical guarantees of security which they felt to be their right, and were convinced that with the growth of American and British isolationism France would again be faced with the eternal German menace. In these circumstances they acquired the general, if undefined, conviction that they must seek their future safety by other means. There were several alternative roads which French policy might then have followed. The French Government might have concentrated upon convincing the two western de-

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mocracies of France's deeply pacific intentions, of the justifiability of her apprehensions, and of her real need to coöperate with the United States and Great Britain in a policy of reconstruction. It might, on the other hand, have concentrated all its faith and energy upon the League of Nations, seeking to find in Geneva that identity of purpose with Great Britain which had not been achieved under the golden chandeliers of the Quai d'Orsay. The circumstances of France's anxiety were very real; the anxiety itself was sufficiently widespread and acute to demand some solution; but the actual form which that solution took was determined by the personality of Raymond Poincaré. This precise and gifted logician had the mind, not of a lawyer only, but of a chartered accountant; he thought in balance sheets and figures. The emotional idealism of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was as abhorrent to him as the emotional patriotism of Clemenceau and Foch. He approached the situation as a mathematical problem, without duly considering the effect of that approach upon opinion abroad. He instigated a fallacious movement for Rhineland separatism; he occupied the Ruhr and sought to exact productive pledges; he constructed a weak and most provocative ring around Germany in the shape of the Little Entente; and in so doing he was representative, not of the permanent wisdom of his country, but of its momentary mood. Poincaré was not a genius; his mind was small and taut and very trim; he worked out his own mathematical solution, forgetting that history is not a sum, and he imposed that formula upon his country and upon Europe. The disasters which his policy produced furnish an admirable illustration of how, in times of general uncertainty and disquiet, a man of ability who knows exactly what he desires can, temporarily at least, carry with him the majority of his own countrymen and to that extent determine events.

His main adversary during those decisive years was Lord Curzon, a man of outstanding intellect and petulance. He did not regard his controversy with Poincaré as a conflict of principle; he came to regard it as a personal combat. Both statesmen at the moment represented to some extent the will of their respective peoples; France, while Germany was still weak, desired to obtain guarantees for her future safety; Great Britain desired repose and the end of European bitterness. But whereas Poincaré interpreted security in narrow terms of physical and economic coercion, Curzon interpreted repose in terms of a successful triumph over Monsieur Poincaré. The need was there; the occasion was

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offered; but had Poincaré been less mathematical and Curzon either stronger on principles or less combative in action the trend of diplomatic history might well have assumed a wider and less torrential form.

My conclusions are threefold: first, that in periods of placidity and repose even the most outstanding political or military genius is ineffective; secondly, that in periods of change events are turned in a certain direction by the men of energy whom they throw up; and thirdly, that in phases of uneasiness and change even secondary people can, by the nature of their intelligence or the quirks of their temperament, give to events a shape and a development which they might not, in other hands, have assumed.

This leads us to ask what part conscious motive plays in the shaping of events. And my answer is, "Not so great a part as the historian supposes. All too often he ignores the chain of circumstance." The word "motive" is not very explanatory, nor does it help much to distinguish between personal or impersonal motives. Was Wilberforce's determination to abolish the slave trade or Woodrow Wilson's determination to impose the Covenant of the League personal or impersonal? A more useful differentiation in examining conscious motive is that between positive motive (namely, the consistent desire to achieve certain aims), and negative motive (namely, the consistent refusal to admit the violation of certain principles). I should say from my own experience that the former type of motive is the more rare, variable, opportunist and unascertainable.

It is necessary also to distinguish between conscious motive and that more generalized striving for success and power which we call ambition. It is no discredit to any public man, who has to fight hard in the political arena, to assume that his most constant motive is personal success: without this central propellant he might flinch from the unending energies and conflicts which the struggle entails. Moreover, an isolated motive (be it a dedication to prohibition, proportional representation or any other "cause") leads to extreme specialization, a narrowness of interest which is apt to place the aspiring politician in a somewhat lonely position. Modern political conditions impose upon most men a habit of empiricism; nor is it cynical to suggest that the conscious pursuit of definable aims is a particular rather than a general phenomenon. There are, of course, many instances when it can be shown that some statesman has devoted his whole life and energies to

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the achievement of a definite aim, subordinating to it all other possible considerations; Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cavour, Bismarck, Masaryk, Venizelos, Lenin, Kemal, have all displayed this consistency of motive. But my own experience is that in the conduct of human affairs the element of conscious human motive is, with obvious reservations, less prominent in day-to-day negotiation than many historians would have us believe. Their habit of deriving ascertained effects from assumed causes tempts them to discover motives in circumstances in which such motives did not consciously exist.

Do my doubts regarding the influence of conscious motives seem exaggerated? I ask those who feel so to consider how often false motives are attributed to public men. Few indeed who have played even a minor part in public affairs have not from time to time been startled to learn that their actions or attitudes are attributed to motives (generally discreditable) which in fact did not, even unconsciously, come within the area of their intention. Obviously any man who enters upon an international negotiation is provided with a "line of policy;" obviously also, it is his duty to defend the interests of his own country against the interests of other countries. Yet that seldom means that he pursues a definitely selfish policy or that he is blind to the fact that, on the whole, the common interest is of more value and importance than any separate interest. It is the extent to which he can see the special in the general which differentiates the statesman from the politician.

When I read the recorded proceedings of various international conferences — for example, of the varying and uncertain discussions which took place between Bonaparte and the allies at the Congress of Châtillon in 1814 — and when I compare them with my own experience of similar conferences, I am certain in my own mind that things did not really "happen" in the way we are told. It is not merely that most of the decisive exchanges and decisions were made in private conversation and that all the chroniclers are wise after the event. It is that history omits (as it is bound to do) all the cumulative gradations and fluctuations of purpose and desire created by such chance or incidental circumstances as exhaustion, personal sympathy or antipathy, gratitude, hospitality, illness, the impossibility of being continuously obstructive toward people one is meeting every day, preoccupation with politics and politicians at home, banquets and the lethargy they induce, female society and all the countless

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minor pains and pleasures which affect the human heart and mind. To take a small point only: historians do not give sufficient attention to the order in which subjects are arranged upon the agenda paper. It is a common experience in any conference that the subjects which come first on the agenda are discussed with greater acerbity or attention than those which, after an exhausting sitting, come toward the end. I do not say that these small considerations impede or largely affect conscious motives. But they have an immense influence upon unconscious motives, and the part which they play in any negotiation is bound to be powerful, and, in some instances which I have myself noted, almost determinant.

Yet although I suspect the historian of allowing himself, for purposes of clarity, to exaggerate, to misplace, to invent, or even to antedate, the element of *positive* motive, it is my belief that in international affairs the immense influence exercised by *negative* motive has not been sufficiently emphasized. A statesman is fortunate indeed if he is able to impose upon an international conference the complete acceptance of something ardently desired by his own country, as when Castlereagh, before going to Vienna, secured the acceptance by his allies of the independence of the Netherlands. Such positive achievements are rare; but the refusal to depart from a given national principle is a far more common device. It is easier to say "No" than to induce five other governments to say "Yes;" and it can be observed in practice that a firm refusal is generally more effective in a conference than a definite demand. To refuse to discuss a subject which might imply the violation of a national principle (such as the Monroe Doctrine or the Statute of Westminster), even if that principle be unilaterally established, is less complicated than to induce others to agree to the extension of a hitherto nonexistent national interest. That is why denials in terms of principle are often more operative in international affairs than affirmations of desire.

To say that if the statesman is unable to distinguish principle from detail he is no statesman is to beg the question. If genius be the capacity to differentiate between the extraordinary and the impossible, then statesmanship is certainly the capacity to tell the difference between principle and detail. But it is never quite so simple as all that. The unscrupulous or ingenious negotiator will always seek to achieve a principle in the shape of its own details. It was a principle with Hitler, for instance, to destroy the Treaty of Versailles; and he ingeniously encompassed

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that end by ignoring the principle and concentrating upon the successive items — the "artichoke" method of diplomacy. As he detached each leaf he asserted that it was assuredly his last. The other nations were never faced with any single act so menacing as to provoke retaliation; and at last, in one delicious gulp, Hitler was able to swallow the *fond d'artichaut* in the shape of the Rhineland.

The problem of principle and detail is further complicated by the desire for "improved relations," an inevitable and not at all discreditable tendency to which all diplomatists and statesmen are prone. Man is by nature a sociable animal and he finds an atmosphere of unabated discord and bickering uncongenial. He seeks to mitigate by concession in detail the animosities which he may rightly cherish in principle. If wisely handled, such concessions can be a useful lubricant to the over-heated machine of international intercourse; but the Stresa Conference, at which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was too polite to his host even to mention the matter of Abyssinia, is an example of how disastrous it can be to identify as a detail something which, however painful and inconvenient, is in fact a matter of basic principle. A statesman both wise and strong should be able, like Metternich, to allow himself wide latitude in shifting the frontiers between detail and principle; the misfortune is that so few statesmen are either strong or wise.

To the question whether or not the idealist is more potent than the realist in international affairs one can hardly say more than that it depends upon how accurately the idealist has estimated the support which he possesses. Men like Wilberforce or Canning had behind them the united will of the majority of their countrymen; and at that date Great Britain's influence was determinant in international affairs. Although the United States was determinant in international affairs in 1919, President Wilson did not have the united will of his countrymen behind him.

In dealing with problems of international relations the present tendency of the ordinary citizen is both to oversimplify and to undersimplify. On the one hand he allows himself to forget that foreign affairs are precisely that, and as such involve the interests, not of his own nation only, but of several nations. He is apt to think that his own country's Secretary of State should frame an ideal policy and hand it over to the experts for execution, much as the Secretary of the Treasury can frame a finance bill or the Secretary of Agriculture a scheme of farm relief. When

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other countries with other interests impede this policy he is too ready to believe that some "evil" (by which he means "different") influences are at work. Conversely, he is apt to under-simplify, in the sense that he is so appalled by the infinite complexity of the subject that he abandons all hope of understanding it. At its best, this means that he leaves the foreign policy of his country in the hands of those who may be supposed to know its true interests; but at the worst his lack of personal attention or feeling of responsibility creates unfortunate results. He either falls into a general mood of suspicion and displeasure (which tempts him to feel that his own country is virtuous and every other country selfish or debased); or he seeks to take short cuts, adopting patent medicines or falling back upon headline types of opinion such as "Federal Union," "Collective Security" or "America First."

My own experience is that public opinion, or more accurately public instinct, is correct in the end; but since in foreign affairs events move rapidly, whereas opinion in democratic countries moves slowly, an immense advantage of manœuvre and initiative is accorded to the totalitarian countries where public opinion can, at least in the initial stages, be ignored. The lag between the time when the expert reaches a reasoned conviction and the time when the ordinary citizen feels ready to adopt an attitude is not always compensated for by the fact that popular backing provides added force in the end. The lag can be reduced somewhat by education and information; but the difficulty must always remain that in dealing with external affairs statesmen cannot always utter unambiguous warnings without causing dangerous offense abroad. For this reason leaders in democratic countries should by all means in their power refrain from policies which are difficult to explain openly and in detail. The public understands principles whereas it does not understand manœuvres; and a foreign policy based upon ascertainable and avowable principles is more likely to command the ordinary citizen's consent than one based in any respect upon ingenuity or adventure. Sir Edward Grey was once asked by a young inquirer whether he found it difficult as Foreign Secretary to reconcile his private morality with his public functions. "Well, you see," he said, after a long pause, "I have discovered that to do the right thing is generally the right thing to do." Because I believe that, if for practical reasons only, democratic diplomacy is bound to become more simple, I also believe that it will become more unselfish.

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SURPLUS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Arthur Robert Burns

WHEN a business decides to close down a line of activity it transfers to other departments such assets as are usable and liquidates the remainder at the best price obtainable. But when the United States reduces its military establishment it cannot merely sell off its excess property for the highest possible price. Maintenance of employment at home and the requirements of a constructive foreign policy are far more important than the cash which may be realized. The prospect of immediate financial gain must be balanced against the more distant but very important effects which the sale will have on both domestic business and world trade.

Though it is impossible to say how large the surpluses will be at the end of the present war they are likely to be big enough to exert a damaging effect on postwar production if they are merely dumped on the world markets. When and how should they be sold? How, particularly, should they be sold abroad? And, more difficult still, what methods of payment should be arranged, in a world economy suffering from a shortage of dollars? Unquestionably there will be dire need for some of them in the foreign nations devastated by the war; and countries eager to expand their economies will undoubtedly want some also. At the same time, foreign businessmen fear the sudden sale of surplus goods for the same reasons that our own do. And some foreign governments will have surplus property of their own to get rid of.

It is logical to look to our experience after the last war for help in answering such questions, but the search is not very rewarding. Surplus property in 1919 was infinitesimal compared with the amount expected to be in existence when this war ends. Its value was perhaps only 2 or 3 percent as much; and it was less widely scattered. Furthermore, neither our methods of disposing of our surplus last time nor many of the economic policies of that period can now be regarded as models.

An Act of July 9, 1918, authorized the President, through the head of any executive department, to sell any surplus war supplies on such terms as that department head deemed expedient. On

Author's Note: The views expressed in this article are personal and should not be regarded as reflecting policies that may be adopted by the Government.

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February 11, 1919, the Secretary of War, by direction of the President, created the United States Liquidation Commission to dispose of all surplus army property and to settle war claims held by and against the United States. As a general rule, it was decided not to bring property abroad back to this country. There was great pressure for the speedy disposal of such property on the spot in order not to delay the return of the troops. And in the case of the Army's automotive equipment, for example, it was sold abroad in order to minimize the effect of the sale on the market for new vehicles in the United States. Nevertheless, property worth about $672,000,000 was brought back.

More than half of our surplus military property abroad was in France. Movable property, valued at its cost in the United States plus the cost of its transportation to France, was appraised at $697,298,000, which a 25 percent deduction to cover deterioration, etc., reduced to $522,974,000. Immovable property, such as barracks and railroad yards, was estimated to have an "Armistice value" of $39,256,000. From the total was deducted $135,281,000 covering certain categories of goods, *e.g.* equipment used for maintenance of troops or donated to the Red Cross, and animals sold at auction, leaving an appraised value of $426,949,000. After a further reduction these goods were transferred to the French Government in consideration of a ten-year 5 percent dollar note.

A further sale amounting to $7,341,000 was made to the French Government on credit. From the remaining American supplies in France and other parts of Europe, sales amounting to $195,386,000 were made on credit to the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Russia and Serbia. Some of these sales were made through relief societies in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. No credit sales were made to the British Government. Surplus goods were also transferred without payment to the American Relief Administration and goods valued at $10,000,000 to the American Red Cross. Further sales amounting to $227,537,000 were made for cash to individuals and non-government organizations in various countries. The aggregate contractual value of all sales of surplus property was therefore $822,923,000. This has been reported to be about 60 percent of cost.

Various claims against the United States for railroad and port dues, transportation of United States troops in Allied ships, etc., were set at $120,000,000; and there were claims by the United States for war material supplied to its Allies. The net balance on

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all these transactions, including the sale of surplus property, is estimated to have been $757,000,000 due to the United States. This sum is arrived at as follows:

Sales of Surplus Property	*Millions of Dollars*	
On credit to foreign governments		
Block sale to France	$400,000	
Other sales to France and other countries	195,386	$595,386
For cash to individuals and non-government organizations		227,537
		$822,923
Claims		
Against the U. S. Government	$120,000	
By the U. S. Government	55,000	$65,000
Net balance in favor of the U. S.		$757,923

Of this sum $595,386,000 was received in foreign government obligations running from three to ten years and carrying 5 percent interest.

The subsequent history of these obligations is tangled with that of other obligations of the debtor governments. Interest was paid on the French debt for surplus property until 1926, when the short-term obligations of many governments were funded into 25-year debts carrying a minimum interest of 4.5 percent. From 1926 to 1931 interest and principal were generally paid; but payments have been made by few since the 1931 moratorium.

II

With so much fighting yet to be done, the impossibility of making more than an extremely rough estimate of possible surpluses after this war is obvious. Major questions of postwar policy yet to be decided, such as the size of our postwar army and the quantity of strategic reserves we should keep, will also affect the final total. And some lend-lease goods may become surplus. When lend-lease ends, there will be supplies in course of production for lend-lease countries or on the way to them. The Lend-Lease Act permits these to be delivered in accordance with any international agreement made prior to the termination of the law; but if no such agreement has been made, they may become surplus. Whether materials already supplied on lend-lease and in stock in recipient countries or partly worn out will be returned for disposal on behalf of the United States also depends on major policy decisions which have not yet been made.

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But even though accurate estimates of the amount of government property likely to remain after this war are impossible, there have been guesses that there will be surplus material which originally cost between 60 and 100 billion dollars. Much of it will consist of combat equipment. Potential surplus civilian goods may amount to about 18 billion dollars; of this perhaps half may be abroad, though here again there is little real basis for an estimate.[1] Civilian materials will include food, drink, clothing, medical supplies, almost all kinds of housekeeping goods — cooking, shoe repairing, sewing and laundry equipment — machine tools, and communications and transportation equipment such as aircraft, railroad locomotives, freight cars, trucks and port installations. There will be significant surpluses of some raw materials. Much of the accelerated mineral production of the war years will not have been lost and will return to the markets as scrap, possibly in quantities sufficient to depress prices for a number of years. (A sharp fall in mineral prices would be serious domestically and internationally.) There will be surplus steel, aluminum, synthetic rubber and aircraft plants. We shall also have many installations abroad, although there will be fewer than might be supposed because many barracks and other facilities abroad have been supplied to our Army on reverse lend-lease.

Clearly the surpluses will be large enough to affect markedly the economies of some of the countries in which they are sold. If we were forced to choose between selling large quantities of surplus goods in the United States in a time of serious unemployment, or destroying them, it would in general be more economical to destroy them, although we may not have to make this choice. The selling of surplus goods is a deliberate process of reducing inventories, and if it is done when many people are out of work the sales aggravate the unemployment. It is natural and desirable to wish to make use of things already produced; and selling government surpluses at the "best" price might be expected to channel them where they are most useful, and also reduce the national debt. Thus the Baruch-Hancock report on "War and Post-War Adjustment Policy" points out that "the fact that surplus sales will lower the debt dramatizes an important point which some business groups are inclined to forget. The net result of an effective disposal program will aid *all* business; which is an important consideration to be balanced against the possible short term

[1] It must also be remembered that figures of wartime costs reflect abnormally high wages, large amounts of overtime and the use of much unskilled labor.

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effect of individual sales." [2] But the losses which might result in the shape of unemployed men and unused plant can, in a society organized like ours, exceed the benefits of a course aimed at the greatest possible reduction of the national debt.

The maintenance of employment is a task of the first magnitude. It cannot, of course, be achieved merely through careful control of the sale of surplus property; but the policies for such disposal must be coördinated with the larger task. It may seem that the United States, which had a prewar annual production of around 90 billion dollars and a wartime annual production of 190 billion dollars, ought to be able to absorb civilian goods originally costing 10 to 20 billion dollars. And it is true that some commodities produced for the Army — trucks, for example — are so much less satisfactory for peacetime purposes than goods manufactured expressly for commercial use that they will not compete sharply with new products. But other surplus goods will; and there may be enough of some kinds to supply the market for a considerable time. Government stocks of transport aircraft, in particular, may be two or three times the annual need. Stocks of aluminum, copper and other raw materials are likely to present similar problems. And there is an added danger that surpluses may come on the market and cut new production just when industry is going through reconversion and some unemployment is inevitable.

We might try to avoid these difficulties by suspending sales as soon as serious unemployment appears and resuming them when full employment has returned. To sell only during a period of shortage of commodities would give the government good prices, would bring immediate benefits to consumers and would exert a downward pressure on prices. Resuming sales when full employment reappears might prevent a rise in the price level like that which occurred in 1919–1920. On the other hand, the presence of large unsold stocks of goods in government warehouses would undermine the confidence of business in its future markets, and might discourage reconversion. An exact balance cannot be struck as to the advisability of putting surpluses "on ice;" but we can perhaps conclude that though the immediate sale of certain goods, such as machine tools, may be needed to facilitate reconversion, the sale of equipment should not exceed the maximum quantity that the market is able to absorb without interference with current production.

[2] "War and Post-War Adjustment Policy," by Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944, p. 64.

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III

One alternative to selling at home during periods of unemployment or to putting on ice is to sell abroad. Such sales may in some cases also affect the domestic economy by cutting into the market for new American goods. But disposal of surplus food and clothing, so terribly needed in countries freed from Axis rule, should interfere little with American production. This country's contribution to UNRRA can be made partly out of those surpluses, and in so far as the governments of liberated countries possess funds, their needs for relief should be met on the basis prescribed by the UNRRA agreements.

The sale abroad of commercial and industrial equipment involves more complex problems. Our refusal to sell would not necessarily maintain the foreign demand for new American machinery, since surplus or new goods from other exporting countries may also be on the market; and some countries may be able to buy nothing at all except surplus goods at reduced prices. There will be no lack of desire for American products; and the need for industrial equipment will be enormous — greater, perhaps, than the total of American surpluses and postwar output combined. The main difficulty will be the inability of foreign countries to pay for what they want — a problem to which we shall return below.

It is sometimes said that we should sell no industrial equipment such as machine tools or textile machinery to foreign countries, since they will thereby be enabled to make and possibly also to export goods formerly bought from the United States. But the growth of industrialization in other lands could be prevented only by prohibiting export of both new and surplus machinery and by somehow inducing all other industrial nations to refuse to export machines — an absurd idea. We cannot overlook the simple humanitarian obligation to help the people in war-torn lands overcome their destitution; but in any event the amount of damage that our sales of excess equipment could do to our export trade is often greatly exaggerated. We ought, in fact, to have little difficulty in disposing of large industrial surpluses abroad without harming our exports. Many American manufacturers of equipment will find that improvements which they are making in their products will open future export markets to them. These improvements will accelerate the obsolescence of much existing equipment; yet in undeveloped countries experience with earlier

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and simpler models is often a necessary step toward the purchase of more modern equipment.

Sales of surplus goods abroad should, indeed, benefit the future export trade of the United States. The sooner the people in the devastated areas can begin to produce, the sooner they will cease to be candidates for relief and become potential customers for imported goods in general. Sales of peculiarly American equipment — for example, trucks, agricultural implements and construction and road building machinery — in countries which have had none before would create a market for repair and maintenance materials and for additional equipment. And an increase in production abroad tends to create purchasing power and expanded opportunities for American goods and services.

The temptation to make the purchase of supplementary new equipment from the United States a condition of our sale of surplus property abroad should be resisted. This country will have a greater surplus to sell than any other, and attempts to use it as a lever to obtain new business would disturb world markets seriously and create much bad feeling.

It has been suggested that buyers in the United States should have first choice of efficient modern equipment from surpluses. The Baruch-Hancock report states: "American industry will want to purchase much of this modern efficient equipment to replace obsolete equipment so as to improve our national industrial efficiency upon which our high wages and living standards rest. *Before selling this equipment abroad these possibilities should be fully explored.*" The report also recommends that the government "develop the possibilities of *disposing of surpluses abroad*, balancing this with the need of improving the efficiency of our own productive plants and with other domestic needs." The proposal is of course reasonable, provided net prices on domestic sales are no lower than on export or foreign sales, and provided that we are aware of all the consequences of such a policy. Domestic sales of up-to-date machinery out of surpluses might hurt the American markets for new machinery. Furthermore, the American manufacturer buying a machine out of surplus might obtain a competitive advantage over rivals who had previously invested in such machinery at the full market price.

IV

Our examination of aspects of the sale of surplus goods abroad has so far been concerned mainly with the effect of various policies

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on our domestic welfare and on our own foreign trade. But of course the interests and policies of foreign countries are a large element in the problem; goods cannot be sold in other lands against the wishes of their governments. Their attitude toward the sale of our property will naturally be influenced markedly by whether they produce goods of the kind which we might export to them. The United Kingdom, for example, produces some of the industrial goods of which the United States will have surpluses. For instance, we shall possess most of the world supply of surplus transport aircraft after the war, and the British may wish to purchase some American planes in order to expand their commercial aviation quickly. But they do not want the world market to be filled for years to come entirely out of American surpluses. The present proposal is to make surplus American transport aircraft available to foreign and domestic buyers without discrimination, giving them the option to buy outright, to purchase on a terminable installment plan, or to lease. The alternative of leasing will enable British firms to begin commercial air transport as soon as planes are released from war work, without, however, closing the markets to later planes of British make.

We have established prices in this country for surplus general-purpose machine tools based on the original price and the length of time the tools have been in use; and we are considering returning surplus cutting tools to the original manufacturers for rehabilitation, storage and sale on behalf of the Government. The manufacturers would be required to sell these goods in quantities bearing a fixed relation to their sales of new tools. A somewhat similar procedure for dealing with surplus communications equipment is being studied. Should the British wish to adopt a policy of the same sort so as to maintain the market for their own new tools they will have to be sure that American surplus tools will not be sold in the United Kingdom at prices which would undercut their own. In other words, the sales of surplus American goods in countries producing similar equipment must be coordinated with the efforts of the governments of those countries to maintain full employment, just as, doubtless, we shall ask foreign governments to coördinate their sales of surpluses in the United States with our own domestic plans. If we ignore the intentions of the buyer when we sell our surpluses in this country, leaving him free to use them, resell them here or ship them abroad, we cannot make arrangements with other nations which have surpluses regarding exports from this country. It may be both

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possible and desirable, however, to make agreements with the governments of such countries regarding American surpluses already abroad.

Of course, many countries will need our surplus goods badly and will be little concerned with the effect of purchases on their own postwar production. Industrial plants and transportation facilities will have been terribly damaged throughout Europe and the Far East. The shortage of trucks will be almost world-wide for some time. Agricultural equipment and domestic equipment in urban areas and innumerable other types of goods will have to be replaced. In addition, many countries are determined to develop their resources and will be eager to obtain industrial equipment. Some of these manifold needs can be met out of American surplus goods.

The problem of our excess merchant shipping, which closely affects our postwar relations with our Allies, demands special mention. At the end of the war the United States Government will probably have 12 billion dollars invested in ships. Our Allies have pooled their shipping with ours during the war and have lost many of their ships through enemy action; yet in the pooling of common production resources most shipbuilding has been allotted to the United States. The total tonnage of world shipping is now a little more than what it was in 1939 (78,000,000 tons), but at the end of the war we shall own a much larger share of it — 50,000,000 tons as compared with 11,000,000 in 1939.

If we decide to hold in reserve the ships which we cannot use, we might nevertheless offer some of them to foreign countries on much the same basis that we propose to offer transport aircraft. In this way we would help them recover a reasonable share of their shipping business. Since ships built in wartime will not be able to compete with those built later, this procedure might be advantageous all around, since it would put postwar mercantile fleets on a more equal competitive basis, and might also reduce somewhat the probability of postwar building by other countries and save war-built American ships from idleness.

V

Perhaps the greatest single problem to be faced in selling surplus American property abroad will be how to obtain payment. Some supplies can be traded for foreign claims against us, and some might be traded for rights to naval and air bases, aircraft landing rights and property to house American government rep-

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resentatives abroad. Some countries which have not actively participated in the war will possess considerable dollar balances and for a time can buy for dollars. But some of the countries where our Armed Forces will leave property are so undeveloped (for example, in the Pacific) or so devastated by war (for example, Italy) that payment will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Even payment in local currency may be out of the question at first unless the countries concerned resort to inflation; and later, if local currency can be made available, its conversion into dollars may be impossible, since that can be accomplished only when a country exports more than it imports. It will be useless for the United States to grant credits, to be paid in dollars, to a country which is too poor to have any prospect of achieving an export balance. We might consider reëxporting the surpluses in those countries for sale elsewhere. But some material will cost more to transport than it is worth; and the withdrawal of goods from a country in sad need of them, or their destruction there, would certainly not endear us to other nations.

We shall not be able to forecast export balances with any certainty, and it may be desirable to sell for dollars, with clear and liberal provisions that payment may be postponed if the purchaser cannot acquire exchange. After a period of postponement, we might accept local currency, and if that accumulates, consider using the procedure adopted in regard to the Boxer indemnity.

Under the Boxer protocol of September 7, 1901, 13 Powers exacted a promise from China to pay an indemnity equivalent to about $330,000,000 over a period of 39 years, at 4 percent interest. In 1908 the United States remitted $11,961,000 of its share, directing that it be used to support Tsing Hua College and those of its students who came to the United States for further study. In 1917, when China declared war against the Central Powers, her obligations to Germany and Austria were cancelled, and all sums due to the Allied Powers (except the amount owed to Russia and the portion of the United States share which had been remitted) were suspended for five years. In 1922 and 1923 the French Government agreed that the French share should be used to pay off the Far Eastern creditors of one of its banks which had failed, and for public education. In 1923 Japan agreed to apply its share to education, art, sanitation and other work, to the aid of Chinese citizens living in Japanese territory, and to scientific research in Japan relating to China. In 1924 the United

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States remitted the balance of its share amounting to $6,137,000 and stated that this sum was to be applied, at the discretion of the President, to educational and cultural activities selected by a Sino-American Board of Trustees. In 1925 the United Kingdom followed suit, but the British stipulated in 1930 that all funds for the British share in the indemnity should be used to create an endowment for educational purposes — the funds to be invested in railway and other productive enterprises in China, all the materials for which were to be bought in the United Kingdom. The Belgian Government had made a somewhat similar arrangement in 1927.

If the local currencies which were paid for our surplus goods and which could not be converted into dollars were used for cultural and philanthropic purposes, on the Boxer precedent, we would not receive any money for our property but we would at least avoid disrupting international exchanges in fruitless efforts to obtain payment. And we would win wide good will.

Some devastated countries which cannot pay cash for our surpluses immediately can, however, achieve an export balance once they get their industry and transport going. Credit will be necessary if any considerable quantity of surpluses are to be sold in these countries, or in undeveloped countries. The ability of other countries in general to obtain dollars, apart from loans and sales of gold, will depend upon our willingness to import foreign goods and pay for foreign services. Our tariff is the principal obstacle to imports.

The disposal of our surplus property will be a complicating factor at a time when political and economic conditions already are difficult. But if we are clear about our national interests in two major fields — employment at home and foreign policy — the action we decide to take about our surpluses can be made to further our domestic and international policies. The most difficult problem will be to weigh short-term financial considerations against the long-term effects of our transactions on domestic business, on international political relationships and on world trade and monetary mechanisms.

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THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA

By Horace S. Sewell

CONSIDERING the size and importance of the Burma campaign, it has had very little public attention. Events in Burma have been overshadowed by the climax of the war against Germany and the great advances in the Pacific; and because of this the Allied forces in Burma, more than a quarter of a million strong, have not received their fair share of credit. These men have been engaged in the largest and most important ground fighting yet undertaken against the Japanese. They have been operating on a front 700 miles long, second in length only to that in eastern Europe, among the most inhospitable surroundings — malarial, disease-ridden swamps, impenetrable jungle and immense mountain ranges.

These operations are of great strategic importance. Burma is the back door to China, which Japan has tried to shut. Thanks to the courage of American and British pilots, flying from Assam over the most dangerous air route in the world, supplies have continued to reach China; and now, thanks to the Allied forces of the South East Asia Command, who have done their duty so well in Assam and Burma, a land route to China has been opened up.

The official announcement of the opening of the new road to China was made by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander in South East Asia, on January 24, 1945, in the following Order of the Day:

> The advance southwards of the American, British and Chinese forces formerly under the leadership of General Stilwell and now commanded by Lieutenant-General Sultan with Lieutenant-General Slim's Fourteenth Army, fresh from its victories at Imphal and Kohima on the right flank, has inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy and driven him from north Burma.
>
> Lieutenant-General Sultan's forces and a Chinese expeditionary force have now joined hands west of Wanting. From Ledo through Myitkyina and Bhamo the new road now sweeps south to join the old Burma Road and land communication to China is open.
>
> The first part of our mission therefore has been completed and it will not be long before Brigadier-General Pick's United States Engineers will have the road ready for traffic. This has been achieved through a truly inter-Allied, inter-service effort.
>
> The air supply route to China is assured. With the rapid development of airfields at Myitkyina, this route is carrying an ever-increasing volume of traffic. In addition, the Allied air forces, by their magnificent support of the army, contributed to the advance to Mandalay.
>
> The advance of the Fifteenth Corps under Lieutenant General Christison, assisted by the air and navy, on the Arakan coast materially contributed to the over-all difficulties of the Japanese positions in Burma.
>
> The fine fighting qualities and high morale of all the forces engaged in this great effort made victory certain. In the task still before us — the utter defeat of Japan — I am confident the same qualities will be shown by all and that final success will be ours.

The victories of Lieutenant-General William Slim's Fourteenth Army at Imphal and Kohima, and the advance of the Fifteenth Army Corps under Lieutenant-General Philip Christison in Arakan, to which Admiral Mount-

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

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batten refers in his Order of the Day, though only a part of the campaign, were main factors in the liberation of northern Burma. Unless the Japanese Army had been fully engaged in other directions, the American, British and Chinese forces under the leadership of General Stilwell would not have been able to move into Burma from the north.

To appreciate how the battles that were fought by the Fourteenth Army and the Fifteenth Army Corps set the pattern for the campaign, the situation of the opposing forces in the winter of 1943–1944 and the peculiarities of the country should be considered. Topography influenced the planning and conduct of the campaign in Burma to a greater extent than in any other theater of war. The Japanese, in their central position, had good road, rail and river communications. The Allies had to rely on the Assam railway for their main operations, and on the railhead of the Eastern Bengal railway 18 miles south of Chittagong for the operations in Arakan. Supplies for General Stilwell's forces also had to be sent by the Assam railway, which runs parallel to the front and too close behind it for safety. This strategical weakness in the Allied position during the battle in Assam, though never exploited by the Japanese, necessitated leaving some fighting troops along the railway in a defensive rôle.

Local and seasonal variations of climate and rainfall affected the planning and timing of operations. High mountains covered with thick jungle separate Burma from Assam and the Arakan shores of the Bay of Bengal. For five months of the year — May to September — the southwest monsoon blows in from the Indian Ocean across the Bay of Bengal, and during this period the rainfall is very heavy. In Arakan the annual rainfall varies from 100 to 240 inches according to locality; in many places in the mountains on the Assam-Burma border it is more than 100 inches. Most of this rain falls during the monsoon season. The Allies had one great advantage over the Japanese in Burma. They had air superiority, and the greatest possible use was made of it. All Allied plans were based on supplying large forces from the air and on the rapid transfer of reserve formations by air over long distances, whereas the Japanese were denied the use of this method of moving supplies and men.

The plans for the 1943–1944 Burma campaign approved at the Ottawa Conference, when Admiral Mountbatten's appointment to the South East Asia Command was announced, included amphibious operations. These, however, had to be cancelled, for the vessels and material intended for southeast Asia were wanted in Europe and were actually used at Anzio and in Normandy. New plans had to be framed on a less ambitious scale, and to conform with these the following tasks were laid down for the Fourteenth Army by General Sir George Giffard, who was then commanding the Eleventh Army Group, which comprised all Allied land forces of the South East Asia Command: (1) Hold the frontiers of Bengal and Assam. (2) Advance in north Burma to the line Mogaung-Myitkyina. (3) Advance in Arakan to the Buthidaung-Maungdaw road.

For these tasks General Slim had available the Fifteenth Army Corps in Arakan, the Fourth Corps in Assam, and General Stilwell's Chinese-American forces in the Ledo area. These Chinese-American troops had been placed under the operational command of the Fourteenth Army and were to remain so until they had occupied Kamaing, when it was planned that they would combine with the Chinese forces operating on the Salween River. General Stilwell's forces (five Chinese divisions, one American brigade and the British Fort Hertz

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detachment) would carry out the advance to the line Mogaung-Myitkyina. To enable these forces to achieve their objective the Japanese Army had to be occupied elsewhere, and some direct assistance in the way of cutting the lines of communication to the Japanese 18th Division at Myitkyina was necessary. For this purpose three operations were set on foot:

(1) The Fourth Army Corps, composed of three divisions, the 17th, 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions, was ordered to operate offensively from Assam to draw off and occupy the main Japanese forces. If necessary to achieve its object, the Fourth Corps offensive was to be carried on up to and beyond the Chindwin River and the Chin Hills.

(2) In Arakan, the Fifteenth Army Corps, composed of two divisions, the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions and two brigades of the 81st West African Division, was ordered to advance with the 5th and 7th Divisions direct on Maungdaw-Buthidaung, while the 81st Division protected the left flank of the Corps against a possible Japanese counterattack up the Kaladan River.

(3) The 3rd Indian Division, Wingate's Force, was to move into the Indaw area and operate from there to cut the main road and rail communications behind the 18th Japanese Division in the Myitkyina area.

The Japanese had increased the size of their army in Burma during the summer of 1943, and in November enemy forces were distributed approximately as follows: in Arakan, two divisions with corps troops and other formations; in the Mogaung-Myitkyina area in the north, one division; on the Salween near the Chinese frontier, one division; in the Chindwin area, three divisions with corps and army troops, and two to three divisions in reserve.

II

In December 1943, the Fifteenth Corps advanced in Arakan against the 55th Japanese Division, near the coast, and in the Kaladan valley against elements of the 54th and 55th Divisions. The 5th Indian Division fought its way down the Mayu Range, running north and south parallel with the coast, through which the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road is tunnelled. It also fought its way down the Naaf River Valley, which empties into the Bay of Bengal at Maungdaw, and secured the Nechadauk Pass, five miles north of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The 7th Indian Division moved through the Pass into the Kalapanzin valley, east of the range. The 5th Division remained on the west of the range, between it and the sea. Maungdaw was captured January 8, 1944, and by that time there were indications that the Japanese would counterattack before the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road could be reached.

Preparations were made for meeting the Japanese counterattack by arranging to have air supplies ready to be flown to any portion of the force that might be cut off. Orders were issued that formations or units that might be isolated would hold their ground. In addition, marine operations were started against the coast line behind the enemy to pin down his reserves. The 26th Indian Division from army reserve was warned to be ready to move up from Chittagong to support the Fifteenth Corps.

On February 3, the Japanese made their attack with about 8,000 men from the 55th Division, under the command of Colonel Tanahashi, an officer who had distinguished himself in the previous Arakan campaign. The first object of the attack was to reoccupy the Nechadauk Pass and so separate the 5th and 7th Divisions. Another detached force went further north to block the

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Bawli-Maungdaw road behind the 5th Division. Tanahashi accomplished both these objectives, and at the same time the main Japanese forces launched a frontal assault against the 7th Division to force it back on the Nechadauk Pass. Had this succeeded, the division would have been annihilated in the Pass, and the enemy would then have gone on to deal with the 5th Division in much the same way by forcing it back onto the road-block, south of Bawli. The Japanese then intended to march on Chittagong; and when British reserves had been drawn to that area, their main attack from the Chindwin against Assam was to start. However, the 7th Division stood firm and even took the offensive, and the 5th Division, holding its front with minimum forces, reopened communications with the 7th. During this action both divisions were supplied from the air.

The 26th Division moved up to Bawli ready to counterattack, if needed, and the 36th British Division from India replaced the 26th in army reserve. As a result of these movements, the attacking force was caught between the 5th and 7th Divisions in the south and the 26th and 36th Divisions in the north. After bitter fighting, much of which was with bomb and bayonet in the hills, the enemy force was completely defeated, broken up and dispersed into small parties trying to escape through the jungle. More than 5,000 dead were counted on the ground. The Fifteenth Corps at once passed to the offensive and took the tunnel area of the Mayu Range which was defended by the enemy to the last. The capture of Buthidaung followed and the task allotted to General Christison's Corps was completed.

Everyone took part in the fighting which went on for many days during the Japanese counterattack, in and around the area occupied by the 5th and 7th Divisions. Transport and supply personnel defended the rear organization with the same tenacity that British and Indian infantry held the "box" defenses in front. (Each Indian Infantry Division consists of three British and six Indian or Gurkha battalions. The personnel of the divisional artillery is largely British.) During this period, there were examples of deliberate, cold-blooded slaughter of wounded and non-combatants by the Japanese. A 7th Division field dressing station, containing more than 80 wounded, was overrun at night and occupied by the Japanese. Forty-eight hours later, a senior Japanese officer arrived and ordered the massacre of the doctors, medical orderlies and wounded. Six doctors were lined up and dispatched with a bullet through the ear, the orderlies were butchered, and Japanese soldiers went from stretcher to stretcher bayoneting the wounded.

III

In the north, General Stilwell's forces covering the construction of the Ledo road had crossed the mountains and reached the Hukawng valley early in January 1944. The American-trained 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions led the advance, their flanks covered by Brigadier-General Frank Merrill's Marauders. In their first action the Chinese divisions inflicted very heavy losses on the 18th Japanese Division, which fell back to a strong position astride the Hukawng valley near Kamaing. The Fort Hertz detachment which advanced on a parallel route further to the east was also opposed by elements of the 18th Division.

Early in March, the 3rd Indian Division (Wingate's Force) was moved into the Indaw area, 100 miles south of Kamaing, behind the 18th Japanese Division. One of Wingate's brigades had started its march to Indaw from Ledo and

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the rest of the division was flown in. Indaw was selected as the most suitable locality for a force to land and cut Japanese communications. Three landing places for gliders had been chosen: Piccadilly, Broadway and Chowringhee. Their suitability had been noted by General Wingate in 1943, during his first expedition behind the Japanese lines, and in March 1944 it was uncertain what state they were in. If Allied planes had visited the area enemy suspicions would have been aroused; one plane was sent to reconnoitre, however, just before the division was to be flown in, and found Piccadilly obstructed by large logs.

The whole of the advance glider force of Wingate's Division, towed by Dakotas, was then directed to Broadway. Fortunately that site was neither



blocked nor guarded by the Japanese, though the ground surface, which looked level in reconnaissance photographs, was found to be intersected with large trenches overgrown with elephant grass. Many gliders crashed and almost all were damaged or destroyed, but sufficient men and material were landed to guard and prepare a good landing place, and during the following days the rest of the division — less Brigadier-General Mike Calvert's brigade which was marching through enemy-held country from Ledo, 250 miles to the north — was landed in the Indaw area.

Wingate started operations at once; the railway and road to Mogaung and the road from Bhamo to Myitkyina were cut and kept cut for some time. The Japanese at first did not perceive how strong a force had been landed behind them and it was some time before they brought a portion of the 53rd Division

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to reinforce the lines-of-communication troops who had lost very heavily in their attempts to interfere with the 3rd Division.

In Assam the Fourth Army Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones, acting on General Slim's instructions, advanced in the Tiddim area and the Kabaw valley to occupy the main Japanese forces. But when it became obvious that the Japanese themselves, in spite of their defeat in Arakan and the presence of the 3rd Indian Division in the Indaw area, were preparing for a large-scale offensive against Assam, General Slim decided to withdraw the Fourth Corps toward Imphal and fight the decisive battle in that area. By retiring to Imphal he shortened his own communications and forced the Japanese to lengthen theirs, an important consideration with the approach of the monsoon. Plans were made for the 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions to cover Imphal on the east and south, and for the 17th Indian Division to withdraw from Tiddim to Imphal. The Kohima garrison was strengthened and the evacuation of non-combatants from Imphal commenced. The 5th Indian Division was moved back from Arakan into army reserve at Chittagong, and arrangements were made for the air transport and supply service, which later played such an important part in the defense of Imphal.

On March 16, the three leading divisions of General Mutaguchi's Fifteenth Army crossed the Chindwin River and sent columns forward on a broad front. They were very lightly equipped and marched silently and swiftly, hidden by the jungle. Their intention was to reach Imphal and Kohima before Allied reinforcements could arrive, and then to break into the Brahmaputra valley, cut the communications to General Stilwell's forces and overrun the airfields from which supplies were being flown to China. Success depended on the rapid occupation of Imphal, which Mutaguchi expected to capture before March 27. On the right of the attack the 31st Japanese Division reached the Kohima area. It was not expected that the enemy would be able to move so large a force through such country and the strength of the attack at Kohima was a surprise. The outnumbered garrison was forced back gradually toward the town and the situation was serious. In the center the 15th Japanese Division suffered very heavy casualties at Ukhrul, where the garrison held out until greatly reduced in numbers before drawing back toward Imphal. The Japanese intention in the center was to break through by Palel with guns and armor for the attack on Imphal, but the 20th Indian Division prevented any such movement by a series of counterattacks in the Tamu-Palel area, though the enemy did succeed in cutting the road between Imphal and Kohima, with columns moving through the jungle. Imphal thus was isolated except by air.

On the left of the attack, the 33rd Japanese Division, which had moved very fast, reached the Tiddim-Imphal road before the 17th Indian Division had been withdrawn to Imphal. The Japanese object was to annihilate the 17th Division while on the mountain road. The 23rd Indian Division had to be sent from its position in reserve at Imphal to meet the 17th and help it in its withdrawal. The 17th fought its way up to Imphal with great skill and courage and brought all its guns, transport and wounded with it, but the fighting on this side of Imphal had occupied nearly the whole strength of two divisions and there was no reserve left on the Imphal Plain.

The 5th Indian Division was flown up from Chittagong and two brigades were landed at Imphal, where they provided the needed reserve. One brigade reached Dimapur and, after fighting its way up the mountains, was able to get

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reinforcements through to the hard-pressed garrison at Kohima. Headquarters of the Thirty-Third Army Corps from India was moved to Dimapur to take over control of operations in the Dimapur-Kohima area under the direction of General Slim. Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford, commanding the Thirty-Third Corps, had with him the 2nd British Division from India.

From the start of the campaign, General Slim's strategical objective had been to draw off the Japanese while General Stilwell advanced; but he was also responsible for holding the frontier of Bengal and Assam, and when the Japanese attacked his first thoughts were for the line of communications by the Assam railway to General Stilwell's forces. The two generals met, and Stilwell offered one of his two best Chinese divisions to protect the railway, pointing out, however, that the withdrawal of this division from the Ledo road extension would compel him to abandon or postpone his operations in the Hukawng valley. This offer was refused by Slim who was reluctant to give up operations in the north at the moment when the whole of the Japanese Army was committed to battle. Slim took the responsibility of directing Stilwell to continue his advance to Myitkyina with all possible vigor. He guaranteed that the lines of communication would not be interrupted for more than ten days. Stilwell willingly accepted this and continued his advance with characteristic energy.

General Slim also decided that the 3rd Indian Division should continue to operate against the rear of the 18th Japanese Division in the north, and that it should come directly under General Stilwell's command as soon as it had advanced north of Hopin. Slim made this decision during the crisis of the battle in Assam, when the 3rd Division was in a good position to strike at the rear of the Fifteenth Japanese Army.

The battle round Imphal was fought out between the three divisions of the Fourth Corps reinforced by the two brigades of the 5th Division and the 15th and 33rd Japanese Divisions, reinforced by elements of two more Japanese and one Indian National Army Division. Kohima was relieved after bitter fighting during which the British 2nd Division and two brigades of the 7th Indian Division stormed the Kohima Hills and defeated and destroyed the 31st Japanese Division. This division attacked bravely but showed very little enterprise. It had made no attempt to send a detachment to cut the Assam railway when it was in a position to do so.

During the final stages of the Japanese attack on Imphal, General Mutaguchi ordered the reinforced 33rd Division to carry out the last desperate assault. "The fate of the Empire depends on the results of this battle," he said. "Imphal will be taken at all costs." The commander of the 33rd Division passed this on to his troops, adding: "You will take Imphal, but the division will be annihilated." With its accustomed fierceness this division delivered a series of fanatical attacks, all of which, after bloody fighting, were held and smashed by the 17th Division, reinforced by a brigade of the 20th Division.

There was no pause after the defeat of the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal; the pursuit was kept up through the worst of the monsoon rains. The 33rd Division was driven south, first by the 17th Division and then by the 5th Division, while the Lushai Brigade, supplied from the air, operated against the enemy's flanks and rear and inflicted heavy casualties. The remnants of the 31st and 15th Divisions were driven back across the Chindwin by the Thirty-Third Corps.

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IV

In north Burma, meanwhile, General Stilwell had planned a bold flank move to slip past the 18th Japanese Division with three columns, each composed of one American and two Chinese battalions, to seize the Myitkyina airfield. The operation was pushed with determination, the force marching by secret paths and appearing on the field suddenly, on May 17. Chinese reinforcements were flown in to occupy the town, and though they just failed to do so, the airfield was firmly held.

By June 1944, the Fourteenth Army had carried out the tasks assigned to it. In seven months — December 1943 to June 1944 — four Japanese divisions (the 15th, 31st, 33rd and 55th) and other troops amounting to more than a division in strength, were destroyed as effective fighting formations. Two more Japanese divisions had suffered considerably. A fifth Japanese division, the 18th, was destroyed by the combined operations of Stilwell's force and the Fourteenth Army. On the Fourteenth Army front 50,000 Japanese dead had been counted, not including enemy casualties on General Stilwell's front. Most of the guns, tanks and vehicles that the enemy brought into Assam were lost and 600 Japanese prisoners were taken. Battle casualties in the Fourteenth Army (not counting American and Chinese casualties) amounted to 40,000.

The success of the campaign was due to foresight and to good leadership in the field, particularly to the bold and confident leadership of Generals Slim and Stilwell. A great contributing factor was the magnificent support which the Commander-in-Chief in India gave to the Fourteenth Army, through the provision of men and material and in the control of movements in India. The Eastern Air Command destroyed the Japanese air forces and provided the transport and supply on which all the army's plans were based and without which success would have been impossible. The efficiency of the administrative, supply and health services made it possible for the troops to live and fight in one of the worst malarial countries of the world. Above all, the success of the Fourteenth Army was due to the courage and endurance of the troops engaged — British, American, Indian, Gurkha, Burman, African and Chinese.

The Japanese Army has been given no time to recover from its defeat. The pursuit of the broken divisions into the Chindwin valley and down the Irrawaddy has been followed by an Allied offensive along the whole front. On the right, amphibious forces working down the shores of the Bay of Bengal have by-passed and isolated enemy units in the Arakan mountains. In the center, the junction of the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy has been reached and Mandalay is threatened. On the left, General Sultan's forces, working in coöperation with the First Chinese Army, are heading toward the Mandalay-Lashio road.

The enemy continues to resist with his customary ferocity and there is no sign of a general withdrawal. As long as there is a Japanese Army in Burma its destruction must be the first consideration of Admiral Mountbatten's forces. Allied occupation of Rangoon is also desirable to make possible increasing aid to China by the use of the old Burma Road. It would, however, be pure speculation to consider how and when Burma will be liberated. Decisions on these matters must already have been made by the Allied leaders through their planning staffs, and by now the direction to be taken in the next move by Admiral Mountbatten's forces has probably been settled. It is certain that Admiral Mountbatten's veteran ground and air forces and his powerful East Indies Fleet will participate in the utter defeat of Japan.

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THE FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN PRESS

By Luigi Einaudi

ITALY lost her last remnants of liberty when the freedom of the press was abolished in January 1925 and all Italian newspapers became, despite their different titles, nothing but Official Gazettes or Master's Voices. A proper solution of the problem how to restore that lost freedom is essential to the restoration of truly democratic government in Italy.

Until Italy is completely liberated from the Germans and neo-Fascists, and so long as newsprint continues to be extremely scarce, some regulation of the number and size of newspapers is obviously unavoidable. The responsible occupying authorities limited the number of papers to one for each political party. This makeshift, however, cannot be prolonged if the aim is to revive truly free political life in Italy.

Italy has never had anything to compare with the weeklies of Anglo-Saxon countries, and past experience does not encourage us to rely on the weekly press for the political education of the people. Dailies will continue to be almost the only channel through which electors can be led to form a strong democratic government truly representative of the will of the people. Today nobody knows what this will is; probably, indeed, no such thing as a popular will exists. Hopes, fears, shibboleths, slogans, rumors sway the country. Without a truly free press, representing all shades of opinion, the general elections to be held eventually will be much more like a Napoleonic, Mussolinian or Hitlerian plebiscite than a reasoned selection of the best men to be put at the helm of the state.

II. THE PARTY PRESS: ITS MERITS AND LIMITATIONS

The new dailies — whether published legally in Naples or Rome, or illegally in Milan or Turin, and including the local papers in the smaller cities — are organs of the different political parties. In this respect the old newspapers like *Avanti!* which were suppressed in Italy during the Fascist régime may be classified as new also; for they are party organs too. To the extent that the mouthpieces of the parties — Liberal, Conservative, Christian-Democratic, Action, Socialist, Communist — openly declare their affiliations their standing is perfectly honorable. Indeed, they form a strong and necessary pillar of any proper political structure. It is all-important that people who for 21 years were kept in absolute darkness about the differences of political parties should be able to consider programs and hear contrasting views as to how best to achieve the country's economic, social and moral reconstruction.

In addition, there will, of course, be dailies which are organs of various economic and social organizations. Trade unions, for instance, will publish their daily newspapers. Well and good, provided they admit that they are published to represent the ideas and interests of such-and-such a group.

But the party papers and those devoted to representing special economic or social interests do not together form the press which is needed most urgently in Italy. The party press and the group press are not an independent press. They are the loyal and useful organs of their respective parties and groups, cogs in the party or group machinery. Not the editor is master, but the party caucus, the organization meeting. Only conformist opinions will have any

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chance of reaching the eye of the public. An outsider, the independent critic, the man in the street, will find it as difficult to catch the public eye as it is difficult for a back-bencher in the House of Commons to catch the eye of the Speaker. If all dailies are bound to be the organs of a political party or of a social or economic group, it will be necessary to organize a new party or a new trade union before undertaking to publish a new daily, thus increasing the fearful profusion and confusion of parties already existing in liberated Italy. Too many parties are perhaps an unavoidable reaction to the one-party Fascist system; but the reaction threatens to go so far as to make any strong government impossible.

There lurks a danger in the party press. It is highly improbable that party programs will establish general political and social aims corresponding to what the people at large would spontaneously desire. In countries such as Great Britain or the United States, where political discussion has never been interrupted, the attention of the public is focussed on specific problems. Full employment, education, housing policy, reclaiming of arid or waste lands, flood control and the development of waterways offer American examples. They are usually concrete problems, more or less capable of solution in practical terms. The political class in Britain or America is an established group; it changes slowly and its leaders are well known. New men emerge from time to time; but their appearance does not revolutionize what happens in the political arena.

In Italy things are very different. On July 25, 1943, the Fascist world disappeared at a stroke. New men emerged whose names were as unknown as those of the old guard who had survived in exile. The best of them have spent years in Fascist prisons or camps. Born and educated in a climate of revolt and conspiracy, they think in terms of revolutionary change, of the inevitability of great social upheavals. Many of the younger men are pure intellectuals, with no background of solid economic and social training. The so-called corporative theories which were taught during the Fascist régime were an ill-digested abracadabra of slogans, which changed rapidly according to the whim of the dictator. In their place, the generation 20 to 40 years of age is now eagerly absorbing other ill-digested propaganda, mostly abridgements of Marxism or Leninism.

In this climate, where old men, half forgotten, are reappearing, and where new young men are emerging and striving to form a new political class, radical solutions are apt to feature all party programs and their slogans in the daily press. Apart from how to liquidate the remnants of Fascism, the problems most discussed in Italy today are: republic or monarchy, the socialization of banks and great industries, distribution of the land, workers' councils in the factories, profit-sharing, the introduction of the Russian *kolhoz* system on the land, etc. Nobody knows if the Italian people want these or other things, because none of them is discussed on its merits. All are accepted, more or less, by the parties because they think that something big must be done to satisfy the masses, which are suffering the consequences of 20 years of Fascist rule and the present war. With parties which court the electoral favor of the masses, and a daily press whose editors will not dare to do battle against slogans apt to catch votes for their masters, who will undertake the urgent task of forming a reasoned public opinion? Only a daily press whose editors have a strong background of ideals of political and social freedom, but who at the same time are independent of parties.

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III. THE INDEPENDENT PRESS BEFORE FASCISM

Before 1922, and even until January 4, 1925, Italy had a great independent press. Its origin was very much like that of the great press in England, where the *Times* had at its start a Walter, the *Manchester Guardian* a Scott, the *Economist* a Wilson. A few cases may be mentioned. A strong journalist, Botero, created the *Gazzetta del Popolo* in 1848 in Turin, when that city was the moral capital of divided and Austrian-ruled Italy; and the newspaper remained the property of Signor Botero and of his associate and follower, Signor Cerri, and their descendants, until the advent of Fascism. In Turin, also, an even older daily with a small circulation, called until 1896 the *Gazzetta Piemontese*, was renamed the *Stampa* by a young man, then a lecturer at the University, Signor Frassati, who worked hard and gained for it second place among Italian newspapers: its circulation in time reached 500,000 copies. He remained the exclusive proprietor until 1925. First place surely was held by the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, created in 1876 by a great journalist, Signor Torelli Viollier, with the aid of a small group of devoted friends. At his death, the editor's chair was given to his former secretary, Signor Luigi Albertini, a young man who began his career as an economist with a book on the eight-hour day. Under his editorship, the *Corriere della Sera* reached a circulation of over a million copies.

These dailies, and many others, had the following characteristics:

(1) They were independent of financial or economic big interests. In some cases, like that of the *Corriere della Sera*, industrialists were among the proprietors; but the editor of that paper, first Signor Torelli Viollier and then Signor Albertini, was its sole manager, with unlimited liability and responsibility, and his associates had only control over the yearly balance-sheet. The *Gazzetta del Popolo* and the *Stampa* were exclusively family concerns.

(2) The editors were persuaded that honesty was the best rule and that the only road to financial prosperity was to rely exclusively on the daily nickel, the yearly subscriptions of regular readers, and advertisements. Once a newspaper accepted subventions from private interests it was doomed. Whereas the independent dailies achieved circulations of half a million or a million copies, those which were subsidized by financial or other interests sank to ten or twenty thousand copies and registered losses instead of profits for their proprietors. Advertisers had no influence whatever on the political or economic policies of the independent newspapers. It has often been alleged that almost all the big French newspapers sold their pages to various banking or economic interests and even to foreign governments: but no such reproach could be made to the great Italian press. Its moral standards were of the highest, and it made money, in some cases a great deal of money. Honesty did pay. The capitalized value of one of the above-mentioned newspapers, in which only $50 had originally been invested, was valued at one time at over $4,000,000.

(3) The newspapers were ruled by an autocrat called the editor. No party caucus or political friend had any power to influence his policy. A few editors, such as Signori Frassati, Albertini and Bergamini, after they had achieved supremacy in the journalistic world, were made senators, but they were not truly political men. The politicians in general hated them because there was no way of obtaining anything from them, their aim being the successful performance of a public duty. They had, indeed, political tendencies; but they remained above all critical. Their task was to report, as fully and as impartially as possi-

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ble, facts and opinions. They tried hard to guide and form the opinions of their readers. In a country where protectionism prevailed in the programs of practically all parties, the economic pages of the *Corriere della Sera* and of the *Stampa* were entrusted by the editors to two university professors who for 25 years, from 1900 to 1925, struggled to enlighten public opinion about the vagaries and effects of protectionism, bad money, monopolies and economic privileges.

The advent of Fascist totalitarianism marked the end of independent journalism in Italy. One by one, the old editors were obliged to surrender. Owing to a technical fault in the deed of association, Senator Albertini was obliged to withdraw from the editorship and his family from the proprietorship of the *Corriere della Sera*. Senators Frassati (*Stampa*) and Bergamini (*Giornale d'Italia*) were likewise obliged to sell their property rights respectively to the FIAT concern and to a Signor Armenise. The *Gazzetta del Popolo* passed from the Cerri family and its associates to the SIP (electricity) concern. If they had not sold their interests, the newspapers would have been suppressed by the Fascist Government. Thus, violence — a legal violence indeed, but violence all the same — expelled the old editors and proprietors in 1925 from the guidance of the Italian press.

IV. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE FUTURE

In the interval between 1925 and 1944 these glorious old newspapers were prostituted. They became mere propaganda tools in the hands of the Fascists. Therefore some say: "Their very name means shame. Suppression is the only way to make them expiate their sins."

Beware of too-logical reasoners. Their moralism cloaks a struggle among the political parties. Every party would be only too glad if it could become the master of the *Corriere della Sera* or the *Stampa;* but as it is afraid that some other party might be the winner in the race, it prefers that none should have them. This is the gist of the matter. This is the real reason why they want the old papers eliminated and only those dailies published which are party organs. Nor can the problem be solved by having the government, or some government-controlled committee, take over the management of the old papers.

Any such course means the suppression of critical independent opinion. The Socialist, Communist and Christian-Democratic Parties are mass parties, well organized. Their official newspapers, *Avanti!*, *Unita* and *Popolo*, will obviously have a following among the organized members of their respective parties. Intermediate, liberal opinions are to be found among the middle class, in the professions, both public and private, and also among independent agriculturists, artisans, small and medium landed and house proprietors. They were never organized in the past; and it is improbable they ever will be. These classes, which are the backbone of Italian society and control perhaps a majority of votes, cannot be reached by the party press. Cut them off from the great daily press, and they are practically cut off from political life.

The Italy of the future will be ruled by the men elected by the people at large. What is wanted is that all shades of opinion can be presented to the public so that the electors will make a reasoned choice. What is wanted is that independent public opinion should be placed again in the position of relying upon an independent press. This situation is not especially Italian; it is world-wide. Italy has a chance to give a sound solution to a general problem presented in many countries.

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The principles which should govern the renaissance of the independent press are the following:

(1) Present proprietors must be expelled, for two reasons. First, their position is morally indefensible. They ignominiously made themselves subservient voices of the dictator. Second, they are suspected of being voices of private interests. The *Stampa* (Turin) is now the property of the gigantic FIAT concern (automobiles and engineering); the *Gazzetta del Popolo* of the SIP (one of the biggest electricity trusts); the *Corriere della Sera* of the Crespi family (cotton); the *Giornale d'Italia* of a Signor Armenise who was recently indicted before the Court of Justice as a Fascist profiteer.

(2) The present proprietors must be duly indemnified. A judicial expert can estimate the present value of the expropriated concern. The buyers will have to pay the price. If the state has a claim on the proceeds because of taxes, general or special, such as taxes on Fascist profiteering, a special lien should be placed upon it.

(3) An option should be given the old proprietors who were expelled from their property in 1925, or to their heirs, or to a group headed by them, to repurchase, at the stated price, the concern which was formerly their property. In many cases, the option will be taken up. In a régime of freedom, the daily press, if well managed, is bound to be again, as of old, one of the most prosperous ventures of the country.

(4) Guarantees should be exacted to make sure that special private interests will not acquire predominance.

(5) The editor should be solely responsible for the political, economic, financial and general policy of the newspaper. If he is willing, he should also be entrusted with the management of the concern (as was the rule before 1925 for the *Corriere della Sera*, the *Stampa*, and probably others also). Once appointed, the editor should not be dismissed nor have his powers restricted without the consent of the body outlined below.

The present offers an unhoped-for occasion for adopting in Italy a method which I think was first initiated in Great Britain, when the proprietorships of the *Times* and of the *Economist* were transferred from the Walter and Wilson families to shareholders' companies. It was deemed necessary to guarantee that these world-famed institutions should not become the property of financial or other interests which might have policies running contrary to the public interest. A body of trustees was created — men enjoying universal respect — with the duty and right of consenting to the appointment of new editors and to any transfer of shares, thereby ensuring the future independence of the newspapers.

There would not be any difficulty in adopting some such device in Italy. Of course the system need not be enforced for the small fry. Only those newspapers which have reached a circulation of at least 100,000 copies and are not the official organs of a political party or of a trade union or other economic association need appoint a Board of Trustees. Once selected, the Board should be self-recruiting.

An editor who is bound to obey the directions of a party caucus is not a true editor. He is a servant of other men. He cannot create: he can only follow. His paper will never be great. Only the editor who is free to diffuse independent ideas can make and keep a newspaper great. Italy, and all Europe, needs great independent newspapers to lead men again into the ways of freedom.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

AN INTELLIGENT AMERICAN'S GUIDE TO THE PEACE. EDITED BY SUMNER WELLES. New York: Dryden, 1945, 370 p. $3.75.

Mr. Welles believes that the American people cannot fulfill their responsibilities in the society of nations unless they know the basic geographical, historical, economic and political facts of life in the rest of the world. With the assistance of a staff of competent experts, therefore, he has assembled this valuable compendium of information, covering not only the independent states but a number of the major dependent areas. The countries are taken up in alphabetical order and their affairs are discussed under four headings: the land and the people, the nation's economy, its history 1919–44, and its stake in the peace. The material is well organized, succinctly and clearly presented, and on the whole accurate. The compilers have also felt free to insert judgments on conditions, trends and men, and this lifts the volume above the level of a mere factual compendium of unarticulated data. In the introduction Mr. Welles takes occasion to restate the principles and program which guided him in his post as Under Secretary of State and more lately in his educational work in the press and over the radio.

STRATEGY OF PEACE. BY HENRY MERRITT WRISTON. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944, 159 p. $1.00.

This thought-provoking book by the President of Brown University is in three parts: the first deals with international relations in general, the second with the history of American foreign policy, and the third with the structure of the coming peace settlement. He is skeptical of "geopolitics" as a basis for American foreign policy because it does not allow sufficient flexibility for changes in the non-geographical factors of world politics. As for the peace settlement, he wants it to be embodied in brief instruments providing for gradual pacification rather than a bulky and detailed affair like the Versailles Treaty.

THE GENTLEMEN TALK OF PEACE. BY WILLIAM B. ZIFF. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 530 p. $3.00.

Mr. Ziff not only has an axe to grind, but he wields it with a strong arm. Much of what he says about the realities of international intercourse has been said before, if not as pungently. He is hard on various peace-planners, such as Streit and Culbertson, but nevertheless comes up with a blueprint of his own. This provides, not only for the dismantling of Germany, but for dividing up the world into five "Power Aggregates" — an enlarged Russia; a European union; an Oriental union; a Western union to include the Americas, the British Isles, Australia, New Zealand and sundry islands; and a mandated area in Central and Southern Africa. Readers will take this nostrum at their own risk!

FOREIGN POLICY BEGINS AT HOME. BY JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Harcourt, 1944, 308 p. $2.50.

In this timely book the author has happily joined together readability with understanding of the international issues of our day. The major portion of his work consists of a fast-moving explanation of how the world came to its present pass, with the core of the story always centering around American policy, or lack thereof.

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PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE. By Wilson Harris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 116 p. $1.25.

Into this little book, which forms part of Sir Ernest Barker's series on "Current Problems," the author has managed to compress a remarkable amount of common sense suggestions about the method and substance of the peace settlement in Europe.

THE SECOND CHANCE. Edited by John B. Whitton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 241 p. $2.50.

Essays by seven contributors on the fundamental ideals and ideas which they believe must be embodied in any peace that is to endure.

THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE WORLD. By Haridas T. Muzumdar. New York: Universal Publishing Co., 1944, 288 p. $2.50.

An Indian scholar's "Treatise on How to Win the Peace."

CONTINENTALISM: FOR ENDURING PEACE. By Allan Ramsey Wurtele. New Orleans: Pelican Publishing Co., 1944, 234 p. $2.00.

Since nationalism and its concomitant imperialism have been prime causes of war, and since a strong world government can for the present be only a dream, the best thing for humanity to do is organize itself into eight superstates of continental dimensions.

THE PEACE WE AMERICANS NEED. By Edmund Jacobson. Chicago: Kroch, 1944, 206 p. $1.00.

A medical man explores the unhappy state of the world and comes up with a number of pertinent, and not easily answered, questions.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE. Edited by George B. de Huszar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944, 261 p. $2.50.

Walgreen Lectures delivered early in 1944 by 11 members of the University of Chicago faculty.

POSTWAR PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS, EDUCATION, AND GOVERNMENT. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1944, 146 p. $1.50.

These papers were presented at a conference held at Vanderbilt University in March 1944 by a group of leaders in education, business and government. They deal with both domestic and international problems.

LE PROBLÈME DE CIVILISATION: LA NATION. By J.-T. Delos. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1944, 2v. $3.00.

A theoretical treatise, of which the first volume concerns the "Sociologie de la Nation" and the second "Le Nationalisme et l'Ordre de Droit." The author has served as professor of international law at Lille and Laval (Quebec) Universities.

PIONEERS IN WORLD ORDER: AN AMERICAN APPRAISAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Edited by Harriet Eager Davis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 272 p. $2.75.

The 16 essays in this symposium were contributed by Americans who, in one capacity or another, were associated with the work of the League of Nations.

COLONIES. By Eric A. Walker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 168 p. $1.25.

This little book contains a keen analysis of the relations between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States on the one hand and their overseas possessions on the other in the light of contemporary conditions, notably of warfare and communications.

BUREAUCRACY. By Ludwig von Mises. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, 125 p. $2.00.

The noted Austrian economist, author of "Omnipotent Government," presents a closely reasoned but not entirely convincing (except to those already convinced) case for unrestricted free enterprise and the profit system against the disease of state control and its handmaiden, bureaucracy.

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THE DEVICE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON CIVIL POLITY. By John Laird. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 173 p. $1.50.

This concise, intelligent review of some of the essentials of political philosophy should be comprehensible to the layman.

HOW TO TELL PROGRESS FROM REACTION. By Manya Gordon. New York: Dutton, 1944, 320 p. $3.50.

Through the medium of an imaginary Mr. Hopewell, Miss Gordon explores the age-old conflict between individual freedom and security, economic as well as political. The experience of the United States, Britain and Sweden with socialization and nationalization is compared with that of the Soviet Union — to the disadvantage of Communist collectivism.

L'HOMME CONTRE LES TYRANS. By Raymond Aron. New York: Maison Française, 1944, 400 p. $2.25.

These essays, which originally appeared as articles in *La France Libre*, concern such matters as tyranny, the weaknesses of democracy and imperialist war.

WAR THROUGH THE AGES. By Lynn Montross. New York: Harper, 1944, 941 p. $5.00.

This vast tome is a history of the "art" of war from ancient Greek days down to our own. There is not much interpretation of causes or of broader issues, but within its restricted field it is certainly a useful work of reference.

WAR AND ITS CAUSES. By Luther Lee Bernard. New York: Holt, 1944, 479 p. $4.25.

Much of this book sounds like the sort of intellectually and ethically unhinged stuff that passed for "objective scholarship" during the interwar years. Professor Bernard is a sociologist and his thesis that war is a "social institution" may account for part of his failure to produce a wholly rational and convincing explanation of its causes. The reader will also suspect that some of the trouble may lie in the author's prejudices, such as his Anglophobia.

WHAT MAKES A WAR END? By Lieutenant-Commander H. A. Calahan. New York: Vanguard, 1944, 260 p. $2.50.

The author reviews the circumstances surrounding the conclusions of nine major wars since the American Revolution. He finds no predictable pattern, but shows that the record demonstrates the necessity for enforcing peace, once it has been established, by constant vigilance through collective action.

WARFARE TODAY. Edited by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon and Others. London: Odhams, 1944, 256 p. 7/6.

This is an illustrated, popularly written but quite authoritative description of "how modern battles are planned and fought on land, at sea, and in the air." Major-General J. F. C. Fuller and Air Marshal Sir Patrick Playfair are co-editors.

AIR POWER AND THE EXPANDING COMMUNITY. By Major Oliver Stewart. London: Newnes, 1944, 232 p. 15/.

Major Stewart takes a very dark view of the future of mankind. The airplane, he believes, will tend to create fewer and larger states, which in turn will make use of the airplane to fight bigger and more terrible wars for world hegemony.

BOMBING VINDICATED. By J. M. Spaight. London: Bles, 1944, 159 p. 6/.

In this important addition to the literature on modern warfare a noted British aviation expert makes out an interesting case for the bomber as a savior of civilization.

LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR. By Sir Arnold Duncan McNair. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 436 p. $6.00.

This expanded edition of a scholarly work that first appeared in 1920 has been revised to take account of legal developments during the present war.

CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS. By

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NORMAN HILL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 248 p. $3.00.

This scholarly study, by a professor in the University of Nebraska, is particularly timely in view of the many current demands for changes in international frontiers.

BEYOND ALL FRONTS. By MAX JORDON. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1944, 386 p. $3.00.

The personal reactions of an American journalist and radio correspondent who witnessed Europe's descent into chaos. Mr. Jordan, a German Catholic, has been employed for some time by the National Broadcasting Company, first as European director, then as director of religious programs. His devotion to the Catholic Church startlingly colors many of his observations and conclusions.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1945. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper, 1945, 203 p. $2.75.

This indispensable source of reliable information about governments, programs and leaders of political parties, and the political affiliations of newspapers of all countries, continues its usual high standard in the 1945 edition. The sections dealing with the nations recently liberated have been entirely rewritten and contain much needed information which is not obtainable elsewhere. The material is brought up to date as of January 1, 1945.

General: Economic and Social

GOLD AND THE GOLD STANDARD. By EDWIN WALTER KEMMERER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944, 247 p. $2.50.

This is a history of the use of gold for monetary purposes and an appraisal of how the gold standard has worked in practice. The author concludes with a proposal for a reformed gold standard to be set up after the war.

WORLD COMMODITIES AND WORLD CURRENCY. By BENJAMIN GRAHAM. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944, 182 p. $2.00.

How can an expanding economy be provided which will be free from violent cyclical fluctuations? The author's answer in this clearly written book is an international currency based on reserves of staple commodities, including gold. The reader, whether or not he agrees, will profit by Mr. Graham's competent and stimulating analysis of world economics.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION. By GEORGE N. HALM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945, 355 p. $4.00.

This book provides a competent summary of the controversy in the United States and the United Kingdom over plans for monetary coöperation as they developed between the publication of the White and Keynes Plans and the initialing of the Bretton Woods Agreements. The author calls the International Monetary Fund "the only practicable multilateral solution of the world's monetary problems" and says a failure to back it up would "risk destruction of the last chance for a return to healthy multilateral trade."

THE HISTORY OF RUBBER REGULATION, 1934–1943. EDITED BY SIR ANDREW MCFADYEAN. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1944, 239 p. $3.25.

A compilation, by members of the International Rubber Regulation Committee and its staff, of useful information and opinion on the operation of rubber control schemes.

THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY: A STUDY IN GROUP ORGANIZATION. By ROY GLENDAY. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 320 p. $4.00.

A suggestive analysis of the problem of "equilibrium between the population as a whole and environment as a whole." A summary of the author's principal argument will be found in his introduction.

CLIMATE AND THE ENERGY OF NATIONS. By S. F. MARKHAM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 236 p. $3.50.

This is an interesting attempt to determine the effect of climatic factors on the "national energy" of various countries. The author may not always be convincing, but

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at least he has assembled a host of provocative observations. Three chapters concerning the United States have been added to the original English edition of 1942.

THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS. Edited by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 532 p. $4.00.

A score of experts in anthropology and peripheral fields contribute interesting essays covering a wide assortment of human problems.

PLENTY OF PEOPLE. By Warren S. Thompson. Lancaster (Pa.): Cattell Press, 1944, 246 p. $2.50.

A scientific review and interpretation of Europe's demographic problems since Napoleon, with an appraisal of coming population developments in the postwar era.

DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF SELECTED AREAS OF RAPID GROWTH. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944, 158 p. $1.00.

These seven papers, presented at the Twenty-second Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, deal with the population problems of Japan, India, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Near East and Egypt.

JEWS IN POST-WAR EUROPE. By Z. H. Wachsman. New York: Glanz, 1944, 111 p. $1.25.

After a brief survey of the problem of rehabilitating the Jews of Europe, the author examines the policies and pronouncements of ten governments-in-exile on this matter.

THE JEWISH REFUGEE. By Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944, 676 p. $5.00.

This is a carefully documented and statistical analysis of the problem. The major portion of the volume describes conditions of Jewish refugees in the principal countries to which they have gone. There is an extensive bibliography.

THE CHURCH AND THE LIBERAL SOCIETY. By Emmet John Hughes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 310 p. $3.00.

A Catholic review of philosophical trends during the modern era in which the author is a little hard on some of the forces of materialism which have made that era what it is.

THE POPE'S NEW ORDER. By Philip Hughes. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 331 p. $2.50.

"A systematic summary of the social encyclicals and addresses from Leo XIII to Pius XII," arranged under topical headings.

A WORLD TO RECONSTRUCT: PIUS XII ON PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION. By Guido Gonella. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1944, 335 p. $3.50.

This volume comprises a number of articles that first appeared in the Vatican organ, the *Osservatore Romano*, of which Gonella is the editor. Each article was approved by the Pope, and some were annotated by him.

Second World War

AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE. By Raphaël Lemkin. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1944, 674 p. $7.50.

Dr. Lemkin, a Polish scholar, has performed a signal service in compiling and analyzing the laws, ordinances and decrees by which the Nazis and their satellites have governed the subject peoples of Europe. About half of this thick volume consists of documents which the author has selected as illustrative of Nazi-Fascist theory and practice. The rest contains Dr. Lemkin's own scholarly analysis of what all this evidence means, not only to our comprehension of the essential lawlessness and utterly cynical inhumanity of Nazism, but of the terrible problems which even a defeated Nazism will leave as a *damnosa haereditas* to the post-Hitler world.

MEDITERRANEAN AIR POWER AND THE SECOND FRONT. By Air-Commodore A. W. F. Glenny. London: Conrad Press, 1944, 62 p. 4/6.

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The author retells the story of the part played by the Allied air forces in the Mediterranean campaigns in order to illustrate his theories about the importance of air power.

THEY FLY TO FIGHT. By Keith Ayling. New York: Appleton-Century, 1944, 191 p. $2.00.

A popular account of the operations of the airborne divisions in Europe.

THE DYESS STORY. By Lt. Col. Wm. E. Dyess. New York: Putnam, 1944, 182 p. $2.00.

This is the story of the death march from Bataan and of the author's final escape from the horrors of a Japanese prison camp.

THE ISLAND. By Captain Herbert L. Merillat. Boston: Houghton, 1944, 283 p. $3.00.

This is the history of the First Marine Division on Guadalcanal from August 7 to December 9, 1942. It is detailed and clear but lacks the sense of drama which some readers may feel was an inseparable part of the record.

HELLDIVER SQUADRON. By Robert Olds. New York: Dodd, 1944, 225 p. $3.00.

The exciting story of a bombing squadron operating from a carrier in Task Force 58 that has won fame in the Pacific.

BRAVE SHIPS OF WORLD WAR II. By Joseph Leeming. New York: Nelson, 1944, 238 p. $3.00.

An illustrated narrative of the principal naval engagements fought during the opening years of this war.

BY SEA AND BY LAND. By Lieutenant Earl Burton. New York: Whittlesey, 1944, 218 p. $2.75.

This is the story of American amphibious operations in the present war. It is rather personal and, because of military necessity, undoubtedly omits some of the most interesting episodes.

HALF PAST WHEN. By Hassoldt Davis. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1944, 283 p. $3.00.

A breezy, episodic, quite personal account of the author's adventures, with and for the Fighting French, in various parts of Africa and the Near East.

STILL TIME TO DIE. By Jack Belden. New York: Harper, 1944, 322 p. $3.00.

Vivid, intensely human impressions of the war in China, Malta, Tunisia and Sicily, by the author of "Retreat with Stilwell."

The United States

OUR JUNGLE DIPLOMACY. By William Franklin Sands and Joseph M. Lalley. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 250 p. $2.50.

Mr. Sands served for a number of years in the United States diplomatic service in Japan, Central America and Ecuador. He has some pertinent things to say about the mistakes of our foreign policy and the inadequacies of our diplomatic personnel.

FIRST FLEET. By Reg Ingraham. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1944, 309 p. $3.00.

A popular account of the part played by the United States Coast Guard in all our wars since the American Revolution.

THE HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1938. By Basil Rauch. New York: Creative Age Press, 1944, 368 p. $2.50.

The period covered in this summary of recent American political history is from 1932 to 1938. A second volume is to carry the story onward into the era when foreign policy took precedence over domestic issues.

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE. By Stuart Chase. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945, 142 p. $1.00.

This fourth volume in Mr. Chase's series "When the War Ends" analyzes the conflict

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in the United States between the interests of special groups and the welfare of the country as a whole.

MEET YOUR CONGRESS. By John T. Flynn. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 157 p. $2.00.

Mr. Flynn says his purpose is to defend Congress against charges of incompetence and worse, and to demonstrate its necessary rôle as a check on the Executive, particularly President Roosevelt, whom he thoroughly dislikes. Yet in so doing he defends some of those very practices which have most discredited Congress in the popular eye.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE: A STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper, 1944, 415 p. $4.00.

Unhappily, this book, first published over a decade ago, has not been properly revised to take account of recent developments and of the author's more mature reflection.

THE DIES COMMITTEE. By August Raymond Ogden. Las Vegas (N. M.): The Author, 1943, 295 p. $2.00.

A critical examination of the activities of the late, unlamented special House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities from 1938 to 1943.

WHAT AMERICA THINKS. By William A. Lydgate. New York: Crowell, 1944, 167 p. $2.50.

The editor of the American Institute of Public Opinion presents a panorama of the trends unearthed by Mr. Gallup in recent years in this country, especially on political and social questions. One of his interesting conclusions is that in general the American people have been ahead of their government in wanting a vigorous foreign policy.

WHAT THE NEGRO WANTS. Edited by Rayford W. Logan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 352 p. $3.50.

A collection of 14 essays by a wide variety of leaders in American Negro thought and action, in which the recurring theme is the search of their race for equality in opportunity as well as responsibility.

JIM CROW JOINS UP. By Ruth Danenhower Wilson. New York: Clark, 1944, 129 p. $2.50.

The hardly happy story of the treatment of American Negroes in our armed forces.

HERE COMES TOMORROW. By A. W. Zelomek. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1944, 131 p. $2.00.

Mr. Zelomek is president of the International Statistical Bureau, Inc., which supplies research services to business organizations. This may account for the very sanguine predictions he makes of a high level of general prosperity in the first postwar decade.

WHEN JOHNNY COMES MARCHING HOME. By Dixon Wecter. Boston: Houghton, 1944, 588 p. $3.00.

An authority on American history reviews the aftermaths of the Revolution, the Civil War and the First World War by way of suggesting the patterns of behavior, especially on the part of veterans, which we may expect after the present war.

THE ECONOMICS OF DEMOBILIZATION. By E. Jay Howenstine. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1944, 336 p. $3.75.

A review of American experience after World War I and the lessons which we can derive from it for the coming postwar period.

CIVIL AVIATION AND PEACE. By J. Parker Van Zandt. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1944, 157 p. $1.00.

This is Volume II in the series "America Faces the Air Age," which began with the author's "The Geography of World Air Transport," reviewed here in January 1945. In the present work Mr. Van Zandt gives an authoritative treatment of such matters as the control of civil aviation and the relation of general economic conditions to the volume of air traffic. There are valuable statistical tables in the appendix.

THE WILSON ERA: YEARS OF PEACE — 1910–1917. By Josephus Daniels.

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Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944, 615 p. $4.00.

This is the third volume in Mr. Daniels' autobiography, being a sequel to "Tar Heel Editor" (1939, 544 p., $3.50) and "Editor in Politics" (1940, 644 p., $3.50). In it, the former Secretary of the Navy adds his personal contribution to the history of the first Wilson Administration. Though his memoirs make few revelations, they fill in gaps here and there, notably in the development of the Navy, and fortify their author's place as a real statesman.

BERNARD BARUCH. By Carter Field. New York: Whittlesey, 1944, 314 p. $3.00.

A sympathetic, journalistic account of Mr. Baruch's career and an appreciation of his services to the American people.

GENERAL IKE: A BIOGRAPHY OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. By Alden Hatch. New York: Holt, 1944, 288 p. $2.50.

A somewhat sentimental biography of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Western Europe

THE SPEECHES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE. By General Charles André Joseph de Gaulle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 189 p. $1.75.

English translations of the General's addresses delivered between June 18, 1940, and December 28, 1942.

LA FRANCE N'A PAS PERDU LA GUERRE: DISCOURS ET MESSAGES. By Général de Gaulle. New York: Didier, 1944, 300 p. $2.50.

The texts of speeches and statements by the French leader made between June 1940 and June 1944.

L'AFFAIRE PÉTAIN — FAITS ET DOCUMENTS. By André Schwob. New York: Maison Française, 1944, 201 p. $2.00.

The documents in this volume were published in order to convict Pétain of the charge of having participated in the Fascist plot to kill the Third Republic.

PAGES DE JOURNAL 1939–1942. By André Gide. New York: Pantheon Books, 1944, 169 p. $2.00.

The most important part of these extracts from Gide's diary deal with his reaction to the invasion and collapse of France.

BELGIUM. Edited by John Eppstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 111 p. $1.00.

This is the first of a series of small volumes entitled "British Survey Handbooks" prepared by the British Society for International Understanding. Each book is in small format, is printed in small type, and in general represents a remarkable feat in condensing a great deal of historical, geographical, economic, social and political information within a small space. Emphasis is on developments in recent decades. In this volume on Belgium there are two chapters on the Nazi occupation, a brief note on Luxembourg, and a map folded in at the end.

PASSEPORTS POUR L'AU-DELÀ: RÉCIT DE L'UNDERGROUND BELGE. By Robert Goffin. New York: Maison Française, 1944, 375 p. $3.00.

A dramatic fictionalized story of the underground movement in Nazi-occupied Belgium.

QUEEN WILHELMINA: MOTHER OF THE NETHERLANDS. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1944, 120 p. 8/6.

A popular, illustrated account of modern Dutch affairs at home and in the colonies, centered around the personality and activities of the reigning Queen.

HAAKON VII: NORWAY'S FIGHTING KING. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1944, 107 p. 8/6.

This is a companion volume to the author's work on Queen Wilhelmina.

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BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 1933–1934. By Franz Neumann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 649 p. $4.00.

This telling criticism of the Nazi régime was first published in 1942. It is now reprinted with over one hundred pages of additional material, collected in the form of an appendix, with reference notes to the relevant passages in the original text.

GERMANY BETWEEN TWO WARS: A STUDY OF PROPAGANDA AND WAR-GUILT. By Lindley Fraser. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 184 p. $2.50.

Though the story as told here contains little that is new, the author has performed a useful service in retelling it and in pointing out how the Germans have already begun to carry on a propaganda campaign for evading responsibility for this war as a part of their preparations for World War III.

A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM. Volume Three, Part 2, GERMANY UNDER FASCISM 1933 TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Jürgen Kuczynski. London: Muller, 1944, 239 p. 9/6.

The volumes and parts of this ambitious work are not appearing in chronological order. In the present book the author gives a Leftist account and interpretation of the Nazis' labor policy during their first decade in power.

GERMANY — LAND OF SUBSTITUTES. By Olaf Nissen. London: Gifford, 1943, 176 p. 7/6.

The author has managed to lift the curtain part-way on the secrets of Germany's amazing new substances and processes begotten by her autarchic policies.

GERMANY'S STEPCHILDREN. By Solomon Liptzin. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1944, 298 p. $3.00.

A reliable review of the contributions made in various fields of cultural activity by the Jews of Germany during the last century and a half.

THE JUNKER IN THE PRUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION UNDER WILLIAM II 1888–1914. By Lysbeth Walker Muncy. Providence: Brown University Press, 1944, 256 p. $3.00.

This scholarly monograph on an important and interesting problem of modern German history is Volume IX in the "Brown University Studies."

L'ITALIA E L'ORDINE INTERNAZIONALE. By Luigi Sturzo. New York: Variety Bazaar and Italian Books, 1944, 230 p. $2.00.

Don Sturzo, founder of the Popular Party in pre-Fascist days, restates his faith in the future of the democratic Italy that will take a leading place in a democratic Europe. An English version of this work was published by Macdonald (London, 1944, 7/6).

Eastern Europe

PRÉLIMINAIRES DE LA GUERRE À L'EST. By Grégoire Gafenco. Fribourg: Egloff, 1944, 397 p. $3.00.

The author served as Foreign Minister of Rumania and as Rumanian Minister in Moscow. His book consists of two unequal parts: the first and longer contains a circumstantial account of Russo-German relations from the Moscow Pact of August 21, 1939 to the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941; the second and shorter part reviews Rumanian foreign policy, particularly during the present war. M. Gafenco moves with considerable assurance through his subject matter, but with what justification we shall see when more documents are available.

RUSSIA THEN AND ALWAYS. By Nina Verhovskoy and Fillmore Hyde. New York: Coward-McCann, 1944, 331 p. $3.00.

Though this interpretation of Russian history is a corrective against many current distortions, allowance will have to be made for its own exaggerations and prejudices.

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BEHOLD RUSSIA! By Nora Ware Myles. Dallas: Mathis, 1944, 258 p. $3.00.

In the subtitle this book is said to be "A vivid description of Modern Russia."

THE UKRAINE: A SUBMERGED NATION. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 91 p. $1.75.

In this slender volume, after very briefly reviewing the history of the Ukraine, Mr. Chamberlin proposes that, after the war, this vast region be given wide autonomy within a federalized and decentralized Soviet Union. One cannot but wonder whether Mr. Chamberlin really thinks this suggestion is within the realm of practical politics.

POLAND. Edited by Bernadotte E. Schmitt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945, 500 p. $5.00.

Some two dozen scholars and experts have contributed to this review of Polish progress which forms part of "The United Nations Series" edited by Professor Kerner.

STORY OF A SECRET STATE. By Jan Karski. Boston: Houghton, 1944, 391 p. $3.00.

Karski was a leader in the underground movement in Nazi-occupied Poland. His story of how that movement survived the horrors of Gestapo rule and of how the author suffered all sorts of tortures forms one of the more unforgettable books on this war.

RACIAL STATE: THE GERMAN NATIONALITIES POLICY IN THE PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA. By Gerhard Jacoby. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944, 355 p. $3.00.

A detailed description of the results of the Nazis' attempt to impose their racial doctrines in western Czechoslovakia.

BALKAN FEDERATION. By L. S. Stavrianos. Northampton: Smith College, Department of History, 1944, 338 p. $2.00.

A sound piece of scholarship on the history of "The Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times," by an assistant professor at Smith College.

BALKAN BACKGROUND. By Bernard Newman. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 354 p. $2.50.

A delightfully sensible and well-informed book by a highly literate Englishman who for many years spent his summers bicycling along the byways of eastern and southeastern Europe.

RUMANIA. By C. Kornos. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1944, 122 p. $1.00.

This is the second volume in the series of "British Survey Handbooks" which is described above (see John Eppstein's "Belgium").

The British Commonwealth of Nations

FULL EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY. By William H. Beveridge. New York: Norton, 1945, 429 p. $3.75.

In a sense this is a sequel to the famous Beveridge Report, though unlike the latter it is not an official document, being aimed rather at the intelligent citizenry of Britain. In it Sir William sets forth the manner in which enforced idleness can be abolished. His prescription includes considerable state intervention in the economic process.

REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY. By J. Donald Kingsley. Yellow Springs (Ohio): Antioch Press, 1944, 324 p. $3.50.

In this history and interpretation of the function of the Civil Service in the British governmental scheme of things, the author has departed from the usual politico-constitutional analysis and has emphasized social and class interests.

THE CHURCH LOOKS FORWARD. By William Temple. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 193 p. $2.00.

These addresses by the late Archbishop of Canterbury deal with social and political problems as well as with those more strictly spiritual.

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ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM FISHER. By Admiral Sir William James. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 159 p. $2.00.

The biography of one of Britain's outstanding naval leaders, who was in command of the Mediterranean Fleet during the "sanctions crisis" in 1935.

DIPLOMATS IN DUBLIN. By K. van Hoek. Dublin: Talbot, 1944, 118 p. 10/6.

Pen portraits of 16 diplomats representing the Vatican and 15 nations — Axis, United Nations and neutral countries — in Dublin.

MACKENZIE KING: A PORTRAIT SKETCH. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 62 p. $1.75.

Another biography from the prolific pen of Ludwig. A French edition has also been published by the Éditions de l'Arbre of Montreal (1944, 95 p.).

The Near East

AMERICA AND PALESTINE. Edited by Reuben Fink. New York: Herald Square Press, 1945, 538 p. $4.00.

This is a revised edition of a compendious collection of material purporting to illustrate the point of view of the United States Government and of the American people toward the Zionist program in Palestine.

TRANS-JORDAN: AN ECONOMIC SURVEY. By A. Konikoff. Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency, 1943, 142 p. 450 mils.

A useful handbook on a region for which we have very little up-to-date information.

Africa

WITHOUT BITTERNESS: WESTERN NATIONS IN POST-WAR AFRICA. By A. A. Nwafor Orizu. New York: Creative Age Press, 1944, 395 p. $3.00.

A young Nigerian, part of whose education was obtained at American universities, presents a very interesting picture of the ferment of ideas at work in West Africa. He demands Nigerian independence within the near future and hopes this and other aspirations of the colonial peoples of Africa can be attained without drenching that continent in the blood of both whites and blacks.

LABOR PROBLEMS OF AFRICA. By John A. Noon. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, 144 p. $1.50.

This is the sixth in the useful series of "African Handbooks" being prepared by the Committee on African Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.

RACE AND POLITICS IN KENYA. By Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham. London: Faber, 1944, 247 p. 12/6.

This volume consists of correspondence between Mrs. Huxley, exponent of the point of view of the white settlers in Kenya who demand self-government, and Miss Perham, who holds that the home government must continue to administer the colony through the Colonial Office until the natives are ready to take over their own rule.

The Far East

AMERICA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY. By T. A. Bisson. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 235 p. $3.00.

Mr. Bisson, an expert on Far Eastern affairs, here reviews our relations with the Orient since the 1890's, explains them in terms of contemporary needs and circumstances, and criticizes our policy soberly and without being captious or posing as an omniscient perfectionist. There is useful documentation in the appendices.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK CARRIES ON. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1944, 155 p. 7/6.

Another in the series of volumes in which the author reviews the recent history of

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some of the United Nations largely in terms of the activities of their leaders (see above for his works on Queen Wilhelmina and King Haakon).

CHINA TO ME: A PARTIAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Emily Hahn. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 429 p. $3.00.

An enterprising American — biographer of the Soong Sisters — skips lightly around in this description of a decade in China, including a not-too-unpleasant period in Hong Kong under Japanese occupation.

MODERN KOREA. By Andrew J. Grajdanzev. New York: Day, 1944, 350 p. $4.00.

A good book on Korea has long been high on the list of *desiderata* in the field of international relations. With the appearance of the present work this lacuna has been filled about as satisfactorily as is possible in view of the fact that the author had to depend largely on Japanese sources. Even so, he is able to document the oppression, economic as well as political, to which the Korean people have been subjected by Japanese rule. The book is published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

SO SORRY, NO PEACE. By Royal Arch Gunnison. New York: Viking, 1944, 272 p. $3.00.

A personal account of an American writer's nearly two years of internment in Japanese camps at Manila and Shanghai.

UNFOLDING DRAMA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Basil Mathews. New York: Friendship Press, 1944, 184 p. $1.00.

A report on religious affairs and missionary activities in Southeast Asia, the East Indies, the Philippines and the islands of the Southwest Pacific.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA. By Charles Robequain. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 400 p. $4.00.

The original edition of this valuable work appeared just on the eve of the war in 1939. The present translation contains a forty-page supplement reviewing developments during the years 1939–43. It is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Latin America

THE PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN ORGANIZATION. By M. Margaret Ball. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1944, 117 p. $2.00.

A concise, reliable description of the organization and operation of the various bodies which have been created, or proposed, among the republics of this hemisphere.

TO THE SOUTH. By Kurt Severin. New York: Duell, 1944, 244 p. $3.00.

Somewhat episodic first-hand impressions and recollections of many years of travelling about in the Latin American countries.

BELICE: PATRIMONIO DE GUATEMALA. By Gabriel Pasos. Granada (Nicaragua): Escuela Tipográfica Salesiana, 1944, 106 p.

A doctoral dissertation sustaining Guatemala's historical and legal claim to British Honduras.

EL PAÍS QUE SE BUSCA A SI MISMO. By Ruben Franklin Máyer. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1944, 492 p. 6 Pesos.

Not the least interesting thing about this book is the fact that it was published under the present political dispensation in the Argentine, for the author's point of view is professedly democratic and anti-totalitarian. He is opposed to the topheavy and corrupt bureaucracy of the federal government, to the urban oligarchy in Buenos Aires, to the absentee landowners of the latifundia, to foreign capital, and to all those forces which he believes are responsible for the decline of faith in democratic processes among the youth of Argentina. His own faith rests on the *gaucho* and his hope is in a thoroughgoing agrarian reform.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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Reports on recent developments in the foreign trade of the American Republics. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1945.

1. Venezuela. 83 p.

Proceedings of the conference of commissions of inter-American development, New York, May 9–18, 1944. Washington, Inter-American Development Commission, 1944. 206 p.

To Assist in the development of the Virgin Islands. Report from the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 5029, December 4, 1944. Washington, 1944. 1 p. (H. Rept. 1304.)

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Post-War disposition of merchant vessels. Hearings before the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 4486. May 25–June 15, 1944. Washington, 1944. 182 p. 25¢.

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